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Abstract 
 
ERICH ALAN WERNER: Rants, Reactions, and other Rhetorics: Genres of the 
YouTube Vlog 
 (Under the direction of Dr. Jordynn Jack and Dr. Daniel Anderson) 
 
Rants, Reactions, and other Rhetorics: Genres of the YouTube Vlog 
examines the YouTube vlog or “video blog” as a rhetorical mode of address and a 
portal to the public sphere. Vlogs are technically simple videos in which a person 
faces a camera and addresses a public viewership briefly, informally, and more or 
less intimately. This dissertation explores how and why these largely unrehearsed, 
unedited, and unorganized videos have nonetheless become one of the internet’s 
most magnetic and beloved forms. Through case studies of four vlogging genres 
(the confession video, the reaction video, the rant video, and the witness video), I 
identify four sources of vlogging’s rhetorical vitality and force: (1) their 
conversational mode of address, which invites ongoing dialogue with viewers; (2) 
their ability to relay emotion, especially emotion displayed bodily through facial, 
vocal, and gestural expression; (3) their ability to broadly spread information of 
public interest that is being overlooked or ignored by old media; and (4) their 
many and complex speeds, which afford both immediate public expression and 
indefinite public archiving. The conclusion explores relationships between 
vlogging genres and the preexisting genres they remediate. Just as webpages 
remediate print encyclopedias and newspapers, vlogs remediate earlier genres of 
speech and emotion display. However, by situating those genres within new 
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performative settings or “ceremonials,” remediation endows those genres with 
new meanings and movements, and opens up new possibilities for social action. 
Specifically, three affordances of vlogs differentiate them from speech genres they 
remediate: vlogging’s reach, replayability, and modularity. As the technology 
necessary to vlog becomes more and more inexpensive and ubiquitous, rhetors 
gain new and wide-reaching access to public spheres. Vlogging’s easy modularity 
makes them open to rapid movements, recontextualizations and the 
transformations—all of which may be wanted or unwanted, thrilling or chilling. 
Overall, this dissertation presents vlogging as a powerful rhetorical act as well as 
an act of extreme bravery. Within the ceremonial of online video sharing, 
vloggers make themselves vulnerable not only by exposing their private thoughts 
and emotions to public audiences, but also by exposing themselves to the 
complex and unpredictable rhetorical ecology of YouTube, by facing the 
possibilities of harsh criticism and profound connection, of indefinite stagnation 
and instant virality, of unexpected reach as well as unexpected reappropriation. 
  
 iv 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
Chapter 
1. Introduction: The Rhetoric of Vlogging........................................................1 
 Research Aims....................................................................................2 
 Defining the Vlog................................................................................5 
 Vlogging and New Media..................................................................10 
 Vlogging, Genre, and Emotion..........................................................17 
 Research Methodology.....................................................................20 
 Chapter Overviews............................................................................27 
2. The Confession Video: Vlogging as Monologue and Dialogue...................31 
 Vlogging as Monologue....................................................................37 
 Vlogging as Dialogue........................................................................44 
 Conclusion: Vlogging as Identification............................................57 
3. The Reaction Video: Vlogging and Emotion Display..................................66 
 Vlogging and Emotion......................................................................69 
 Reaction as a Genre..........................................................................88 
 Emotion as Intervention: Vlogging about Twilight.........................94 
4. The Witness Video: Vlogging and the Problem of Online 
Credibility...................................................................................................112 
 The Witness Video Genre................................................................115 
 Witness Videos and Media Convergence........................................116 
 v 
 Credibility and Vlogging.................................................................120 
 Distributed Credibility and the Witness Video..............................132 
 Limitations of the YouTube Interface for Assessing 
Credibility........................................................................................144 
5. The Rant Video: Vlogging’s Many Complex Speeds..................................153 
 Tracking Speeds Online..................................................................157 
 The Speeds of the Rant...................................................................167 
 Ranting against the Rant................................................................175 
 From Rant to Ruin: the Afterlife of Vlogging.................................182 
6. Conclusion: The Apology Video: How Vlogging Remediates 
Expression..................................................................................................187 
 Vlogging and Remediation.............................................................189 
 Vlogging’s Vital Expressivity..........................................................192 
 Implications for Composition Pedagogy........................................197 
WORKS CITED.....................................................................................................201 
  
 vi 
List of Tables 
5.1 A Taxonomy of Rhetorical Speeds...................................................................162 
5.2 Oral Rants vs. Rant Vlogs, a Comparison of Rhetorical Speeds....................169 
  
 vii 
List of Figures 
1.1 The vlog’s characteristic mode of address: casual, close-up, and uncut............8 
2.1 A vlogger shares his experiences as an African-American atheist...................32 
2.2 Another vlogger shares his experiences as an African-American atheist........39 
2.3 Another vlogger shares her experiences as an African-American atheist.......40 
2.4 Another vlogger shares her experiences as an African-American atheist.......51 
3.1 A vlogger shares her reaction to the trailer for the movie Twilight.................66 
3.2 A vlogger captures his (lack of) reaction to the Twilight trailer......................77 
3.3. Breaking Dawn reaction videos......................................................................97 
4.1 A witness video claiming that it was raining oil due to the Gulf spill.............123 
4.2 A YouTube user channel.................................................................................125 
4.3 Cleanup worker Jennifer Rexford’s first vlog.................................................134 
4.4 A BP-produced witness video.........................................................................141 
4.5 Illustration by Jessica Hagy of Indexed, poking fun at the  
crudity and incivility of YouTube comments. .....................................................145 
4.6 An anti-BP video featuring ad for a BP-sponsored video..............................148 
5.1 The infamous “Asians in the Library” vlog by former UCLA  
student Alexandra Wallace...................................................................................154 
 viii 
5.2 Video statement by UCLA Chancellor Gene Block, responding  
to Alexandra Wallace’s rant. ................................................................................179 
6.1 Politician Charlie Christ apologizes via vlog...................................................188 
 
  
 
Chapter 1 
The Rhetoric of Vlogging 
 Many media commentators have hailed vlogging as a revolutionary mode 
of address. Vlogs are brief video speeches, composed casually and shared online. 
Despite their unassuming tone, however, some have ranked vlogs among the 
most transformative of all new media forms. Media industry player Michael 
Rosenblum, for example, describes vlogging as a “liberat[ing]” medium, 
comparing the spread of vlogging to the history-altering spread of the Gutenberg 
printing press (qtd. in Betancourt). Striking a similar note, Wired journalist Clive 
Thompson suggests that vlogging will radically change communication, and 
maybe cognition too. As video digitizes and democratizes, Thompson claims, we 
are developing “a new language of video—forms that let us say different things 
and maybe even think in different ways.” (Thompson). Rumors of a vlogging 
revolution come not only from media journalists and insiders, but also from 
scholars. Stressing its psychological effects, anthropologist Michael Wesch 
suggests that vlogging has the power to “shock” composers “into new forms of 
self-awareness” (21). Stressing its social effects, communication scholar Michael 
Strangelove grants online video sharing and vlogging sweeping social and 
political powers, including the capacity to “redefine national identity, challenge 
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normative assumptions [ . . . ] subvert the agenda of corporate news, mediate 
historical traumas [ . . . ] and propagate counternarratives” (24).1  
Many believe that prophecies like these, testifying to vlogging’s 
transformative, democratizing potential, have already begun to be fulfilled. For 
proof, many point to the 2011 Arab Spring. Writing in Foreign Policy, David 
Kenner claims that while social media sites have played key roles in Egyptian and 
Syrian uprisings, it is vlogs that “provide the best window into what’s happening 
on the Arab street,” allowing protestors to intercommunicate, to sidestep media 
censorship, and in general to craft effective, efficient, and emotionally powerful 
messages. Vlogging, it seems, may be more than a revolutionary medium. 
According to commentators like these, it may be helping to spark actual social 
revolutions. Not all media observers, however, agree about vlogging’s 
revolutionary potential. There are many media observers who downplay or 
outright dismiss the role of vlogging and other social media in the Arab spring 
and other movements, arguing that while these indeed “played a major role in 
how the Arab Spring transpired,” there is no way to prove whether internet 
platforms actually caused these movements or effected their outcomes (Carvin). 
Regardless, the rhetoric of revolution that surrounds vlogging, along with online 
video sharing more generally, seems to warrant an investigation of vlogging’s 
rhetoric.  
Research Aims 
                                                
1 Throughout this dissertation, I use bracketed ellipses to indicate where I have 
omitted words from text or video sources. I reserve unbracketed ellipses for video 
sources only, to indicate moments in which speakers pause. 
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As a rhetorical study, rather than a historical or sociological one, this 
dissertation can neither definitively prove nor disprove claims about vlogging’s 
supposedly revolutionary social powers. Instead, this research adopts a more 
modest aim. Guided by rhetorical genre theory, it documents how YouTube vlogs, 
in their first few years of existence, have been cultivated and used by rhetors and 
their audiences. Specifically, the dissertation examines four of vlogging’s 
emergent genres: confession videos, reaction videos, witness videos, and rant 
videos. These genres are recurrent forms that vlog-makers and vlog-watchers 
have collectively created and curated, and therefore reveal a great deal about 
vlogging’s growing social currency. From the perspective of rhetorical genre 
theory, genres are far more than simple templates or blueprints for composing 
texts. Rather, genres are powerful instruments that allow rhetors to carry out 
established “social actions.” As theorists like Carolyn R. Miller and Charles 
Bazerman have illuminated, genres are customary ways of acting, of doing things 
with words. As Miller puts it, 
What we learn when we learn a genre is not just a pattern of 
forms. . . . We learn, more importantly, what ends we may have: 
that we may eulogize, apologize, recommend one person to another, 
instruct customers on behalf of a manufacturer, take on an official 
role, account for progress in achieving goals. [ . . . . ] As a recurrent, 
significant action, a genre embodies an aspect of cultural rationality. 
(“Genre” 165) 
Bazerman, reaffirming and riffing on Miller, writes, 
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Genres are not just forms. Genres are forms of life, ways of being. 
They are frames for social action. They are locations within which 
meaning is constructed. Genres shape the thoughts we form and the 
communications by which we interact. Genres are the familiar 
places we go to create intelligible communicative action with each 
other and the guideposts we use to explore the unfamiliar. (“The 
Life of Genre” 19) 
If we accept that genres represent recurrent social actions and perhaps even 
“forms of life,” then one fruitful way to study the social impact of vlogging is to 
examine its genres. By investigating a number of vlogging’s most popular genres, 
this study offers an (admittedly incomplete and exploratory) report on vlogging’s 
social applications, a sketch of what people currently use vlogs to say and do. 
Extrapolating from these genres, this dissertation identifies a number of 
rhetorical characteristics distinctive to vlogging as a mode of address. Behind all 
the claims about vlogging’s revolutionary social powers lies the assumption that 
vlogs somehow communicate differently than other modes of address, even other 
electronic modes. This dissertation tests this assumption about vlogging’s 
uniqueness by diagramming its idiosyncratic rhetorical workings. It takes a look 
under the hood, so to speak, in order to examine how vlogging works rhetorically, 
and how those workings differentiate vlogging from its rhetorical relatives and 
ancestors: modes of address like television, blogging, social media, and face-to-
face conversation.  
In the pages that follow, I suggest that the vlogging is rhetorically 
distinctive in how it connects its interlocutors, the videomakers and viewers 
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whom vlogging puts into conversation. Specifically, vlogging encourages extreme 
candidness and emotionality among strangers and promotes ongoing back-and-
forth conversation in much the same way that face-to-face conversation does. In 
many ways, vlogging is much like communicating verbally with a stranger or 
strangers (whether at a party, a pub, or anywhere else one might wander into 
intense but short-lived intimacies). I also suggest, however, that despite the sense 
of intimacy and cooperation that grows between videomakers and viewers, 
vlogging can nevertheless have highly unpredictable outcomes, as videos take on 
altered and unintended meanings and effects as they circulate among viewers, in 
extreme cases going “viral” for all the wrong reasons.  
Overall, the dissertation presents vlogging as a highly interactive and 
highly emotional mode of address that resembles and remediates specific genres 
of face-to-face conversation. However, because of its digital nature, vlogging 
departs considerably from face-to-face conversation, taking on new affordances 
that allow video messages to circulate in extreme, unpredictable, and 
transformative ways. My hope is that my study of vlogging’s distinctive rhetorical 
properties can help inform debates about its supposed revolutionary powers, but 
also contribute to scholarship on new media, on rhetorical genre theory, and on 
the rhetoric of emotion. Before I discuss what those contributions might be, 
however, I want to more sharply define my research object. 
Defining the Vlog 
Vlogs are perhaps the simplest, most elemental mode of video address. In 
a vlog, a person faces a camera (usually, an inexpensive webcam attached to their 
computer) and addresses a public viewership, briefly and informally. Wesch 
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describes vlogs as “videos of people sitting alone in front of their webcams and 
just talking to anybody and everybody who cares to click on their video” (21). 
Vlogs tend to be loose in their tone, loose in their organization, and loose in their 
orientation. As Wesch points out, vlogs usually “have no specific addressee. They 
are meant for anybody and everybody, or possibly nobody—not addressed to 
anyone in particular—or perhaps only vaguely addressed to ‘the YouTube 
community’” (21). 
This looseness, it seems, is part of what attracts videomakers and viewers 
alike to vlogging. The looseness of vlogging, Burgess and Green recognize, carries 
with it a vitality, a feeling of “liveness, immediacy, and conversation” (54). 
Though they are actually prerecorded, vlogs suggest liveness and immediacy by 
presenting themselves as spontaneous, unstaged, and unrehearsed. Vloggers tend 
to ramble and repeat themselves and wander off course. They rarely edit, 
preferring instead to leave in all their fumbles, mistakes, and pauses, whether for 
the sake of convenience or rawness or authenticity.  
As Patricia G. Lange has articulated, vlogs tend to possess a sense of 
intimacy and vulnerability (“Vulnerable”). Like webcam feeds (those continuous 
online video streams of baby pandas playing or Las Vegas wedding chapels 
bustling) vlogs seem to offer access to what would otherwise be hidden or private. 
Adding to the sense of intimacy, vlogs nearly always have intimate, domestic 
settings. Basements, bathrooms, living rooms, and bedrooms provide the (poorly 
lit and out-of-focus) backdrop for most vlogs. Unlike webcam feeds, however, 
vlogs are limited in duration and asynchronous in delivery, thereby allowing 
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vloggers to channel that sense of intimacy into more focused, purposeful, and 
replayable public messages. 
Vlogs also feel intimate because they echo face-to-face exchanges. As in a 
face-to-face conversation, the vlog brings the viewer visually close to the speaker, 
with his or her face and upper body filling the frame. Furthermore, the always-
present possibility of interacting with the vlogger, through comments, personal 
messages, response videos, and other forms of exchange built into online video 
sharing platforms, means that vlogging does not merely simulate one-on-one 
conversation, but actually remediates it, creating a new channel for interpersonal 
dialogue. 
The term vlog, both generally and for the purposes of this study, 
encompasses any and all online videos (serial, single, or otherwise) that involve a 
certain characteristic mode of address: one that is casual, close-up, and 
(seemingly) uncut (Figure 1.1). The term “vlog” was originally a sandwiching of  
“video” and “blog.” This portmanteau is accurate insofar as vlogs share the 
textual weblog’s informal tone, as well as its fundamental interactivity; vloggers 
like text-based bloggers tend to interact energetically with their audiences. The 
comparison between blogs and vlogs, however, only goes so far. Textual blogs are 
mostly serial, offering or promising a regular sequence of entries, while vlogs 
often appear singly or in clusters.2 While some of the vloggers discussed in this 
dissertation do vlog serially (for instance, the impassioned Twilight fan 
                                                
2 Granted, there are many vlogs that are serial, including popular vlog series by 
Nigahiga, a Japanese-American comedian; by geriatric1927, the self-proclaimed 
“Internet Granddad” who shares stories and reflects on his long, active life; by 
JennaMarbles, known for her blunt commentary on dating and other issues 
relevant to young people; and many others. 
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NuttyMadam3575 discussed in the third chapter), most (like the African-
American atheists discussed in the second chapter) have only uploaded one or 
two vlogs, rhetorical one-offs that respond to singular exigencies, without any 
intention of vlogging regularly. In short, while the term vlog seems to have 
originally designated a “video blog,” it seems more accurate to think of vlogs 
more expansively, as “videologues,” as speeches or addresses circulated via online 
video sharing platforms. 
Despite, or because of, their haphazard production and highly personal 
content, vlogs have become fantastically popular, particularly on today’s largest 
online video sharing site, YouTube, from which this dissertation draws its case 
studies. Back in 2007, when Jean Burgess and Joshua Green performed a 
Figure 1.1: The vlog’s characteristic mode of address: casual, close-up, and 
uncut. From Vlogbrothers. “How to Vlog: From the Vlogbrothers.” YouTube. 
20 May 2011. Web. 2 May 2012. 
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comprehensive analysis of the site’s most popular content (tracking what videos 
were most viewed, favorited, discussed, and responded to) they found that the 
most popular videos, according to these metrics, were not clips created by or 
cribbed from old media, as they originally expected. Rather, the most popular 
content on YouTube was generated by the site’s users. Perhaps surprisingly, most 
magnetic of all were these dashed-off, rambling video speeches, vlogs (42). 
Not even YouTube’s founders seemed to foresee the popularity of vlogging 
and other user-generated content. In early internal e-mails, YouTube’s founders 
expressed deep doubts about the value and currency of user-generated video, 
arguing that the site would thrive on clips borrowed from commercial media, and 
not on user-generated videos like vlogs. “If you remove the potential copyright 
infringements,” wrote one YouTube exec, “site traffic and virality will dropt [sic] 
to maybe 20% of what it is” (qtd. in Viacom). “Steal it!” wrote another exec 
bluntly, “[ . . . . ] We have to keep in mind that we need to attract traffic. How 
much traffic will we get from personal videos?” Burgess and Green provide a 
surprising answer to this executive’s sarcastic question. According to their sample, 
user-generated content comprises about two-thirds of the most “responded to” 
and “most discussed” videos on YouTube. In other words, while commercial 
content drew more overall views, user-generated content drew far more 
engagement and participation. Furthermore, among the most popular user-
generated content, it was vlogs that drew the most attention and interaction. 
“Vlog entries dominated the sample,” write Burgess and Green, “making up 
nearly 40 percent of the videos coded at Most Discussed and over a quarter of the 
videos coded at Most Responded” (53). Their study shows that vlogs, the mode of 
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address once dismissed as dead-end “personal videos,” are actually what brings 
many users to the site—and, equally important, vlogs are what bring users back, 
again and again. While they represent a fraction of the total videos uploaded to 
YouTube (about five percent by Wesch’s rough count) vlogs nevertheless are 
YouTube’s most magnetic form. “A thriving community has emerged around such 
videos,” Wesch observes, “one that some participate in and believe in with almost 
religious zeal” (21).  
My study does not claim to be exhaustive or authoritative, as a study of 
YouTube, or as a study of vlogging specifically. As anthropologist Patricia G. 
Lange observes, vlogs are staggeringly diverse in their content and character. 
While their basic (intimate, conversational) mode of address remains more or 
less stable, vlogs vary considerably in terms of content. Briefly cataloging the 
variety of vlogs, Lange explains that they “may be diary-based, artistic, 
journalistic, entertainment-based, or they may take any number of other forms” 
(“Vulnerable”). This dissertation more fully maps the scope and variety of 
vlogging by studying four of its most prominent genres: the confession video, the 
reaction video, the witness video, and the rant video. Each chapter pairs an 
analysis of one vlogging genre with a broader theoretical exploration of vlogging’s 
rhetorical affordances: specifically, its participatory architecture, its capture of 
emotion displays, its mechanisms for constructing and assessing credibility, and 
finally its speech and reach. 
Vlogging and New Media 
Despite their magnetism, vlogs have received scant attention from scholars 
of rhetoric and composition. In general, the field’s studies of online video sharing 
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tend to focus on digital videos that are overtly political, like those associated with 
presidential campaigns and debates (Dietel-McLaughlin, Dubisar and Palmeri, 
Jackson and Wallin). Other rhetorical studies have focused on redactional video 
content: the remixes, mash-ups, dubs, and other user-generated genres 
composed by creatively altering or combining old media materials (Dubisar and 
Palmeri, Schaffner, Skinnell, Stedman). Though vlogging has been largely 
overlooked in rhetorical scholarship, it is highly relevant to broader scholarly 
conversations on interactivity and speed in new media, as well as conversations 
about emotion and remediation. Because vlogging lies at the intersection of two 
relatively new and important developments in online rhetoric—namely, the rise 
of video and the rise of social media—vlogging therefore allows me to further 
explore these longstanding rhetorical concerns and extend the existing 
scholarship for new digital and rhetorical moment.  
Vlogging, Interactivity, and Participatory Culture 
 At first glance, vlogging appears to be a unilateral, even solipsistic mode of 
address. Some media commentators, for example, have accused vlogging of 
providing a public stage for empty self-expression, for egotistic rambling, 
blathering, ranting, vociferating, and the like. As this study demonstrates, 
however, vlogging is (or at least can be) a highly interactive mode of address, 
leading to constructive, ongoing dialogue among videomakers and viewers, and 
even potentially creating new social relations, both online and off. 
Scholars of new media have been studying interactivity for decades, 
examining its workings and theorizing about its rhetorical implications.  In her 
2001 book Cyberliteracy, Laura J. Gurak notes the importance of interactivity to 
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rhetoric online, observing that unlike television, radio, newspapers and other 
one-way modes of public address, online media tends to allow for meaningful 
(and instantaneous) exchange between authors and audiences. This interactivity 
alters the communication substantially; because rhetoric online grants audiences 
ready access to composers, Gurak observes, audiences become more than passive 
consumers of messages. Rather, they become active participants in the 
communication: “This ability to interact, combined with the encouragement we 
feel because of the speed and reach of the medium, encourages talking back” (44). 
More recently, scholars have recognized that much more is possible online than 
merely “talking back” to authors.  
Moving beyond Gurak’s primary genres of study (listervs and message 
boards) as well as the binary concepts of “author” and “audience,” subsequent 
scholarship has tracked the rise of “participatory culture,” a term coined by media 
scholar Henry Jenkins to describe the collaborative and redactional practices of 
composers who crib and poach material, who “sample” and “remix” both from 
commercial media and from one another. Alongside these redactional composing 
practices have emerged genuinely collaborative forms of composition, including 
encyclopedic wikis as well as digital art and music authored by mass collectives 
(Cope and Kalantzis, DeVoss and Webb, Fleckenstein, Lessig, Jenkins, Manovich, 
Welch). Although the video addresses at the center of vlogging often feature a 
single person speaking, the larger exchanges they inspire subsequently bring 
together a multitude of participants, all of whom contribute to the meaning and 
movement of the vlog. Because they configure participants in this idiosyncratic 
way, vlogs offer a fresh example of how a multitude of participants contribute to 
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the composition, contextualization, and circulation of online messages. 
Specifically, by contributing to comment threads, and by embedding and linking 
to videos in other online spaces, viewers participate actively in the rhetorical 
proceeding we call vlogging. 
Vlogs also reveal how online interactivity is structured, both 
technologically and culturally. While the interactivity of new media may invite 
audiences to “talk back” and even participate more directly in online 
communications, that interactivity is never free or unstructured. The interactivity 
of online platforms may alter, and sometimes radically transform, the terms on 
which individuals communicate. However, vlogging shows that online 
communications remain deeply structured, possessing their own formal 
protocols: constraints, decorums, and etiquettes. These protocols are determined 
not only by the technological affordances of a given online platform, but also by 
culture, that is, by the collective and cumulative activity of a platform’s users. 
Drawing on the genre theory of Anne Freadman (discussed in greater depth 
below), I use vlogging to illustrate that “We never leave a space of rituals for a 
space of non-rituals: we choose one ritual instead of another” (61). Specifically, 
the vlogging “ceremonial” prompts videomakers and viewers to interact in certain 
ways and not others, strategically positioning its interlocutors, and thereby 
encouraging and discouraging certain modes of interaction. More broadly, I 
suggest that each and every online mode of address, from podcasting to photo 
sharing, comes along with its own rituals or protocols, however invisible or 
taken-for-granted, rituals that profoundly structure participants’ interactions, 
and that therefore deserve and demand further study. Interactivity and 
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participation, in other words, are everywhere structured by rhetorical protocols—
rich, complex, and ever-evolving rituals that create and constrain how online 
rhetors interact with one another. 
Vlogging and Speed 
This study also extends and complicates understandings of the “speeds” of 
rhetoric online. For decades, the rapidity or quickness of new media has inspired 
composers, fueled media journalists and advertisers, and fascinated scholars. 
Gurak, for instance, declares that the speed of the internet “is certainly changing 
how we live and what we expect, and it may be changing our mental states as well” 
(Cyberliteracy 30). Likewise, in the stories told by popular mythmakers 
(advertisers, journalists, technology moguls, and the like), online communication 
is constantly accelerating. Like a sprinter or an experimental racecar, online 
communication supposedly sets new speed records every year, with every new 
platform and device transmitting information faster and faster. Ads for internet 
devices now stress speed in virtually every sentence, leaving copywriters 
seemingly desperate for imaginative synonyms for “fast.” Similar stories have 
been spun about the speed of vlogging. Back in December 2006, Time Magazine 
proclaimed “You” their Person of the Year, praising online video sharing, along 
with other Web 2.0 platforms, for granting nearly everyone speedy access to 
public spheres (Grossman). The magazine traced online video sharing’s power, in 
part, to its unprecedented speed and reach, presenting the video sharing site as “a 
place where ideas and images can spread instantly, cheaply, democratically and 
anarchically” (Poniewozik). With occasional exceptions, commonplaces like these 
portray the internet and vlogging as faster, farther-reaching versions of previous 
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communication technologies. This is a somewhat accurate, but simplistic portrait 
that scholars of new media have worked to extend and complicate. 
 The speed of rhetoric is indeed a complex matter (Jack, Hartley, Mutnick, 
Schryer), with the speed of online rhetoric being perhaps even more complex 
(Brown, Gurak, Eichhorn). As Gurak cautions, “Speed does not equal salvation; 
the speed of the Internet does not necessarily bring us closer to any sort of utopia” 
(30). Building off the work of Gurak and other scholars, this study of vlogging 
helps untangle speed from ease, simplicity, and utopianism, dissolving the 
associative webs woven by advertisers and other mythmakers. Going further, the 
study illustrates that the internet generally, and vlogging specifically, have many 
and sometimes conflicting speeds. Popular commonplaces will continue to 
celebrate the ever increasing “top speed” of hardware and software, but just as we 
rarely drive our cars or bicycles at top speed, this study demonstrates that we also 
rarely communicate at top speed. 
 As a number of scholars have noted, online video sharing has at least two 
main speeds, speeds that like an automobile’s forward and reverse can push 
composers in very different directions (Grainge, Davies).  In “forward,” online 
video sharing becomes a virtual agora, promoting immediate back-and-forth 
conversation, allowing users to compose and share and respond to vlogs more or 
less instantly (Jackson & Wallin, Lange, Juhasz). Meanwhile, in “reverse,” online 
video sharing become an interactive archive, allowing users to create enduring 
records or exhibits of video material that will remain open to public audiences 
indefinitely (Snickars & Vondreau, Skinnell). Unlike an automobile, however, 
online video sharing can and does operate in forward and reverse at once. This 
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paradox can be confirmed by the many unintended composers of “viral” videos, 
videos that circulate beyond or despite the videomaker’s intentions. 
Acknowledging the complexity and unpredictablility of rhetorical speeds online, I 
suggest that online composers, including would-be vloggers, painstakingly study 
and imitate the speeds of the genres they hope to compose in. Attending to 
speeds helps composers understand the risks and rewards inherent in particular 
online platforms and genres, assessing their many speeds of composition, 
publication, and circulation. This may lead composers to realize that on the 
internet our compositions may take on speeds we never anticipated, desired—or 
dared to hope for.  
Vlogging and Remediation 
This study of vlogging also contributes to scholarship on remediation, 
documenting how new media including vlogs both revolutionize and recycle 
existing communicative practices. In their book Remediation, Jay David Bolter 
and Richard Grusin challenge the assumption that new media evoke brand new 
rhetorical and aesthetic practices. As they use the term, remediation describes 
the process by which new media composers inevitably borrow from existing 
media in their forms and functions. Just as the webpage borrows from the book 
or notebook page, so too does the podcast borrow from the radio program, the 
vlog from the reality TV confessional, and so on.  
This study of vlogging reaffirms that remediation is real and ongoing. 
Vlogging too remediates preexisting rhetorical practices, including face-to-face 
conversation. This dissertation extends the scholarship on remediation by 
offering a more precise account of how remediation takes up and transforms 
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specific rhetorical genres. Specifically, vlogging shows that even when a genre’s 
features appear unchanged, remediation may alter their function and effect 
dramatically (Bolter and Grusin). I offer the term genre transfer to describe this 
process of transformative recontextualization. As my second chapter explains, 
vlogging may remediate existing genres, but it also resituates those genres within 
a changed environment or “ceremonial,” thereby both perpetuating and radically 
repurposing forms of expression (Freadman).  
This dissertation tracks the movement of genres, especially emotional or 
pathetic genres, as they transfer from face-to-face settings to the setting of the 
vlog, contemplating how this transfer both extends, and alters, these genres’ 
meanings and applications. For example, a face-to-face confession and a 
confession vlog may share many features, but remediation substantially alters the 
genre. Remediation, of course, alters who witnesses the confession. Equally 
important, however, remediation alters how the confession is witnessed, 
affording different possibilities for uptake, interpretation, and response. In short, 
remediated or parallel genres may perform very different social actions within 
different media and different ceremonials. 
Vlogging, Genre, and Emotion 
 Drawing on rhetorical genre theory throughout, this dissertation does 
more than catalogue the recurring formal features of the vlog,; it also offers an 
account of vlogging’s “social actions,” to borrow Carolyn Miller’s term. The pages 
that follow document the many actions that vloggers carry out through their 
videos: to persuade, to release emotions, to spread information, and perhaps 
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most importantly, to seek out identification—to reach out to likeminded but 
distant and unknown others.  
While my study is deeply informed by rhetorical genre theory, I do not 
identify the vlog itself as a genre. Like Miller and Dawn Shepherd, who in the 
course of their 2009 study came to realize that the blog was not a single genre, 
but rather a flexible “medium” accommodating a variety of genres, I too have 
realized that vlogging is simply too diverse to be considered a genre (Miller and 
Shepherd, “Questions”). However, vlogging is not exactly a medium, either, since 
that label seems more appropriately applied to online video sharing more 
generally. Vlogging, in my terminology, is a ceremonial, a mode of address that 
involves a certain medium and a certain, characteristic configuration of 
interlocutors, a configuration that comes along with its own norms, decorums, 
codes of conduct, and so on. Within this ceremonial, many different social actions 
and therefore many different genres are possible, including those discussed above. 
Again, to be clear, within the terminology of this study, online video sharing is a 
medium, vlogging a ceremonial, and within that ceremonial many genres have 
developed, genres including (but by no means limited to) the ones discussed in 
the following chapters: confession videos, reaction videos, witness videos, and 
rants videos.  
This dissertation extends rhetorical genre theory by offering an account of 
genre transfer, describing how remediated genres, despite formal parallels, take 
on differing social actions as they are adapted within new media and new 
ceremonials.  
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I also propose that the genre concept be expanded to include forms of 
communication beyond verbal speech and text. Specifically, I propose that 
emotion, alongside and intertwined with verbal speech and text, likewise adopts 
recurrent forms and carries recurrent social actions: emotion, in other words, is 
generic, genre-ic. To emphasize the rhetorical and generic nature of emotion, I 
propose the concept of pathetic genres.  
The pathetic genres concept builds on a growing body of theory and 
scholarship on emotion and affect within rhetorical studies and related fields. 
Emotion has been central to rhetorical theory at least since Aristotle articulated 
the concept of pathos or “emotional appeal.” Recent scholarship on emotion, 
however, suggests that emotion plays a much more fundamental role in 
communication than previously imagined. More than a means to some external 
end, emotion is present in all rhetoric, and indeed a rhetorical enterprise itself. 
While emotion is often imagined to be exclusively internal or personal, Edbauer 
Rice explains that it is also inescapably social. Operating alongside and 
sometimes through verbal language, emotion displays are signs that do more 
than reveal existing internal processes: emotion displays drive social interactions, 
prompting audiences to think, feel, act, orient themselves, and respond in certain 
ways. Like words, then, emotion displays do things, signaling inner states, but 
also prompting actions and influencing orientations. Daniel Gross affirms that 
emotions are rhetorical in The Secret History of Emotion. Classical thinkers like 
Aristotle got it right, according to Gross, when they represented emotions like 
anger, for example, as being fundamentally “psychosocial.” For Gross, following 
Aristotle and Homer, an emotion like anger “presumes a public stage rather than 
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private feelings” (3). Like all emotions, anger is an act of orientation, making or 
re-making or un-making social relations, including relations of power. In short, 
Gross’s rhetorical understanding of emotion resonates with Kenneth Burke’s 
suggestion that emotions “[require] an audience” (39). 
To be clear, in proposing the concept of pathetic genres, I do not mean to 
suggest that some genres are emotional, and others unemotional. Rather, I 
acknowledge that, in a sense, all genres are pathetic genres, that all genres 
involve emotional expression. Throughout this dissertation, then, the concept of 
“pathetic genres” is simply meant to emphasize that emotion is one of the 
materials out of which utterances and genres, as learned templates for coding and 
decoding those utterances, are composed. 
Research Methodology 
 My final contribution to rhetorical genre studies is methodological. 
Specifically, I develop and employ a method of genre research designed for the 
study of public and online genres. This method employs intertextual rhetorical 
analysis to track the movement and uptake of genres in online spheres. Because 
public and online genres are, in a sense, more slippery than genres embedded in 
particular professions, disciplines, and other social institutions, this intertextual 
method can more thoroughly and accurately track the social actions that public 
and online genres carry out, thereby extending the ethnomethodological 
traditions of rhetorical genre research, and updating these for a new rhetorical 
moment. 
In the 1984 article widely recognized as the foundation of rhetorical genre 
studies, Carolyn R. Miller acknowledged that conceptualizing genre pragmatically, 
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as “social action,” challenges scholars to adopt quasi-ethnographic methods, as 
they research not only the form, but also the function and effect, of genres (155). 
Studying genre as social action must be “ethnomethodological,” in Miller’s words, 
because while textual analysis can illuminate the “substance or form of discourse,” 
it cannot shed light on “the action [that discourse] is used to accomplish” (151). 
To study genre as social action, then, scholars must not only look at, but also look 
beyond, genres themselves, examining also the social matrix that produces that 
genre, and which that genre in turn helps to (re)produce.  
Earlier forms of genre research within both literary and rhetorical 
traditions have adopted a deductive method. Aristotle, for example, posited 
genres based on their orientation to time, the forensic oriented towards the past, 
the epideictic oriented towards the present, and the political oriented towards the 
future. According to Miller’s vision, however, genre scholarship should proceed 
not deductively, but rather inductively. In terms of method, studying genre as 
social action should lead researchers to identify and situate genres in the 
environments of their use. Above all else, this inductive, quasi-ethnographic 
method targets the context of genres. As Bawarshi and Reiff observe, 
“understanding contexts (and their performance) is both the starting point of 
[rhetorical] genre analysis and its goal” (59). While deductive or formal methods 
illustrate the internal substance or content of genres, Miller-inspired methods 
instead illustrate how genres are embedded in, and contribute to, larger social 
and cultural enterprises. Subsequent genre researchers including Bazerman, 
Catherine F. Schryer, and Carole Blair have taken up Miller’s 
ethnomethodological challenge, producing insights that help us understand not 
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only particular genres (from patent applications to insurance rejection letters to 
memorial quilts) but also, and more importantly, the traditions, rituals, 
institutions, and other social establishments that these genres participate in, that 
produce these genres, and which these genres help to reproduce.  
 This methodology, however, is not without its limitations. Notably, 
rhetorical genre research following Miller has tended to focus on communication 
that occurs within relatively discrete social establishments, bounded spheres like 
professions, academic disciplines, corporations, and so on. Bazerman’s body of 
genre scholarship, for instance, despite its impressive range, rarely strays outside 
these kinds of limited spheres or “activity systems,” where genres remain fairly 
stable and where their social roles remain relatively transparent and measurable. 
Public genres like the vlog, however, pose a serious methodological challenge to 
rhetorical genre research, since these genres are not produced by or for particular 
social establishments, and therefore carry social actions that may be far more 
complex, diffuse, and indeterminate. The social action of a middle school quiz, 
for example, may be fairly easy to identify, since the genre performs a particular 
function within a particular social institution. The social action of a YouTube rant 
video, however, or any other public utterance, for that matter, is 
methodologically speaking far more elusive. What is interesting and challenging 
about public genres is that they are pitched to individuals and groups explicitly 
outside of one’s everyday activity systems. (In fact, as Michael Warner might 
observe, this is precisely what makes these genres public, their being targeted 
towards strangers.) Schryer is able to produce an insightful genre study of “bad 
news” insurance letters through a combination of textual and ethnographic 
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methods, specifically by examining sample letters and interviewing those who 
produce and receive them. Schryer’s methods prove effective and manageable, 
however, only because these letters are produced within bounded spheres or 
activity systems. The social actions of public genres, which have far more 
indeterminate audiences and movements and effects, prove far more difficult to 
track.   
 The fluidness and indeterminacy of public genres is only compounded 
when they are also online genres, genres like the confession, reaction, witness, 
and rant vlogs that populate this study. As new media scholars including Barbara 
Warnick and Lev Manovich have observed, online texts are highly modular, 
capable of being readily taken apart, remixed, reframed, recontextualized, and 
redeployed for alternate purposes. Manovich notes that while modularity and 
remixability predate and extend beyond new media, online connectivity is 
making uptake easier and more widespread. He notes that “the Internet greatly 
increases the ease of locating and reusing material from other periods, artists, 
designers, and so on,” while increasingly powerful composing software is making 
“the technical operation of remixing very easy.” Because of these developments, 
Warnick argues that in online environments authors lack even the illusion of 
control over their texts’ meanings and movements, thereby fulfilling the vision of 
deconstructionist literary critics like Roland Barthes (37). For example, as my 
fifth chapter on the rant video genre illustrates, the social action intended by a 
vlogger, and the social action that subsequently attaches to his or her video, may 
radically differ and even conflict with one another. In this case study, through the 
alchemy of circulation, a racist tirade is actively reframed and recirculated by its 
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viewers, becoming instead a parody of racial ignorance. Methodologically 
speaking, because of its multiple and shifting meanings and application, neither a 
rhetorical analysis of this vlog, nor an interview with its creator, could fully 
illuminate its multiple and conflicting social action(s), nor could it explain how 
the video functions as a genre.  
 All this is to say that, in online environments, genres and their attendant 
social actions are fundamentally dispersed, challenging genre research to 
upgrade its (ethno)methodology. To study rhetoric that is modular and 
distributed, Warnick suggests that rhetorical research methods become more 
intertextual, giving less attention to authorial intention and formal matters and 
giving much greater attention to audience response and uptake (28-30).  
 Acknowledging the methodological challenges posed by public and online 
genres, this dissertation adopts intertextual rhetorical analysis as its primary 
method, closely examining not only individual vlogs but also their con-texts: the 
surrounding videos, comments, playlists, and other texts (online and off) with 
which vlogs interact. In other words, I track how they are taken up and 
(re)interpreted by other texts. Following these patterns of response and uptake, I 
am able to assemble a fuller account of vlogging’s genres and their multiple, 
distributed social actions. The fruits of this intertextual method are perhaps most 
evident in my chapter on rant videos. A rhetorical analysis of the vlog, or even an 
interview with this racially insensitive vlogger, would have suggested that the 
rant video’s primary social action was to spread negative and even hateful 
attitudes. However, tracking response and uptake reveals comment threads that 
mock the vlogger and blog entries that recontextualize the video as an exemplar 
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of ignorance and bigotry. Thereby, this account of vlogs offers a richer account of 
the text, the genre, and the social actions that play out through viewings and 
responses. 
 I believe that this intertextual rhetorical method is especially useful for 
studying genres online, where traces of response and uptake are, after all, easy to 
come by. I also believe, however, that recognizing genres as fundamentally 
intertextual and “intersubjective” phenomena (to borrow Miller’s phrase) can 
enrich an even wider range of genre research. Whether online or off, whether 
electronic, print, or spoken, the “genre” that applies to a given utterance is not 
determined finally or wholly by the author. Indeed, the genre of a given utterance 
is never fully determined at all, since the utterance can always be reclassified or 
relabeled, whether by its authors, its audiences, or by genre researchers. As 
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell recognizes, all utterances are inherently multigeneric, not 
only because their form is influenced by many traditions, but also because 
utterances can always be interpreted through different genre “frames”: 
any example of public discourse can be approached through many 
different frames so that a given work, such as Martin Luther King 
Jr.’s “Letter From Birmingham Jail,” can be treated as protest 
rhetoric, an apostolic epistle, an apologia, Southern rhetoric, 
religious rhetoric, and so on [ . . . ] Each frame is as apt as the 
extent to which it helps us understand the power of King’s letter 
and the sources of its invention; criticism is not a contest to 
discover the best niche. (259) 
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Campbell here focuses on critical interpretation, explaining how rhetorical critics 
approaching the same text with different genre frames may produce different 
interpretations and insights. Genres, however, are heuristic not only for critics, 
but for authors and audiences as well, who are constantly applying genre labels to 
utterances, as a natural and necessary literacy practice that informs 
understanding and uptake. Often, audiences even reject the genre labels offered 
to them. A dissatisfied moviegoer, for instance, might write a scathing online 
review that relabels an action film as a romantic comedy. A spouse might likewise 
relabel an apology as a patronizing insult. Genre, then, is not fixed by the author 
or even the critic, but rather emerges intertextually and intersubjectively. Within 
this dissertation, this is perhaps most obvious in chapter three, where viewers 
strategically (and mean-spiritedly) relabel a “reaction video” as a “seizure” and an 
“orgasm.” This sort of (re)labeling, which we might give the more formal name 
genre attribution, is readily apparent in participatory online platforms like those 
of online video sharing. However, as my examples above show, genre attributions 
and reattributions occur both online and off. An intertextual rhetorical method, 
like the one that this dissertation experiments with, may help researchers better 
understand genre as a literacy practice, as an essential part of how we compose 
and read (and research) utterances.  
 In short, vlogging reaffirms that genres participate in broader ceremonials, 
rhetorical proceedings that structure the roles that interlocutors adopt and 
thereby shape possibilities for participation, uptake, and response. Vlogging 
further reveals that parallel or remediated genres take on different social actions 
as they are transplanted from ceremonial to ceremonial, a transformative process 
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we might call genre transfer. Vlogging also shows that emotions, like speech and 
written text, are composed and read generically. Therefore, we can identify and 
study pathetic genres or genres of emotion display, in much the same way that 
we identify other genres. Finally, situating utterances (including emotion 
displays) within broader ceremonials reveals that “genre” is fluid and socially 
constructed. During uptake, utterances can be identified with, and interpreted 
using, any number of genre labels. An intertextual method allows me to account 
for these multiple and conflicting genre attributions as I track the meanings and 
movements of individual vlogs. 
Chapter Overviews 
My second chapter uses the “confession video” genre to explore vlogging’s 
interrelationships with the rhetorical forms (comment threads, response videos, 
etc.) that surround and support it. This chapter demonstrates that while vlogging 
may seem emptily expressive or monologic, most vloggers are actually in intense 
and ongoing dialogue with their viewer/interlocutors. Through a case study of 
emotional confession videos uploaded by African-American atheists, young 
skeptics who feel alienated by their deeply religious families and communities, 
the chapter reveals that vlogging allows rhetors to connect with distant but 
likeminded others, and to engage in intense, frank, and often constructive 
dialogue with their viewers. However, despite the intensity of vlogging exchanges, 
the connections made, and the dialogue inspired, remain relatively “loose” or 
without constraint, allowing interlocutors to engage one another without 
incurring mutual responsibility, and likewise to ignore or dismiss those they 
disagree with. 
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My third chapter uses the reaction video genre to emphasize the 
importance of emotion to vlogging, and specifically the importance of bodily 
emotion displays, including facial, vocal, and gestural expression. To theorize 
how emotion displays communicate and persuade, I bring together insights into 
the emotions from rhetorical theorists including Aristotle, M.M. Bakhtin, Burke, 
Gross, and Edbauer Rice. I test these theoretical insights through a case study of 
vlogs uploaded by Twilight fans. In 2008, readers of the young adult novel 
Twilight: Breaking Dawn uploaded a flurry of reaction videos to YouTube. This 
vlogging genre allowed discontented fans to circulate public messages about the 
novel through intense emotion displays, messages that reached hundreds and 
even thousands of viewers, including the author of Twilight herself, Stephenie 
Meyer. However, the “reaction video” frame also allowed viewers to dismiss those 
emotions as impulsive, potentially undermining their effectiveness. 
My fourth chapter uses the witness video genre to explore how viewers 
assess the credibility of vlogs. The chapter offers a case study of witness vlogs 
shared during the 2011 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. During this public controversy, 
both citizens affected by the spill and the oil company responsible for it uploaded 
testimony videos to YouTube. These videos offered conflicting information, 
challenging viewers to critically evaluate their authenticity and authority. To 
analyze how viewers assess the credibility of vlogs, I review the comment threads 
on two witness videos that offer competing claims about the spill. I conclude that, 
through their public comments, viewers not only reveal their private assessments, 
but also participate in the collaborative construction of a vlog’s credibility. By 
publishing their support or skepticism, by vowing to share or squash the video, by 
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performing close analysis of the video to test it claims, and by contributing 
context in the form of personal experience or factual information, viewers help 
create the “distributed credibility” of vlogs.  
My fifth chapter uses the rant video genre to chart vlogging’s rhetorical 
speeds. While the speediness or rapidity of vlogging (and other internet 
communications) has been widely discussed, this chapter complicates 
understandings of vlogging’s speeds, charting its complexities, contradictions, 
and unpredictabilities. To replace simplistic speed-rubrics, I offer a more detailed 
and elaborate taxonomy of rhetorical speeds, advising would-be composers to 
consider vlogging’s many complex speeds, from composition (tempo, pacing, 
duration), to publication (timing), to circulation (velocity and continuance). To 
illustrate the value of these concepts, I examine the rant vlog “Asians in the 
Library” and its global spread, suggesting that while this racially-insensitive 
vlogger seemed highly attuned to the genre’s composing speeds, she recklessly 
ignored its potentially unpredictable speeds of circulation, leading to her own 
viral ruin.  
 Together, these four genre studies shed light on vlogging’s rhetorical 
workings and help to explain vlogging’s popularity, as well as its surprising and 
even deceptive rhetorical power. While they may ramble and wander, flicker and 
pixelate, even the most ineloquent vlogs carry a sense of immediacy and intimacy 
that can be difficult to resist. As such, I hope that, in addition to offering broad 
insights into remediation, interactivity, speed, and emotion, this dissertation will 
help readers better understand what makes vlogging such a magnetic—and, in 
 30 
some senses, revolutionary—mode of public address, despite (or because of) its 
fumbles and idiosyncrasies.
  
 
Chapter 2 
The Confession Video: Vlogging as Monologue and Dialogue 
What’s up, YouTube? This is your boy cpiercej making my first 
YouTube video about being a black atheist. I decided to come out as 
a black atheist today after spending like the weekend looking at all 
the different YouTube videos about the black atheist experience. So 
I decided to lend my voice to the chorus of voices out there to let 
other people know that’s it’s okay to come out, that we need to come 
out, and that we need to form community, since we know that the 
black church has such a strong hold on our community and our 
culture. (cpiercej) 
As of April 2012, a YouTube search for the terms “black atheist” summons 
nearly 7,000 videos, many of them powerful “coming out” or “confession” videos 
like the one transcribed above (see fig. 2.1). By the thousands, African-Americans 
have uploaded videos in which they declare that they do not believe, that they no 
longer believe, or that they have never believed in God, creating a “chorus of 
voices” affirming the possibility of nonbelief for African-Americans, voicing the 
otherwise silent or shamefaced presence of atheism in their communities 
(cpiercej). Echoing cpiercej, video after video on YouTube decries the oppressive 
power of religion (the “hold” of the “black church”) over African-Americans’ 
beliefs, thoughts, and lives. Feeling choked and silenced by their families, friends, 
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and communities, many African-American atheists have turned to vlogging to 
declare their nonbelief, reaching out via online video to audiences who might be 
in some way receptive to their confessions.  
As a recent piece in the New York Times attests, the emerging African-
American atheist movement has swelled far beyond the bounds of YouTube, 
giving rise to local meetup groups and national organizations, along with a 
vibrant presence in other forms of new media (Brennan). Nonetheless, as the 
confessor above, cpiercej, suggests, YouTube seems to be a particularly magnetic 
medium for African-American atheists, including those who watch videos, those 
who make videos, and those like cpiercej who are inspired to cross over, who 
decide to “come out” themselves, summoned to speak by the confessions of 
Figure 2.1: A vlogger shares his experiences as an African-American atheist. 
From Cpiercej. “Black Atheist – Coming out of the Closet.” YouTube. 12 July 
2010. Web. 11 April 2012. 
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others. But why YouTube, of all places? What is it about this platform and the 
vlog (the psuedointimate public webcam video) that compels people to confess 
things they cannot confess, even or especially to those closest to them? Why turn 
to vlogging, especially when the unknowable audience on the other side of that 
webcam might include not only hostile strangers, but also, potentially, the same 
friends and family from whom the confessor is withholding secrets? YouTube 
confessor cutemama007 explains, “i tell people I am atheist if they ask. other 
than that i don’t go broadcasting to people I interact with everyday.” Puzzlingly, 
though she withholds her atheism in everyday life, the vlogger continues 
“broadcasting” it publicly online. Like the engaged young man or woman who 
blithely and publicly cheats on a nationally broadcast reality show (cf. all 26 
seasons of MTV’s The Real World), YouTube confessors like these seem to forget 
or overlook (or possibly hope?) that their viewers likely include the very same 
people they betray, denounce, or distance themselves from. What accounts for 
this seeming cognitive dissonance, this seeming rhetorical buffoonery or 
bravado?  
This chapter suggests that we can much better understand confession 
vlogs, their power and their seeming contradictions, by widening our lens and 
examining the contexts in which vlogs are embedded and the rhetorical activities 
that orbit around them—in this case, by examining the “ceremonial” of the 
YouTube vlog. Put simply, these videos encourage public confessions by placing 
speakers in confessional roles. The composing scene of vlogging draws speakers 
into unguarded monologues that then, within the scene of YouTube, lure vloggers 
and their viewers into intimate and ongoing dialogue. It is only within this 
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broader ceremonial or proceeding that we can properly understand vlogging as a 
rhetorical mode of address, one that is at once monologic and dialogic, at once 
expressive, rhetorical, and dialectical.  
Genre theorist Anne Freadman uses the concept of a “ceremonial” to 
emphasize, first, the manifest interconnectedness of texts and genres. Not unlike 
the concepts of the “genre set” (Devitt), “genre system” (Bazerman), or “genre 
ecology” (Spinuzzi and Zachry), Freadman’s “ceremonial” suggests that genres 
are inherently relational, taking on meanings and social actions only in relation 
to other genres. To be fully understood, then, genres must be situated within the 
larger complex of genres and activities, or the ceremonial, in which they take part. 
What exactly is a ceremonial? While Freadman keeps the concept fairly fluid, we 
can safely say that a ceremonial is the broader “place,” “setting,” or perhaps more 
accurately the proceeding, within with genres are used or put into play. 
According to Freadman, for example, the “warm-up, the toss, and at the end, the 
declaration of the winner and closing down rituals—showers, presentations, or 
the drink at the bar” are genres within the ceremonial of a tennis match.  
Likewise, “swearing in” and “cross-examination” are genres within the 
ceremonial of court proceedings. While each of these individual genres can be 
isolated for various purposes, including scholarly study, to do so would be 
“misleading,” according to Freadman, for it is only within their broader 
ceremonial that the meanings and purposes of individual genres becomes clear 
(59).  
Much of the scholarship on YouTube, including many of the insightful 
studies taken up in this chapter, concentrates exclusively on a single genre native 
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to YouTube. Some focus on vids or parodies, others on remixes, still others on 
comment threads, playlists, tags, and so on. This chapter suggests that 
considering texts or genres in isolation (for instance, treating the confession 
video as a bounded, complete, and finished message) seriously distorts how we 
understand them. While some scholars and commentators have accused vlogs, 
including the video confessions of African-American atheists, of being emptily 
self-expressive, this chapter reveals that vlogs, while monologic in form, can 
nonetheless be dialogic in both intent and effect. In this chapter, I reveal the 
dialogism of vlogs by approaching them not as genres, but as ceremonials, 
demonstrating how they create a stage or scene for the interplay of many genres, 
including videos, channels, playlists, tags, and especially comment threads. 
Understood as a ceremonial (as a proceeding rather than a complete and 
bounded text or genre) it becomes much clearer how vloggers including African-
American atheists hope and expect to relate to their viewers—or perhaps more 
accurately, their interlocutors. 
In addition to emphasizing the interconnectedness of genres, Freadman’s 
concept of the ceremonial has the added benefit of clarifying how texts, and 
especially their contexts, strategically position interlocutors in relation to one 
another. Again, it might seem odd that an atheist would “come out” to the public 
on YouTube, when they believe it impossible to come out in an intimate setting 
with friends and family. However, the concept of the ceremonial, in 
foregrounding the importance of “setting” and “place,” sheds light on this 
seeming contradiction. Freadman proposes that ceremonials determine 
“interlocutory positions” in profound and often invisible ways, both defining and 
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delimiting possible roles for participants in any and every exchange (63). The 
power of the ceremonial is such that even the same individuals may take up 
different roles and relations depending on the ceremonial they find themselves in. 
To illustrate how ceremonials establish roles or positions, Freadman develops the 
following example: 
A discussion between two executives, one slightly superior in the 
company hierarchy to the other, will work differently, depending on 
whether the piece of furniture between them is a desk or a lunch 
table, and depending on whether the desk is the superior’s or his 
subordinate’s. The piece of furniture together with the other ‘props’ 
define a space and the ceremonial appropriate to it. It may well be 
that the participants might try to have ‘the same’ discussion in both 
places, but the choice of one or another ceremonial alters the 
conditions of speech and understanding. 
These days, our hypothetical executives might try to have the “same discussion” 
over e-mail or Skype, but this too would shift interlocutory positions and 
possibilities, perhaps subtly, but inevitably. For example, if the setting were a 
lunch table, or a Skype video call, maybe the subordinate would be more likely to 
ask for a raise, or complain about his working conditions, than he would during a 
more formal meeting.  
Similarly, for an African-American atheist, confessing or coming out may 
seem impossible at the dinner table, with say a devoutly Christian matriarch at its 
head. Nonetheless, even if that matriarch has a YouTube account, and happens 
across a confession vlog uploaded by her son or daughter, her position as an 
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interlocutor within that ceremonial is radically different. Within the ceremonial 
of the vlog, she becomes another viewer, another possible commenter, another 
potential troll or hater. What happens the next evening at dinner is another story, 
but nevertheless the ceremonial of YouTube creates a social and psychological 
setting, and a corresponding set of interlocutory positions, wherein otherwise 
impossible confessions become, for the space of a moment, possible.  
In the pages that follow, I suggest that confessions and other moments of 
vulnerability characteristic of YouTube vlogs are made possible by the unique 
ceremonial in which vlogging is embedded. While vlogs take on the character of 
soliloquys (monologues addressed to no one) they nonetheless are embedded in, 
and usually explicitly encourage, ongoing dialogue in the form of comment 
threads, response videos, and the like. In the first section, “Vlogs as Inner 
Monologue,” I draw on the work of new media anthropologists Michael Wesch 
and Patricia G. Lange to explain how the idiosyncratic composing process of 
vlogging invites an intimate, personal, and frank mode of address, despite the 
possibility or intention of a vlog’s gaining a wide public audience.  Then, 
borrowing from scholars of online rhetoric, I demonstrate how, seen as a 
ceremonial, the seemingly solipsistic self-expression of vlogs actually invites 
vibrant and constructive dialogue—and, most of the time, formally requests that 
dialogue. By making possible this idiosyncratic, monologue-within-dialogue, the 
vlogging ceremonial also makes possible the sorts of unexpected disclosures and 
connections we see happening in and around the confession vlogs of African-
American atheists. 
Vlogging as Monologue 
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I was dating a girl last year. She was pretty much as religious as you 
can be. [ . . . . ] So she was trying to force Christianity on me, she 
was trying to get me to go to church, and I just wasn’t feeling it. 
[ . . . . ] So, I told her no, I’m not going to church, I don’t like it. 
[ . . . . ] So she told me, John, if you’re not going to church, if you’re 
not going to go to church, then at least tell me what you believe in. 
[ . . . . ] It got to the point where I knew I had to end it with her 
when she told me she would rather date a murderer than an atheist. 
And she wasn’t goofing off; she was dead serious. And I mean she’s 
not the only one saying stuff like this; I hear crazy claims like this 
all the time from Christians. (JohnBeezy3) 
Few African-American atheists directly explain, or even claim to fully understand, 
why they have turned to YouTube and the vlog to publicly declare their nonbelief. 
Most, however, drop a clue or two along the way. Consider the story told by 
JohnBeezy3, perhaps the most widely viewed confession of all (fig. 2.2). Here 
JohnBeezy3 recounts an earlier attempt at a confession. In a conversation with 
his then-girlfriend, JohnBeezy3 is invited to share what he believes. When he 
does, the result is breakage. The couple breaks up. Their conversation breaks 
down. Furthermore, this seems to be only one of many, similarly broken 
conversations JohnBeezy3 has suffered through, as he explains that “she’s not the 
only one saying things like this.” In a stark contrast, the same kind of intimate 
confession that earns him a deeply traumatic excommunication, subsequently 
earns JohnBeezy3 tens of thousands of views and hundreds of supportive 
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comments on YouTube. Though he invokes the same genre, the “confession,” in 
two different settings JohnBeezy3 receives two very different responses. 
This story is echoed in video after video, as African-Americans share how 
intimate confessions of nonbelief have wounded them deeply and alienated them 
from friends and family. Another atheist, cutemama007, suggests her friends and 
family have smothered any attempts at an intimate confession (Figure 2.3). 
Explaining her motivation for making the video, she says, “this is just one of my 
videos to let other people know in the world that are black, we do not have to be 
quiet about our nonbeliefs.” Before this bold public confession, however, she 
suffered years of private suffocation:  
Figure 2.2: Another vlogger shares his experiences as an African-
American atheist. From JohnBeezy3. “Black Atheism.” YouTube. 6 
September 2008. Web. 12 April 2012. 
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And I was [quiet about my nonbelief] for a while. For a long time.3 I 
was afraid to say I didn’t believe, and when I hinted, I got those 
looks. You know those looks black people give you, or other people. 
I got those side-eyes. “What?!” [imitates side-eyes] I got those. 
Through words and especially nonverbal cues (those “side-eyes”), cutemama007 
received the message that her friends, her family, and her community would react 
with hostility, or even reject, an intimate confession of nonbelief. 
                                                
3 Throughout this dissertation, I set aside the convention of noting errors in 
spelling, grammar, and so on with [sic]. This is a practical consideration, since 
the texts I analyze (vlogs, comment threads, and so on) have such a volume of 
errors that noting them would clutter the page and distract from my discussion. 
Furthermore, for the purposes of my analysis, I prefer that these so-called “errors” 
stand without correction, since they reveal something about the character and 
rhetorical conventions of vlogging.  
Figure 2.3: Another vlogger shares her experiences as an African-
American atheist. From cutemama007. “Black Atheist…” YouTube. 24 
December 2009. Web. 12 April 2012. 
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 Both cpiercej and cutemama007 explain that they were motivated to 
produce their YouTube confessions by watching other YouTube confessions. “I 
decided to come out as a black atheist today after spending like the weekend 
looking at all the different YouTube videos about the black atheist experience,” 
explains cpiercej. Cutemama007, in explaining the motivation behind her video, 
contrasts the suffocation she experiences in her everyday life with the sense of 
openness and connection she discovers online:  
I decided that I can’t go around muffling or stifling that part of me 
and so when I got online and I found out there was other groups 
and other people that looked like me, who were black, and who 
don’t believe, I got excited! So I’m here to say that I’m one of you 
black atheists. 
Clearly, the gathering “chorus of voices” described by cpiercej has taken on 
momentum, as video confessions yield further video confessions. This, however, 
does not fully explain why YouTube and the vlog seem to accommodate and 
welcome this sort of expression in the first place, when it has been so stifled 
elsewhere. Nor does it explain why certain vloggers risk publicly confessing what 
they cannot or will not confess privately—a puzzling phenomenon that is by no 
means limited to the confessions of African-American atheists. In his study of 
vlogging, anthropologist Michael Wesch calls the “confessional” the “most 
surprising form of YouTube vlog,” observing that “vloggers sometimes reveal 
secrets on YouTube that they have not yet revealed to their closest friends and 
family.” (26) 
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 Wesch explains the idiosyncratic power of the YouTube confession, and 
the vlog more generally, by describing the perplexities and paradoxes that 
vloggers wrestle with during the composing process. Specifically, he suggests that 
vloggers wrestle with “context collapse,” as they confront all possible audiences 
and all possible contexts at once, even as they sit, alone, before a silent blinking 
webcam: 
Now look carefully at a webcam. That’s there. That’s somewhere 
else. That could be anybody. On the other side of that little glass 
lens is almost everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you 
have ever heard of, and even those you have never heard of. In more 
specific terms, it is everyone who has or will have access to the 
Internet—billions of potential viewers, and your future self among 
them. Some have called it at once the biggest and the smallest 
stage—the most public space in the world, entered from the privacy 
of our own homes. [ . . . . ] That seemingly innocuous and 
insignificant glass dot is the eyes of the world and the future. (22) 
Context collapse, described so poetically here by Wesch, paralyzes many would-
be vloggers. But for others, context collapse cultivates powerful introspection, 
self-examination, and reflection, as this universal gaze (“the eyes of the world and 
the future”) collapses in on itself entropically (22). Faced with the impossible task 
of “address[ing] anybody, everybody, and maybe even nobody all at once,” 
vloggers seem to abandon context and audience altogether, and just speak to 
themselves. As a result, the vlog, in Wesch’s view, is an inherently expressive 
form, a video diary composed of “uninterrupted introspective inner dialogue” 
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(26). This for Wesch explains the puzzling aspects of the YouTube confessional. 
Vloggers confess things to YouTube because “context collapse” along with the 
“perceived privacy of the webcam experience” situate vloggers, psychologically, in 
a kind of superamplified echo chamber, where, unsure whom to address, they 
just begin talking to themselves. 
 Wesch’s concept of context collapse helps explain why some vloggers, who 
might be reserved in other contexts, become so frank, open, personal and even 
provocative on YouTube. Equally valuable is Wesch’s analysis of the physical 
setting in which vlogs are conventionally recorded. Surrounded by family and 
friends around the dinner table, the vlogger cutemama007 recognizes or 
anticipates the “looks” that will suffocate her confession. Alone before a webcam, 
she can dismiss or at least defer the anxieties of suppression and consequence. 
While recording, she can tell herself that she won’t upload the video. While 
uploading, she can tell herself her friends and family will never discover it. She 
can speak openly and worry about the social consequences later. (Interestingly 
enough, since I began this research, several confessors have made their videos 
private or removed them from YouTube). 
However, Wesch’s claim that vlogs are wholly self-expressive and 
“unaddressed” (that is, nonrhetorical) stretches the thread too far. While the 
frank confessions of African-American atheists may be, in part, encouraged by 
context collapse and the privacy of the webcam, many of these videos, including 
all the ones I have reviewed, deliberately invoke and address others. It is true that 
most confessions are not explicitly persuasive. In other words, they aren’t looking 
to make an argument, to change hearts or minds, or (anti?)evangelize. Indeed, 
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many African-American atheists on YouTube include in their videos a kind of 
disclaimer explaining that their vlogs are not intended to persuade. Experience 
has shown them that arguing about beliefs is futile. Cpiercej seems resigned and a 
bit tired as he explains, 
I don’t really debate with theists anymore because there’s no point 
to it. I can’t debate your beliefs. Your beliefs are your beliefs. The 
only thing that I can do is talk about what I believe. My beliefs are 
based on evidence and my beliefs aren’t based on faith anymore…So 
it’s really difficult for—and almost impossible—for me to debate 
with a theist because it pretty much just winds up as a circular 
argument. 
Cutemama007 echoes this sense of resignation, turning explicitly away from the 
possibility of argumentation, and turning back to self-expression, to the personal: 
I’m not going to debate with you on scriptures and debate with you 
on evolution and debate with you period. My whole simple point is 
this. It doesn’t have a connection here. [places her hand on her 
heart] 
Though many video confessions and other vlogs are explicitly nonpersuasive, we 
needn’t conclude with Wesch that they are wholly “unaddressed,” emptily 
expressive, nonrhetorical, or monologic. By looking at vlogging as a ceremonial, 
and mapping how videos interact with their surrounding genres, we see that, 
though vlogging is monologic in form, it is nonetheless dialogic in intent and 
effect. What may sound like a soliloquy is usually just the opening statement in 
an open-ended multimodal conversation. 
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Vlogging as Dialogue  
Patricia G. Lange, another anthropologist of new media, emphasizes the 
dialogism of vlogging in a 2006 study of women’s video blogs, illustrating how 
(despite context collapse and the isolation demanded by their composing 
process) vlogging can promote dynamic and productive exchange. Citing 
examples of particular vlogs that inspired spirited online discussion, Lange 
contends that by sharing “intimate moments” and expressing themselves openly 
before a webcam, vloggers can and do effect “social change,” causing critical self-
reflection and productive public discussion of issues. Lange concludes that 
precisely because vlogs are inherently self-expressive, the mode of address holds 
an interpersonal and public significance: 
The sharing of these intimate moments is not self-indulgent, 
solipsistic obsession. Rather, it provides a means to connect with 
others and raise awareness in ways that are less overt than acts such 
as public marches but are nevertheless quite important. 
Lange’s discussion of female vloggers helps explain why the “vulnerability” 
characteristic of the vlog, the self-expressive intimacy produced by context 
collapse and the privacy of solo recording can attract and matter to viewers. 
Equally important, Lange illustrates that vlogs are, counter to Wesch’s suggestion, 
inherently addressed. While vlogs themselves may not directly present an 
argument, distribute information, or relate happenings of explicit public interest, 
vloggers do in fact assume and engage with audiences.  
Furthermore, unlike mass media pundits and other figures whose 
arguments are clearly and sharply “addressed,” vloggers frequently encourage 
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direct and ongoing dialogue with their audiences. In other words, one reason that 
vlogs seem “unaddressed” to Wesch is that his analysis focuses so closely on the 
original text that he overlooks its contexts, failing to recognize that the vlog, 
though it might appear to be a monologue, is generally just the first act or event 
in an ongoing ceremonial, a dance of rhetorical interaction that transpires both 
onsite (through comment threads, video responses, and so on) as well as offsite 
(wherever the video might be embedded and discussed).  
The addressed and dialogic nature of vlogs is apparent in Lange’s analysis 
of a vlog by Micki Krimmel about her own atheism. Lange reveals the dialogism 
of this vlog in two ways. First, Lange chronicles her own personal reactions to 
Krimmel’s atheism vlog: “I am not an atheist, but what struck me about the video 
was that it led to a reconsideration of my behavior and attitudes toward atheists.” 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Lange reveals the dialogism of the vlog 
by documenting the online exchanges this vlog inspired:  
People who are atheist and agnostic left comments on Micki's blog 
and on other Web sites thanking her for making the video. They 
were grateful that it expressed views they had held for a long time. 
Not all of the comments she received on her blog agreed with her 
position, but she expressed gratitude that people used the video 
blog to explore these issues in a frank and public manner. 
While the composing scene described by Wesch may account for the 
characteristic vulnerability and intimacy of the vlog genre, it is the vlog’s 
embeddedness in this larger rhetorical ceremonial, its interconnectedness with 
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other genres and utterances, onsite and , that more fully explains the continuing 
popularity and relevance of the genre.  
The confession vlogs of African-American atheists affirm this. While the 
vulnerability and frankness of these confessors might suggest that vloggers are 
talking only to themselves, in Wesch’s superamplified echo chamber, the 
impression that these confessors are simply soliloquizing is overturned when, 
near the conclusion of nearly every confession vlog, the confessor explicitly 
invites viewers to respond. One confessor, decatursbrowneyes, instructs viewers, 
“If you have any comments, you can leave your comment. Bad ones, good ones. It 
doesn’t really matter.” Cpiercej closes, “If you have any comments, drop em down. 
If you don’t, don’t worry about it. Thanks for watching.” Even the somewhat 
combative JohnBeezy3 concludes by saying, “Um, I appreciate any comments. 
Just get at me.” This conventional request for comments, for continuing dialogue, 
suggests that while confession videos may appear self-expressive, they 
nevertheless function dialogically, calling forth and activating other genres within 
the larger vlogging ceremonial. Indeed, each of the confession vlogs discussed 
this far has attracted hundreds or even thousands of comments. Furthermore, in 
nearly all cases, the vlogger responds to commenters with comments of his or her 
own, continuing to participate in the ensuing dialogue, underscoring that all 
parties involved seem to understand vlogging not as “uninterrupted introspective 
inner dialogue” (Wesch), but as dialogue that manages to be at once inner and 
outer, momentary and ongoing, solipsistic and social. 
Vlogging Channels Personal Address 
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 While not exclusively concerned with vlogs, argumentation theorist Galia 
Yanoshevsky offers insight into this mode of address (and its productive 
paradoxes) in her study of internet activity by presidential campaigns. Revisiting 
concepts of audience articulated by Chaim Perelman prior to the advent of the 
internet, Yanoshevsky argues somewhat surprisingly that Perelman’s notion of 
“argumentation before a single hearer” best explains how rhetors on the internet 
address their audiences, including by implication vloggers (409). Argumentation 
before a single hearer, in contrast to ancient oratory or the newspaper opinion 
piece, must anticipate response and prepare for dialogue. Explaining the concept 
further, Yanoshevsky writes, 
The long, sustained speech to which Rhetoric is typically confined 
may seem ridiculous and ineffective before a single hearer. Thus, in 
dealing with a single interlocutor, the rhetorical speech should 
transform itself into dialogue where the reactions of the 
interlocutor are supposed to be taken into consideration by the 
speaker. (414) 
Notably, Perelman seems particularly keen on argumentation before a single 
hearer, suggesting it produces better results than monologic genres like oratory: 
There is no doubt that the single hearer, having the opportunity to 
ask questions and raise objections, gets the impression that the 
arguments he eventually accepts are more solidly supported than 
the conclusion of a speaker who unfolds his arguments in sustained 
discourse. (36) 
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Yanoshevsky is not arguing that internet rhetors literally target one single 
individual, of course; only that internet address, in some ways, resembles this 
older, face-to-face mode. Specifically, internet address mimics the single-hearer 
mode in 1) its virtualization of intimacy or “proximity” and 2) its appeal to 
audience participation. Yanoshevsky explains that on the internet, and 
specifically within online presidential campaigns,  
Perelman’s concept of ‘‘arguing before a single hearer’’ is thus 
stretched beyond a dialogue where the candidate reasons before an 
interlocutor and responds to the latter’s questions and objections. 
Rather, it becomes a sort of personal plea, where the surfer/voter is 
asked to participate in an activity with the candidate, an activity 
that will yield proximity, enabling the potential voter to express his 
opinions directly to the candidate. (414) 
Internet address, then, is like “argumentation before a single hearer” but is 
probably more accurately described as a “personal plea for participation yielding 
(virtual) proximity.” The desired outcome of internet address is what 
Yanoshevsky calls “connivance,” a sense of psychological connection experienced 
by the addressee toward the addressor, a Burkean “identification” causing the 
addressee to believe that they share common interests, values, and goals, and are 
perhaps even involved in joint projects—in Yanoshevsky’s case study, for example, 
the project of getting a candidate elected.  
 Though she brilliantly articulates its dynamics, Yanoshevsky’s conclusions 
about internet address and virtual connivance are rather gloomy, as she presents 
internet address as an impoverished version of Perelman’s single-hearer mode. 
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She claims that the dialogue inspired on candidates’ websites is weak and “do[es] 
not allow for a genuine exchange of ideas between the candidate and the voter” 
(417). In closing, she suggests that these appeals to proximity and participation 
on the internet are little more than pretense:  
We therefore remain with an “as if” conversation, [ . . . ] that is, a 
mechanism producing a fiction shared by both the candidate and 
the potential voter using the Internet, concerning their proximity. 
[ . . . . ] Dialogue in this context is thus merely a technique designed 
to achieve involvement on the part of the voter in order to induce 
him to perform tasks for the candidate (417).  
These grim conclusions, however, seem more the product of Yanoshevsky’s case 
study, than of her theories of internet address. Transported from presidential 
campaigns to confession vlogs, the concepts of proximity, participation, and 
connivance become not only useful but also enlivening.  
 Like the videos of presidential candidates who ask YouTube viewers to join 
them for dinner (416), vloggers appeal to proximity, encouraging viewers to “get 
closer” by including them within their “intimate sphere.” Like most vlogs, the 
confessions of African-American atheists have domestic settings—living rooms 
(cpiercej), bedrooms (MykeSorrel), even bathrooms (cutemama007, 
“confessional”)—and feature close-ups on confessors and their faces, creating a 
sense of intimacy between vlogger and viewer. Confessions and other vlogs do in 
this sense create what Yanoshevsky calls an “as if” conversation. It is “as if” we 
were sitting chatting one-on-one with vloggers in their home. While this so-called 
“fiction” might seem duplicitous, artificial, or manipulative in the context of 
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Yanoshevsky’s presidential campaigns, this hardly seems the case in the context 
of vlogging, since vloggers usually demand or request nothing of their viewers 
besides a hearing—and maybe a comment.  
Furthermore, like Yanoshevsky’s campaign videos, confession vlogs appeal 
to participation; as we have seen, nearly every vlog ends with an invitation for the 
viewer to comment. Unlike campaign videos, however, vlogs can and do lead to 
the “genuine exchange of ideas” as well as emotions. In short, vlogs appeal to a 
proximity and a participation that may be virtual but is no less real.  
In her confession vlog, “why i am not a christian,” missdynasty33 explains 
how the proximity and participation of one of her viewers inspired her to keep 
making videos (fig. 2.4):  
Figure 2.4: Another vlogger shares her experiences as an African-
American atheist. From missdynasty33. “why i am not a christian.” 
YouTube. 8 January 2011. Web. 16 April 2012. 
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Hi YouTube. Okay. First, um, before I start the video I want to give 
a shoutout to…I think his name is Dr. Popery? [ . . . ] He watched 
my first video that I made saying that I was an atheist. And I got a 
lot of support from him. And he says he’s an old white man who’s 
been an atheist for a long time, and he was proud of me for coming 
out. And he gave me a lot of support. And then I ended up 
[ laughter ] deleting the video, and I think he got mad at me for 
doing—not mad at me, but he was upset that I did that. But I just 
want to give a shoutout to you, thank you for your support. 
(missdynasty33) 
While vlogger and viewer have never actually met, and while they have 
considerable differences (he is an “old white man” and she is a young African-
American woman), missdynasty33’s earlier vlog opened up a space for dialogue, 
empathy, connection, and identification between these two otherwise distant and 
very distinct people. Like other African-American atheist vloggers, 
missdynasty33 explains that any attempt to express her nonbeliefs in her 
everyday life is inevitably suffocated.  
I’m going to keep on making more videos because I feel that I have 
no one to talk to like…All this stuff has been in me for so long, I 
have so much stuff built up, so many things that I want to say, but I 
can’t say it to the people around me because they shut me off—or 
they will shut me off. I have no one to talk to about this stuff, and 
that’s why I wanted to start making videos to talk to other people. 
So, I don’t know. If you want to, leave me a comment, or whatever. 
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Missdynasty33 here belies the idea that vloggers merely talk to themselves 
monologically (Wesch), along with the idea that vloggers’ appeals to proximity 
and participation are always fictional or manipulative (Yanoshevsky), showing 
that online address generally and vlogs specifically can be genuinely and 
transformatively dialogic.  
Missdynasty33 makes videos because she simply wants to “talk to other 
people”—desperately, achingly so—and her reported exchange with fellow 
YouTuber Dr. Popery shows that this kind of talk is indeed possible, productive, 
and, in cases like this, even empowering. 
Dialogism’s Challenges and Rewards 
While not concerned with vlogs specifically, compositionists Brian Jackson 
and Jon Wallin recognize and celebrate YouTube’s cultivation of dialogue in their 
article “Rediscovering the ‘Back-and-Forthness’ of Rhetoric in the Age of 
YouTube.” Jackson and Wallin insist that the “back-and-forth” exchanges that 
happen online, particularly in YouTube comment threads, can be incredibly 
constructive. Moreso than delivering oratorical speeches, penning editorials, or 
composing essays for first-year writing courses—all one-sided rhetorical exercises 
that either defer or simply leave no room for exchange or response—participating 
in YouTube exchanges rhetorically challenges, strengthens, and enlightens its 
participants by demanding that they dialogue actively with others. Linking back-
and-forthness on YouTube to classical dialectic, along with Perelman’s “argument 
before a single hearer,” Jackson and Wallin suggest three ways in which the back-
and-forth exchange characteristic of YouTube challenges and rewards 
participants. Specifically, back-and-forth exchanges challenge interlocutors, first, 
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to be constantly answerable to one another, second, to test the strength of their 
arguments, and perhaps most importantly, to learn from the exchange. 
Expanding on this last benefit, Jackson and Wallin write, “The back-and-
forthness of rhetoric can be progressive in ways that the traditional essay cannot 
be” (383). For one thing, committed interlocutors can reach consensus—but even 
when consensus fails, interlocutors can walk away from a back-and-forth 
exchange enlightened, having improved and broadened their understanding. “In 
other words,” the authors explain, “progress, in terms of an argument, does not 
need to be measured by whether one interlocutor KO’d the other or whether they 
finally agreed [ . . . . ] The value of an argument is what we learn about ourselves, 
our interlocutors, the topic, and reasoning itself through back-and-forth rhetoric” 
(382).  
Jackson and Wallin support these theorizations through a content analysis 
of the comment thread on a controversial YouTube clip (popularly known as 
“Don’t tase me bro!”) showing a student being (unjustly?) arrested and tasered at 
a 2007 presidential campaign event for John Kerry. Acknowledging that many 
YouTube comments, including many of the 500 they analyzed, are shallow, crude, 
and involve ad hominem attacks, the researchers nonetheless concluded that 
most comments on the video are rhetorically literate and constructive, with 66% 
of comments “exhibiting a claim with reasons,” 53% responding directly to a 
previous comment, and 40% “exhibiting an argument at stasis,” or, in other 
words, attempting to establish a baseline consensus on which further 
argumentation could be based. Hinting at the study’s implications for teaching 
composition, Jackson and Wallin express excitement (and perhaps a bit of 
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surprise?) at the dialogue they discovered in this comment thread, noting its 
constructiveness and vibrancy:  
[ . . . ] we find much in this debate to be excited about. We 
discovered a writing venue, converged with other developing media, 
that invites strangers to engage in the back-and-forthness of 
rhetoric with a vitality often missing from the argumentative 
writing our students participate in. Users took turns reading each 
other’s arguments, writing their own in response, and reading and 
responding to further counterarguments that challenged their 
position. In spite of their flaws, users demonstrated a surprising 
degree of rhetorical literacy in the way they made claims, responded 
to claims, and established stasis with other users in an informal 
dialectic that has rolled on for months now, and may (for all we 
know) keep rolling on indefinitely as a cyber-Burkean parlor of 
back-and-forthness.  
The comment thread for missdynasty33’s “why i am not a christian” further 
confirms Jackson and Wallin’s conclusions about the back-and-forthness of 
YouTube and extends them to vlogging, showing that vlogs too are, or at least can 
be, deeply and constructively dialogic. One early exchange between a commenter 
and missdynasty33 compels the vlogger to refine how she articulates her 
(non)belief. In the original video, missdynasty33 only briefly and hesitatingly 
tries to explain what she, in fact, believes. There is sadness and confusion in her 
face and voice as she says: 
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So I want to do another video because I wanted to let you guys 
know how I came to my decision of not believing in the Christian 
god or [ pauses and sighs ] I don’t know, I’m confused about the 
whole thing, but I know I’m not a Christian. 
Responding to her video, the commenter luciano9009 attempts to affirm and 
echo the vlogger’s confession, writing that she too is a “black female atheist” and 
in coming out has committed “social suicide in the black community.” The 
vlogger’s subsequent comment reveals a much more specific, nuanced, and 
confident articulation of her (non)belief.  
well, i don't consider myself an atheist because i don't necessarily 
believe that there is no deity nor do i believe that there is. i simply 
don't know and l leave it at that. i hate when people make you think 
that you have to choose, you know. also, there is no clear or 
universal definition of god so how can i say that i believe or not 
believe. i don't believe in the christian god or gods from any 
abrahamic religion because their god of contradictions. 
Here, as predicted by Jackson and Wallin, the back-and-forth of vlogging leads to 
greater understanding—in this case, of the vlogger’s own beliefs. A later exchange 
in this same comment thread leads the vlogger to critically examine her own 
behavior toward Christians, and uncover there a bit of hypocrisy. Toward the end 
of the original video, missdynasty33 tells how, in her desperation to talk to 
somebody about her crisis of faith, she attempted a conversation with a cousin 
who is a “devout Christian”: 
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I started questioning her beliefs and she just ‘lalala’ [ covers her 
ears and laughs ] and she shut me off. I did call her closed-minded 
and I told her that she was in a box which is Christianity and that 
she stayed in this little Christianity box and she got mad and left. 
The commenter mischatal responds by accusing the vlogger of being, essentially, 
an evangelist, trying to impose her own beliefs on another person, in a similar 
way that others had done to her: 
I think you were wrong to challenge her beliefs - her personal 
identity. Some bridges can only be crossed by the individual, or that 
crossing is not their own. You yourself fell victim to a stronger 
personality, someone else's view of how are things. YouTube is full 
of video's by people who become what they claim to hate, please do 
not fall into that same trap. 
Despite the somewhat scolding tone of this comment, the vlogger acknowledges 
its insight, and is shaken into self-realization: 
I agree. I don't thing [sic] I challenged her beliefs. I just laid out 
points in the bible that didn't make sense to me. Maybe I shouldn't 
have done that. Good post. 
However incremental, this back-and-forth rhetoric leads the vlogger not only to 
better understand herself and what she believes, but also to better understand the 
nature of belief, the ethics of evangelism, and her relations to the religious people 
in her life. 
Conclusion: Vlogging as Identification 
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 This sort of dialogue confirms not only that vlogging is more than 
monologue, but also that vlogging is a more than an isolated “genre.” Rather, it is 
a ceremonial or proceeding, an interwoven set or system of genres that feed upon 
and feed back to one another. Interestingly, while missdynasty33 eagerly engages 
in dialogue with many who disagree with her viewpoint and behavior, the one 
thing she seems completely unwilling to negotiate is her mode of address. Several 
commenters, claiming also to be atheists, criticize missdynasty33’s video for 
being too casual and too long-winded: “You are taking too long to get to the point 
young lady. Come on over to my video forums to Atheists if you like and learn 
what Atheism is,” writes MegaSage007. Another equally blunt commenter 
claiming to be atheist likewise calls on missdynasty33 to be more formal and 
more explicitly rhetorical—or is it evangelical?: 
this long and rambling video never explained why you thought the 
pastor was a pimp. practice, get your talking points, and deliver 
them succinctly, sitting through this was like watching an older 
person tell a story about their youth, slowly speaking trying to 
remember shit and not making a lot of sense. (theherdmentality) 
Commenters like these are clearly looking for vlogs to be less personal, less 
confessional, and more argumentative. Missdynasty33, however, strongly resists 
the suggestion that she change her mode of address. Responding directly to 
commenter theherdmentality, she writes: 
Thats the great thing about youtube and having my own channel. I 
don't have to practice, I can do whatever I want to do and speak as 
slow as I want. don't watch the video if you don't like the way I 
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present it. I don't have to have talking points and I will continue to 
make videos like this. Just don't watch them. Thanx. 
This comment reveals the seed of solipsism and self-expression that gives birth to 
vlogging, as described by Wesch and Lange. Indeed, many vloggers like 
missdynasty33 claim YouTube as a space where one “can do whatever [one 
wants] to do” and speak to an audience of no one: “don’t watch the video if you 
don’t like the way I present it.”  At the same time, the comment affirms that it is 
the vlogging ceremonial, the rhetorical proceedings made possible by its 
intersecting genres, its videos and comments and channels and playlists, that 
enables this hybrid monologic-dialogic mode of expression, this reaching out to 
distant others by talking about oneself: “Thats the great thing about youtube,” 
she explains, emphasizing the importance and power of the setting, of the 
vlogging ceremonial.  
 In contrasting vlogging with other ceremonials like the dinner table or the 
business meeting, I do not mean to suggest that vlogging offers an escape or a 
way out of social settings, a place in which the vlogger and his or her interlocutors 
can simply “be themselves” without constraint. As Anne Freadman cautions in 
her discussion of ceremonials, “We never leave a space of rituals for a space of 
non-rituals: we choose one ritual instead of another” (61). African-American 
atheists come out on YouTube not because it is a rhetorical free-for-all, but 
because they choose to make their confessions within the context of its specific 
rituals, its hybrid monologic-dialogic ceremonial, instead of choosing to confess 
within the ceremonials that make up their everyday life with friends, 
acquaintances, family, and so on. 
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 Though the tone of confession vlogs can differ radically, the motive seems 
to be always the same: to reach out, to discover and connect with others, to 
achieve identification, and to form communities, whether in-person or online. 
Even missdynasty33, who insists that her vlogs belong to her alone, cries out for 
connection with others like herself, sincerely thanking those who have supported 
her, and begging for someone, or anyone, to dialogue with: “I have no one to talk 
to about this stuff, and that’s why I wanted to start making videos to talk to other 
people. So, I don’t know. If you want to, leave me a comment, or whatever.” 
Another vlogger, narrating how he came out to a relative, suddenly spins the 
story into a plea for identification, for more African-American atheists to make 
themselves known: 
That was like the first breaking out and he asked me, you know, so 
what do you believe, and I was like you know something I’m an 
atheist. And it felt so good just coming out and telling him. And 
that’s the reason why I’m making these videos. I want more people 
to be able to come out who don’t feel scared. And it’s crazy because 
a lot of my friend on Facebook I never would have thought. And it’s 
crazy because the people you don’t think is atheist is atheist. And 
you know a few of my female friends came out and was just like ‘I’m 
atheist’ and I’m just like ‘Really? You?’ [ . . . ] So I’m just doing this 
to bring out more people. 
Even Ayanna18vcu, whose vlog on African-American atheism is more 
argumentative than confessional in tone, admits that the primary value of such 
vlogs is identification or connection, not persuasion or conversion:  
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Now I will say that the situation has been somewhat mitigated 
through social sites, such as MySpace, and Facebook, and obviously 
YouTube where we have been able to communicate with others who 
have had similar experiences on their path to atheism. 
Likewise, even the seemingly confrontational sundiatasoulbefree admits that his 
video is not intended to change hearts or minds. Despite his provocative title, 
“Fuck God,” he opens his video with a disclaimer, cautioning viewers that “You 
shouldn’t go around on YouTube looking for videos about subjects you dislike, 
that means any hate mail will be ignored.” Later, despite his argumentative tone, 
he affirms that argumentation about religion, or at least Christianity, is pointless: 
“And I don’t want to have any debates with you people because you guys don’t 
even make any sense. You can’t justify your arguments with quotes from the bible 
because I believe the bible is false in the first place.” Even in this chest-thumping 
video, the motive is not to argue with, but rather to connect and identify with 
others. Indeed, in the description of his video, he writes “this video is for my 
atheist brothers and sisters who are to timid to voice there opinions so im doing it 
for them.” Indeed, each and every confession vlog that allows comments attracts 
responses from other African-American atheists, responses that simply but 
powerfully confirm that there are others out there like them, others who identify 
and empathize with the vlogger. Responding to cutemama007’s vlog, christalh24 
writes, “You aren’t alone, Cutemama! I’m a black female atheist, too.  It can be 
difficult sometimes, but I’ve never been ashame of it.” Responding to cpiercej’s 
vlog, commenter klmbaby6 writes: 
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Wassup bruh. I'm an atheist as well from the motor city. I just 
wanted to welcome you in and say thanks for the video. It feels good 
to see other brothas & sistas coming in from the brainwashing of 
religion. I know it's more of us, we just gotta get the courage to step 
forward.  
 In vlogs, comments, and other genres, African-American atheists seem 
genuinely heartened that they are able to connect and identify with distant others 
online. The sense of connection and compassion is palpable in each of these 
exchanges, but it may be naïve to conclude that the virtual community African-
American atheists find online could replace a local, long-term, community 
grounded in face-to-face interaction. As Ayanna18vcu acknowledges, the social 
isolation of African-American atheists has been “somewhat mitigated through 
social sites,” but only somewhat. She may connect with dozens of others like 
herself online, but when she socializes, even at local atheist events, she feels 
profoundly alone: “In my experience, I have always been the only black person at 
these events. I have talked to a couple of other black atheists who obviously don’t 
reside in my area who said that they have had similar experiences.” Similarly, the 
perhaps-thirtysomething JohnBeezy3 laments that, in his entire life, he has only 
met one other African-American atheist.  
 As with other vlogs, the confessions of African-American atheists produce 
identification and empathy, but their larger and long-term social effects remain 
unclear. As Wesch explains, vlogging and other forms of online interaction 
encourage connections that are at once “deep” and “loose.” Describing 
connections among YouTubers, he cautions that “many of these experiences of 
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deep connection are experiences only, never manifesting into tight relationships 
with the kinds of responsibilities we associate with face-to-face relations” and 
therefore entail “connection without constraint” (27). For example, while 
missdynasty33 may feel empowered, to some extent, by the support of her 
pseudonymous patron Dr. Popery, it seems highly unlikely that Dr. Popery would 
host her in his home, should her family exile her for her nonbelief, or that he 
would be willing and able to drive her to the hospital, should she be physically 
abused. This, clearly, is a limitation inherent in the vlogging ceremonial: that 
however deep a sense of connection, and however constructive a dialogue it 
creates, vlogging seems relatively impotent to actually bond people to one 
another on a lasting basis. African-American atheists may confess on YouTube 
because they cannot confess to their family and friends, but they do not turn to 
YouTube to replace those family and friends. 
 Nevertheless, as Wesch insightfully observes, it is this same “connection 
without constraint” dynamic that grants vlogging its idiosyncratic rhetorical 
magnetism. In other words, African-American atheists and other vloggers turn to 
the YouTube ceremonial not despite, but because it is deep but loose, because it 
creates connection without constraint. As Wesch explains,  
Although these terms seem to contradict each other logically, they 
in fact enhance each other in practice. YouTubers can feel free to 
create or experience deep relationships because they are loose, and 
they may choose to keep them loose precisely because they are deep 
(27). 
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It is Wesch’s vocabulary here, “deep and loose” and “connection without 
constraint,” that perhaps best describe the interlocutory positions posited by the 
YouTube ceremonial, and best explain why someone would confess to YouTube, 
what they would not confess to friends or family. Furthermore, to describe 
vlogging as deep but loose is not to dismiss the genre’s importance or power, but 
rather to acknowledge the specific powers of the relations and rhetorics it 
produces. 
 I want to close, also, by noting that, although online interactions like 
vlogging can and do have their own proper meanings and uses, they can also, in 
some cases, actually give rise to, or enhance, the sort of tight, mutually 
responsible face-to-face relationships that some technophobes fear online 
interactions will replace. Lange, for instance, has shown how young people use 
YouTube to enrich their local interactions (“Fostering”). Cpiercej, the vlogger 
whom we met at the beginning of this chapter, expresses hope that he can use 
YouTube not to bypass his stifling social scene but also to create new, local and 
lasting, social relationships: 
My main thing for coming out like this is to like I said to form 
community [ . . . ] I hope to form a meetup group in the Washington 
D.C. area for black atheists. And I’ve joined some atheist groups in 
the area but I’d like to start something with more of people that 
have had my experience so that we can talk about you know how we 
can reach out to our community and show the black community 
that you know atheists aren’t out to eat babies and party all day. It 
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seemed like I used to party more when I was in the church than now 
that I’m out of the church. 
Here cpiercej expresses hope that, through his confession vlog, he will create not 
only those deep but loose online connections described by Wesch, but will also 
create lasting, face-to-face relationships—and, more than that, new ceremonials, 
new ways of relating, new ways of “partying” outside of the church. 
 Through its exploration of confession vlogs, this chapter has shown how 
online video sharing has fostered new and vibrant ceremonials, new ways of 
connecting and configuring relationships among interlocutors. However, the 
chapter has only touched on questions about medium, about digital video and its 
affordances. The next chapter directly takes up questions about medium, 
examining video and especially its ability to capture bodily emotion displays. 
Through a case study of “reaction videos” uploaded by Twilight fans, it articulates 
what has been implicit in this chapter’s discussion of confession vlogs—that 
vlogging can transform personal emotion into public spectacle, and even into 
powerful public statements. 
  
 
Chapter 3 
The Reaction Video: Vlogging and Emotion Display 
The image below displays a frame from a popular and controversial vlog 
shared on YouTube (Fig. 3.1). Titled “full length twilight trailer reaction!!!” the 
video captures a young woman’s intense emotional reaction as she watches, for 
the very first time, the trailer for the much-anticipated movie Twilight.  
 
Figure 3.1: A vlogger shares her reaction to the trailer for the movie 
Twilight. From Nuttymadam3575. “full length twilight trailer reaction!!!!!” 
YouTube. 10 October 2008. Web. 8 October 2011. 
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 For ten minutes, this woman, who calls herself NuttyMadam3575, squeals, 
hyperventilates, and seemingly even speaks in tongues as she haltingly makes her 
way through the trailer, stopping several times to start over, and crying out that 
“Nothing will ever be the same again!” 
 The video has attracted attention from Twilight fans and haters alike, as 
well as viewers who have no investment in Twilight either way. The video still 
draws a steady stream of viewers, several years after it first appeared in October 
2008, but the comments posted in response to the vlog reveal that many of these 
viewers have trouble understanding why it exists on a public video-sharing site:  
I’ll admit that I can be a bit over-exited about some things and 
squeal and be completely insane — but seriously? [ . . . ] At least I 
don’t fucking publish it for the world to see. Are you trying to 
embarrass yourself in front of the entire world? If so — good job. 
(Frediepin) 
Another commenter expresses the similar sense of puzzlement: 
What I don’t understand is why anyone would bother posting this 
on the internet? Is it madness or loneliness? (Cartman4550) 
Over 10,000 comments have been posted on the video, many of them asking 
similar questions about the motives behind its creation, publication, and 
circulation. The answer, many of these commenters suggest, lies in 
NuttyMadam3575’s individual eccentricity: her “freak[ishness],” her “insanity,” 
her “madness.” More than 80 similar videos, however, in which other fans (and a 
few anti-fans) capture their reactions to the Twilight trailer, were uploaded to 
YouTube during October 2008 alone. While her reaction may be unusually 
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dramatic, in terms of genre, it is by no means an anomaly—within the context of 
Twilight fandom, or of YouTube generally. 
Indeed, well before NuttyMadam3575 appeared, the “reaction video” was 
already a well-established vlogging genre, having thousands of instantiations and 
its own Wikipedia entry. The reaction video is a vlog that captures the reaction of 
an individual (or group of individuals) as they encounter a particular text, usually 
a short media clip. The genre’s Wikipedia entry and general internet lore suggest 
that the reaction video became an established genre in mid-2007, when 
thousands of YouTubers uploaded their reactions (often, a combination of 
laughter and retching) to a trailer for a particularly graphic adult film called “Two 
Girls One Cup.” In 2008, another batch of reaction videos emerged around the 
viral video “Scarlet Takes a Tumble,” a clip in which a woman sings and dances 
on, then falls off of, a coffee table. That same year, Twilight fans like 
NuttyMadam3575 turned to the reaction video genre to communicate their 
emotions after reading the final novel in the series Breaking Dawn and, again a 
few months later, after seeing the trailer for the forthcoming film adaptation. 
 While the reaction video might seem empty or ephemeral, this vlogging 
genre illustrates how emotion displays, circulated via public video sharing sites 
like YouTube, come to do vital rhetorical work, providing a venue through which 
ordinary people participate in public controversies using only a webcam, a 
computer, and their bodies. The theoretical section of this chapter, below, 
explores in greater depth the social and rhetorical dimensions of emotion 
displays, both online and off. I then offer an account of a 2008 controversy that 
played out, in large part, in the reaction video genre. Here I analyze a flurry of 
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vlogs composed by readers of the controversial Twilight novel Breaking Dawn. I 
contend that the genre of the reaction video allowed discontented fans to make 
compelling public statements about Breaking Dawn through emotion displays. 
However, the reaction video genre also framed those emotions in such a way that 
they could be easily dismissed as impulsive and ephemeral, somewhat 
undermining their effectiveness. 
Vlogging and Emotion 
Public video sharing, as rhetoric scholars and popular commentators alike 
are beginning to recognize, may be changing the way that ideas, attitudes, and 
even energies spread. Thanks to increasingly affordable, portable, and share-
friendly video cameras, and the rise of platforms like YouTube, video sharing is 
playing increasingly important roles within public spheres. Just this year, video 
sharing has been praised for helping spread revolutionary fervor across the 
Middle East during the Arab Spring—and blamed for helping spread belligerence 
and bacchanalianism during the London riots in August. Behind all the praise 
and blame lies an unspoken assumption that video sharing somehow 
communicates differently than other media, and even other electronic media—
particularly in how it relays emotion. 
Psychologist Paul Ekman’s research has confirmed that the human face, 
for instance, has a powerful vocabulary for communicating emotion, one that can 
convey complex emotional information. Some of this information can be 
translated into alphabetic text (in descriptions of the face or the emotion itself, or 
indirectly through affectively-loaded language, punctuation, etc.) or it can be 
captured in a still image. But since most facial expressions involve minute, 
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unconscious muscle movements lasting roughly two to four seconds (Ekman 143), 
facial expression is at present most thoroughly captured through video recording. 
And it is only recently, with the widespread availability of the webcam and digital 
video sharing sites like YouTube, that the technology for recording emotion 
display and circulating it widely has come into the possession of everyday people, 
people like Twilight fan NuttyMadam3575. Michelle, another vlogger, in an 
interview with anthropologist Patricia G. Lange, describes the face and its 
emotional expressivity as the key to vlogging’s power and popularity: 
[I] mean people just connect more emotionally with somebody's 
face than maybe with text, [that's] the simplistic version of it. And I 
noticed that when I started doing the video blogs because I had 
been writing about personal stuff for years. [ . . . ] But as soon as I 
started doing video blogs, people were like [wow]. It kind of 
surprised me because I thought who wants to see me sitting around 
talking about my feelings? But they do. I don't know why, but they 
do. (“Vulnerable”) 
Emphasizing its difference from disembodied “writing,” Michelle explains the 
power and popularity of vlogging by stressing its capacity for relaying emotion, 
and particularly emotion displayed on “somebody’s face.” Like other vloggers 
interviewed by Lange, Michelle acknowledges “that the video image, rather than 
text alone, promotes a key connection”—a connection that happens through the 
body and through the emotions. 
However, while technological development explains how the capture and 
circulation of emotion displays is possible, it does not explain why such displays 
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are so popular with producers and viewers, or what rhetorical work these 
emotion displays are capable of doing. To explore these more challenging 
questions, we might turn to affect studies and their recent insights into the social 
and rhetorical workings of emotion.  
The Rhetoric of Emotion 
 Interest in emotion and affect and their role in communication has grown 
significantly in recent years within rhetorical studies and related fields, including 
political science, literary studies, anthropology, and philosophy, to name just a 
few. The theories and research methods associated with the “affective turn” or 
“affect studies” are quite diverse (and at times contradictory) but share some 
common features. Inspired by and borrowing concepts from scientific studies of 
emotion, affect scholars have identified significant (and often frankly surprising) 
affective layers within the weave of society, culture, and communication. 
Motivated by a perceived overemphasis on “the role of reason and rationality in 
politics, ethics, and aesthetics,” affect studies, according to Ruth Leys, seek to 
complicate “flat or ‘unlayered’ or disembodied” accounts of “the ways in which 
people actually form their political opinions and judgments” (436). In short, the 
scholarship on affect rejects logocentrism, the assumption that humans act, or 
should aspire to act, according to pure reason or logic. It proposes instead that 
humans participate meaningfully in social, cultural, and public spheres through 
affect—through feelings, sensations, intensities, emotions, passions, etc.  
Emotion has been central to rhetorical theory at least since Aristotle 
articulated the concept of pathos or “emotional appeal.” In Book II of the 
Rhetoric, Aristotle insists that rhetors must understand the various types of 
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emotion and how each emotion might be aroused in the service of persuasion. On 
the whole, however, Aristotle grants emotion a limited role within the enterprise 
of rhetoric. Rhetoric, in Aristotle’s view, is nothing more than the practical art of 
persuasion, and depending on the particular case, emotional appeals may or may 
not be necessary. Indeed, in the first few lines of Rhetoric, long before his 
discussion of the emotions, Aristotle warns rhetors not to call upon the emotions 
when emotions are inappropriate, distracting, or misleading. Lambasting other 
contemporary teachers of rhetoric, Aristotle cautions that the “arousing of 
prejudice, pity, anger, and similar emotions has nothing to do with the essential 
facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case.” 
Emotions, in the Aristotelian view, are often necessary to rhetoric (as a means to 
some other persuasive end) but they are not absolutely essential to the enterprise 
of rhetoric itself.  
 The new affect studies, however, suggests that emotion plays a more 
fundamental role in rhetoric than Aristotle and his adherents have imagined. 
More than a means to some external end, more than an arbitrary vehicle leading 
audiences to the “essential facts,” emotion is present in all rhetoric—and is 
indeed a rhetorical enterprise itself.  
Understanding how emotions are rhetorical may first require an 
exploration of how emotions are social. Emotions are often imagined to be 
exclusively “internal” or “personal,” as essentially private phenomena that arise 
and fade within the self alone, within the hard psychological boundaries of the 
individual. However, as Jenny Edbauer Rice explains, emotions, even if they are 
experienced as powerfully internal and individual, are also inescapably social. 
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Reviewing recent studies of affect by Sara Ahmed, Denise Riley, and Theresa 
Brennan, Edbauer Rice illuminates how emotion can be at once “inside out” and 
“outside in” (“New”). Rice praises affect theorists including Ahmed for breaking 
away from  
the ‘‘inside out’’ model (where I express my internally felt emotions 
to those outside of my own skin) as well as the ‘‘outside in’’ model. 
The ‘‘outside in’’ model may be more recognizable as a rhetorical 
take on emotions, since this model assumes that emotion resides in 
the social sphere and is later learned, or internalized, by an 
individual. Instead, Ahmed proposes that emotions are the acts of 
orientation between bodies. (206) 
As social “acts of orientation” (which are neither fully internal nor fully external), 
emotions do more than reveal existing internal processes. Emotions—or to adopt 
a more precise term, emotion displays—drive social interactions. They prompt 
audiences to think, feel, act, orient themselves, and respond in certain ways. A 
smile, for example, is more than a signal of inner happiness, it is a sign that 
welcomes others to approach and suggests something about the smiler’s 
character. Like words, then, emotion displays do things, signaling inner states, 
but also producing illocutionary and perlocutionary effects (to borrow the 
vocabulary of J.L. Austin) that prompt actions and influence orientations. 
Emotions, in this sense, are “moves” or “turns” within the game of human social 
interaction, though these “moves” may be made intentionally or unintentionally, 
or may even originate beyond the boundaries of conscious intention (for instance, 
when we “cannot help being angry” with someone who has wronged us).  
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It is perhaps obvious that emotions are social acts within intimate spheres: 
any parent who has dealt with a child who isn’t getting his or her way can testify 
to this. But emotions are rhetorical within public spheres as well, as rhetoric 
scholar Daniel Gross affirms in The Secret History of Emotion. For Gross, 
emotions are “deeply social” and, contrary to the claims of modern brain science, 
are “constituted not in the biology [ . . . ] of all humans [ . . . ] but rather in 
relationships” (2). While the Aztecs believed that emotion originates in the liver, 
Descartes in the pineal gland, and modern science in the brain, Gross insists that 
emotion originates in social relations (1). Classical thinkers like Aristotle got it 
right, according to Gross, when they represented emotions like anger, for 
example, as being fundamentally “psychosocial”: 
“Great is the rage of Zeus-nurtured kings,” muses Aristotle after the 
Iliad 2.196. For Aristotle, the king does not fly into a rage simply 
because his human dignity suffers, or even because his power 
allows him to express a universal emotion others suppress. The king 
is overcome by rage because he suffers a concrete insult despite 
belonging to the class of people who “think they are entitled with 
respect by those inferior in birth, in power, in virtue,” which in the 
king’s case means practically everybody. (3) 
For Gross, following Aristotle and Homer, anger “presumes a public stage rather 
than private feelings” (3). Like all emotions, anger is an act of orientation, 
making or re-making or un-making social relations, including relations of power. 
Gross goes so far as to suggest that emotion, much like verbal language, would 
have no meaning or existence outside of social relations: “Alone on a desert 
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island, the king would not be subject to anger, because he would lack any social 
standing that could be concretely challenged” (3). Indeed, the very existence of 
the reaction video, a genre that centers on the public sharing of emotion displays, 
seems to confirm that emotions are fundamentally social, and sometimes 
fundamentally public. Why would someone post a video of himself or herself 
freaking out to the Twilight trailer, or being disgusted by pornography, or 
laughing along with a pratfall? The short answer seems to be this: because, as 
Gross reveals, emotions demand an audience. 
 Kenneth Burke acknowledges the communicative nature of emotion in his 
discussion of the “rhetoric of hysteria,” early in A Rhetoric of Motives. Here 
Burke clarifies how exactly it is that emotion displays communicate and 
persuade—even when there isn’t any conscious intent to communicate on the part 
of the emoting subject. Drawing on his readings in anthropology, Burke describes 
what is, at first, a seemingly alien form of communication practiced among the 
Tanala people of Madagascar. This is the “tromba,” a “neurotic seizure indicated 
by an extreme desire to dance” (39). “Such seizures,” Burke explains, “are said to 
be a device that makes the possessed person ‘the center of all the attention.’” The 
seized individual, according to Burke’s source, is granted extreme respect and 
even the status of an oracle. In this way, even though the individual experiences 
the tromba involuntarily, as a kind of attack, it nonetheless holds communicative 
power. Burke echoes his source’s suggestive conclusion that the tromba, “like 
most hysterical seizures, [ . . . ] requires an audience” (39).4 We might equally 
                                                
4 We should, of course, be skeptical of this early anthropological source Burke is 
drawing from, particularly its troubling account of its subject’s (lack of) agency. 
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apply his insights into the “rhetoric of hysteria” to the Twilight reaction video 
with which this chapter began: 
For here too are expressions which are addressed—and we confront 
an ultimate irony, in glimpsing how even a catatonic lapse into 
sheer automatism, beyond the reach of all normally linguistic 
communication, is in its origins communicative, addressed, though 
it be a paralogical appeal-that-ends-all-appeals. (39) 
Though Burke’s discussion of the tromba is brief, it nevertheless proposes a 
radical understanding of emotion—namely, a rhetorical one. Burke suggests that 
even when their underlying intentions are hidden from us (whether as witnesses 
to emotion displays or as authors of them), emotions have social and rhetorical 
“origins.” Emotions hold suasive power and begin with suasive motives, whether 
these motives are conscious, unconscious, preconscious, or otherwise.  
To clarify how and what it is that emotion displays communicate, we 
might borrow a spatial metaphor from verbal argumentation: the concept of 
position. Emotion displays establish “positions” in at least two senses. In the first, 
and most obvious sense, an emotion display communicates a position toward an 
object. By capturing and circulating a reaction on YouTube, the Twilight fan 
displays a certain “position” on the movie to a public audience. Put another way, 
the display connects a certain referent (the Twilight movie) to a certain emotion 
(amazement or disgust). Potentially, that display can move audiences to adopt 
                                                                                                                                            
After all, even in its title, the source describes its subjects as “primitive” 
(Kardiner). Burke’s blithe use of the deeply gendered term “hysteria” to indicate 
extreme emotion displays is also troubling. Nonetheless, Burke’s larger point 
about emotion and communication, even if the particular illustration has some 
problems, is still a powerful one. 
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new or changed attitudes of their own, just as pointed verbal analyses and 
commentaries can.  
That emotions establish positions can be clearly illustrated by juxtaposing 
NuttyMadam3575’s euphoric reaction, described at the outset of this chapter, 
with any number of oppositional videos posted in direct response. For instance, 
one YouTuber calling himself PhysicalMonster responded with his own “full 
length twilight trailer reaction!!!!!” (Figure 2.2). PhysicalMonster articulates a 
wholly different position on Twilight simply by retuning the emotion. 
PhysicalMonster begins his video by flatly intoning, in Spanish, “oh my god. i 
can’t believe i’m going to watch the full-length twilight trailer. oh, how emotional 
i am. let’s watch it.” Throughout the 8-minute clip, his intonation and facial 
expression remain comically, and pointedly, slack. Through this reaction,  
Figure 3.2: A vlogger captures his (lack of) reaction to the preview trailer for 
the film Twilight. From PhysicalMonster. “Re: full length twilight trailer 
reaction!!!!!” YouTube. 19 November 2008. Web. 21 October 2011. 
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PhysicalMonster takes a position, strategically and meaningfully responding to 
NuttyMadam3575 simply by re-articulating the same referent to an opposing 
emotion. 
 Emotion displays also involve “position” in another, perhaps even more 
fundamental, sense: emotion displays at once reveal and re-arrange social 
positions. Just as the anger of Aristotle’s “Zeus-nurtured king” rearticulates 
relations between himself and his subjects (if successful, presumably, restoring 
the previous order) so does the Twilight reaction video rearticulate relations 
between its composer, the movie’s producers, other fans, and so on. Emotion’s 
ability to rearticulate social relations is perhaps the most vital source of its power, 
and what makes emotion displays capable of transforming, or reinscribing, the 
social order. To alter the emotional landscape, in other words, is to change the 
social landscape, is to change relations of power. If the king’s subjects find a 
medium and audience for their own anger, big changes are likely on the horizon. 
This is perhaps one reason that video sharing, a web-bound medium that does 
not extend the reach of the internet, per se, but simply changes the terms on 
which already-connected individuals communicate with one another, is so often 
viewed as revolutionary—namely, because video sharing allows ordinary people 
to capture and circulate emotion displays to a mass audience.  
Further, because emotions are tied to social relations, they evolve as social 
relations evolve. Certain traditions in the scientific study of emotion claim that 
human emotions have universal types, unchanging across history and across 
culture. From this perspective, emotion is (paradoxically) both a biologically 
encoded phenomena that is universal in humans across cultures, as well as an 
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expressive phenomena that belongs to the individual-outside-society. According 
to this tradition, emotions and their expression in the human voice and especially 
the human face are not at all conventional—or even, in any meaningful sense, 
contextual. For decades, psychologist Paul Ekman has argued that there are 
“basic emotions” (such as anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust, and surprise) 
that exist across all cultures and, furthermore, are legible across all cultures, 
never needing translation. According to the universalist model popularized by 
Ekman, both an American businessman and a Maori tribesman, though they lack 
any common language or culture, should not only experience identical emotions, 
but also recognize those emotions through one another’s facial, vocal, and 
gestural expression. This universalist model of emotion has influenced not only a 
generation of scientists but also public policy and even popular culture.5 
Nevertheless, because it divorces emotion from context and culture entirely, the 
universalist model of emotion is incompatible with a social and rhetorical 
understanding of emotion.  
As Edbauer-Rice, Ahmed, Gross, and Burke reveal, there is much more to 
emotion than internal physiological processes. Viewed as social interactions, 
rather than isolated internal or bodily experiences, we can see that the forms and 
meanings of emotion are, contrary to the claims of Ekman, historically and 
culturally variable. While emotions may have a universal biological basis, types of 
emotion display and their meanings develop their characteristic forms and 
                                                
5 Ekman, for example, has been interviewed by Oprah Winfrey, has inspired a 
popular primetime network television drama, and has consulted with the U.S. 
Transportation Security Adminstration, training TSA staff to identify emotional 
irregularities in airline passengers.  
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currencies only within particular environments and social relations. When was 
the last time, for instance, someone you knew experienced a tromba? Could a 
member of the Tanala, in turn, experience a modern panic attack? Could an 
ancient Roman “freak out”? Where have all the sufferers of nineteenth-century 
neurasthenia or “Americanitis” gone? Whence the spells of Victorian invalidism? 
Drawing on the vocabulary and assumptions of rhetorical genre theory, we might 
call these culturally situated types of emotion display pathetic genres.  
Pathetic genres, then, are recognizable types of emotion display, what 
might, from a psychological point of view, be called “episodes.” Some 
contemporary examples of pathetic genres would include the rant, the plea, the 
collapse, the lament, the panic attack, the rapture—and, of course, the reaction. 
To borrow Carolyn R. Miller’s vocabulary, pathetic genres are “typified utterances” 
that articulate emotion in conventional ways through a performance composed in 
any number of simultaneous languages: words, facial expressions, vocal 
intonations, and/or other forms of bodily expression (“Genre” 69). 
Pathetic genres, as I see them, are the molds that we pour emotion into—
or more accurately, the templates that we use to shape our emotional displays 
and to interpret the emotional displays of others. Emotion displays need not 
conform to one particular genre-template. Technically, this is impossible, 
because the genre does not reside in the emotion display itself. We might say, for 
instance, that the emotion displayed by NuttyMadam3575’s video is not 
inherently a “reaction.” Rather, reaction is the genre-template that informed 
NuttyMadam3575’s emotional experience and display, and the genre-label she 
offered to her viewers when she uploaded the video. Viewers were free to, and did, 
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apply other genre-templates (“seizure,” “orgasm”)—and do so strategically, since 
different genre templates inherently alter the interpretation of the same emotion 
display. Genre, in other words, does not reside in the emotion display itself; 
rather, it emerges in the minds and hearts of those present to the emotion. Genre 
is not embedded in the display (how could it be? where could it be?) but rather 
enters only into acts of production and interpretation. Pathetic genres then are 
perhaps best described as learned templates for producing and interpreting 
emotion displays, templates that make those emotions socially recognizable or 
readable—and thereby equip those emotions with the ability to carry out social 
actions. Displays of anger can only compel others to change their behavior when 
that anger is recognizable, and displays of pleasure can only compel others to 
continue their behavior if pleasure is readable, whether that pleasure is 
communicated through facial, vocal, or gestural expression, or simply through 
words.  
To be clear, in proposing the concept of pathetic genres, I do not mean to 
suggest that some genres are emotional, and others unemotional. I do not claim 
that pathetic genres are an undiscovered continent—a class of utterances that 
stands apart from all other known classes, or even a subset of genres that is 
clearly distinct from others. I acknowledge that, in a sense, all genres are pathetic 
genres. Take, for example, the oral declamation and the written polemic. These 
genres may be templates for assembling words, but they are also templates for 
assembling emotions—and so too are the personal e-mail, the business memo, 
and the postcard. Clearly, all genres involve emotional expression, though 
depending on the genre that emotion may be expressed by facial cues or words, 
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sounds or icons, touches or gestures, and so on. Throughout this chapter and this 
dissertation, then, the concept of “pathetic genres” is simply meant to emphasize 
that emotion is one of the materials from which utterances and genres, as learned 
templates for coding and decoding those utterances, are made. Again, I do not 
insist upon any hard distinction between verbal and nonverbal genres, or 
emotional and nonemotional genres. Rather, following the work of M.M. Bakhtin, 
I insist on their continuity and consubstantiality.  
Genre and Emotion 
The correspondence between genre and emotion has frequently been 
hinted at, though never explored at length, by genre theorists. This section 
revisits the work of genre theorist Mikhail Bakhtin and extrapolates from this 
theorist's insightful, but somewhat cursory, discussions of genre and emotion. 
Interfacing Bakhtin’s work with that of contemporary affect theorists including 
Brian Massumi, I conclude that Bakhtin recognized that genres, no matter how 
staid or flat they might seem, always come along with characteristic emotions, 
and second, that emotion displays themselves are expressed and received within 
generic frameworks—in other words, as genres.  
Bakhtin, widely identified as the architect of genre theory, offers an 
insightful, although imperfect, framework for understanding the complex 
relations between genre and emotion. Late in his landmark essay, “The Problem 
of Speech Genres,” Bakhtin implies that speech genres, his umbrella term that 
unites both oral and written language, have at least two streams of transmission. 
Adapting Bakhtin’s vocabulary, we might label these streams content and 
expression. The content stream transmits “referentially semantic content”—that 
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is, references to particular, indexable entities that can be either perceived or 
imaged in the mind: grapes, vampires, virtue (84). Meanwhile, the expression 
stream transmits the speaker’s “evaluative attitude toward the subject of his 
speech” (84). 
Here Bakhtin steps into an area of inquiry that would be later be re-
mapped by affect theorists like Brian Massumi and Theresa Brennnan. Though 
he adopts a different vocabulary from Bakhtin, Massumi posits a related 
distinction between content and “intensity.” Massumi explains what he means by 
“content” in this way: “What is meant here by the content of the image is its 
indexing to conventional meanings in an intersubjective context, its socio-
linguistic qualification” (24). An image (to use Massumi’s vocabulary) or 
utterance (to use Bakhtin’s) has various referents, insofar as it refers to various 
things, qualities, actions, and relationships. Referents are real or imagined 
entities that are called to mind by words or other images. For example, the simple 
utterance “I like books” refers a type of thing (books generally) and several 
particular things (“I” and my “liking”). These—referents—are what moves 
through our content stream. 
What, then, moves through the expression stream? Bakhtin proposes 
every utterance, whether oral or written, includes what he calls an “expressive 
aspect,” a term that is more or less synonymous with what I’m calling emotion in 
that it refers to a feeling that emerges alongside but independently from referents 
(84). Expression, he suggests, is always present: “There can be no such thing as 
an absolutely neutral utterance,” Bakhtin explains. The speaker’s “evaluative 
attitude toward the subject of his speech” always necessarily informs the process 
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of composition, influencing the many choices the speaker makes, lexically, 
grammatically, structurally, and otherwise (84). All utterances, then, are 
“expressive” in that they reflect the speaker's “subjective emotional evaluation of 
the referentially semantic content of his utterance” (84). They reveal, whether 
intentionally or unintentionally, how the speaker or writer feels about the 
subject—what might be termed an emotional orientation, or attitude. "When 
selecting words we proceed from the planned whole of our utterance,” Bakhtin 
affirms, “and this whole that we have planned and created is always expressive” 
(86).⁠ Expression for Bakhtin, then, may come through the words that the  
speaker uses to call up referents (books, I, liking), but is qualitatively distinct 
from those referents. Rather, expression is the emotion that emerges alongside 
but somewhat independently from whatever referents it calls up. (These two 
streams of content and expression, it turns out, are not like the streams that run 
from hot- and cold- water faucets, which can be run independently or in isolation. 
They are more like natural streams whose paths and currents interweave.) 
This helps us begin to understand what emotion is and how it enters into 
an individual utterance, but what relations if any exist between emotion and 
genre? This is a more difficult question, and one which neither Bakhtin nor 
Massumi takes up directly.  For Bakhtin, expressivity reveals only “the relation of 
the utterance to the speaker himself” (84). Initially, in passages like these, 
Bakhtin seems to propose that expressivity is not generic but is rather a kind of 
idiosyncratic emotional imprint left by the speaking individual. Bakhtin’s 
discussion here suggests, in other words, that expressivity is not a feature of 
genre, but arises only at the level of the concrete utterance. It is not typified, but 
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rather individual—a phenomenon that is not built into genres but reflects only 
the “evaluative attitude” of the speaker him or herself. From this perspective, the 
expressivity of a book review, for example, would have little or nothing to do with 
the book review genre itself: it would only reveal the attitude of the individual 
writer toward whatever individual book is being reviewed, toward his or her 
audience, and so on.  
Nonetheless, behind Bakhtin’s explicit treatment of expressivity, there 
remain unexplored depths. When mapped onto his overall argument about 
language, genre, and agency, certain of Bakhtin’s comments suggest that he 
recognized not only a connection between emotion and the individual speaker, 
but also between emotion and genre. For our purposes, Bakhtin’s overarching 
argument might be summed up in Carolyn R. Miller’s line that “genre mediates 
between private intentions and social exigency; it motivates by connecting the 
private with the public, the singular with the recurrent” (“Genre” 163). Genre, in 
other words, is never fully internal, but rather connects the internal to the 
external, the individual to the social, by channeling personal expression through 
socially conventional forms. In his discussion of “evaluative genres,” Bakhtin 
implies that emotion can take on generic forms, and thereby mediate between the 
private and the public. Bakhtin acknowledges that in everyday speech, there exist 
what he calls “evaluative genres”—that is, genres keyed to certain types of feeling: 
Fairly standard types of evaluative utterances are very widespread 
in speech communication, that is, evaluative speech genres that 
express praise, approval, rapture, reproof, or abuse: 'Excellent!' 
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“Good for you!” “Charming!” “Shame!” “Revolting!” “Blockhead!” 
and so forth. (85) 
In my reading of Bakhtin, the concept of “evaluative genres” opens the door to a 
more expansive theorization of genre and emotion—one that the Russian theorist, 
who before his death had hoped to expand the essay on genre into a large book, 
never had opportunity to explore (Holquist xv). In proposing the concept of 
evaluative genres, I believe that Bakhtin is suggesting that emotion is to some 
extent conventional. While it may be attributed to the individual composer, 
emotion is also enabled and constrained by genre. Emotion in this sense is 
generic, genre-ic. To return to my previous example, this means that the book 
review genre comes along with certain expectations about not only content and 
structure, but also certain expectations about emotion—about attitude, 
expectations connected to but distinct from these “formal” or “content” 
expectations. Stepping into the role of book reviewer, an individual might take on 
certain emotions, but not others: a lighthearted contempt would seem 
appropriate, or perhaps a vigorous enthusiasm. Adopting a belligerent or bored 
emotion, however, would seem to violate the genre. (Though we can imagine that, 
in certain cases, this violation might be productive, for the purposes of polemic 
and parody. Nonetheless, this is an exception that proves the rule.) Embedded in 
genres, then, are certain typified emotions—or more accurately, a range or array 
of typified emotions the composer might adopt.  
The emotionality of a genre is crucial because it is tuned to the social 
action that genre is designed to carry out. Emotion is what prompts the audience 
to respond and lobbies it to respond in certain ways. For some genres (the book 
 87 
review, the dissertation, the instruction manual) emotion is pervasive but 
perhaps best described as “complementary.” Emotion in these discursive genres 
helps carry the social action, but the burden seems to fall primarily on content: 
on information, concepts, ideas, and other sorts of referents. For other genres, 
however, the reverse seems to be true. This is the case with Bakhtin’s evaluative 
genres. Here, emotion does not complement content; rather, content 
complements emotion. Bakhtin’s evaluative utterances (“‘Excellent!' 'Good for 
you!' 'Charming!' 'Shame!' 'Revolting!' 'Blockhead!’”) do not relay information: 
they relay emotion. Indeed, the social action of these particular utterances could 
be carried out quite easily (in some cases, more easily) without any “semantic 
content” whatsoever, but rather through facial expression, vocal signals (grunts, 
sighs, scoffs), or other bodily signals. This is not true for all utterances or genres, 
of course; no one would attempt to compose a dissertation in the medium of 
facial expression. But few would scold a child using a discursive essay, either. 
What is more, social actions themselves necessarily have emotional 
dimensions. Bakhtin, in his all-too-brief treatment of affectivity, catalogues not 
only possible evaluative utterances but also possible social actions for his 
evaluative genres. Evaluative genres can do the following: “express praise, 
approval, rapture, reproof, or abuse” (85). Importantly, these social actions are 
primarily emotional in nature; there is little transmission of referents here, 
mostly just a dynamic interplay of emotions.  
Evaluative genres are of course a special case, but they illustrate a larger 
point: emotion is present, pervasive, and potent in all genres. Emotion is as 
important, and often more so, than content in carrying a genre’s social action, 
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just as the emotionality of a book review is calibrated to prompt readers to read 
(or not read), writers to write (or stop writing), and to evoke feelings of 
confidence and respect for the reviewer’s opinions. 
Recognizing the emotionality of genre is important not only theoretically, 
but also for understanding what makes vlogging generally, and reaction videos 
specifically, meaningful to composers and viewers. Building on Bakhtin’s insights, 
the next section proposes that the reaction video genre is just one, newly 
remediated instantiation of a broader species I call pathetic genres. 
Approaching “reaction” as a pathetic genre or emotion template, with a 
history and cluster of meanings and rhetorical applications, can help us to 
understand what exactly producers assume they are communicating, and viewers 
assume they are witnessing, when they view a reaction video—and therefore, why 
the genre became so important during the Breaking Dawn controversy. 
Reaction as Genre 
From a historical perspective, the concept of “reaction” as a type of 
personal emotional behavior, “something done, felt, or thought in response to a 
situation, statement, etc.,” seems to have emerged only recently, according to the 
Oxford English Dictionary. Though this is now “the principal general sense,” the 
OED’s first recorded uses of reaction to signal personal emotional behavior date 
to the turn of the twentieth century. These early examples (such as, “Did Bloom 
discover common factors of similarity between their respective like and unlike 
reactions to experience?” and “Although in anger I feel very bitter and full of 
burning hate toward all mankind, my reaction is intense remorse.”) seem to bear 
a certain burden of abstractness and technicality, perhaps a marking of their 
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import from the scientific, medical, political, and other intellectual-professional 
spheres where the term was first popularized. (Interestingly, many of the usages 
documented by the OED directly quote from or channel Isaac Newton’s 
foundational, and frankly catchy, Third Law of Motion: “For every action there is 
an equal and opposite reaction.”) 
If reaction was popularized as a technical description of motion, it is now 
much more likely to be used as a description of emotion—that is, as a pathetic 
genre. Today, a simple Google search of news items that include the word 
“reaction” returns tens of thousands of results. These include accounts of medical 
reactions, particularly of the allergic variety; systemic reactions, particularly in 
reference to financial markets; and organizational reactions, including especially 
government actions taken in response to shifting conditions. However, if these 
prove that reaction is true to its etymological origins in the abstract and the 
technical, there are plenty of items this very hour to suggest that reaction has also 
become a powerful description of emotion. These news items include many 
accounts of “fan reactions” to sports happenings (wins and losses, trades and free 
agent signings) and other developments in popular culture (the casting and 
cancellation of television programs, for instance). They also explore the 
emotional behavior of public figures, including one of the most controversial 
(non?)reactions in recent public memory.  
Nearly ten years after the moment in question, the international news 
agency Reuters distributes a story about George W. Bush’s “apparent lack of 
reaction” to the first news of the September 11th attacks. The Washington Post, 
National Public Radio, The New York Daily News, and others pick up this story. 
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Perhaps unsurprisingly, several copies of the video displaying Bush’s reaction to 
the hurriedly whispered news, as he sat in front of an oblivious elementary school 
class, have been uploaded to YouTube, with many of the YouTube user comments 
and framing suggesting that Bush’s flat reaction is “evidence” that he had 
conspiratorial “advanced knowledge” of the attacks (“Evidence that George W. 
Bush had advanced knowledge of 9-11”). In the Reuters piece, Bush of course 
produces a competing account of his reaction: “So I made the decision not to 
jump up immediately and leave the classroom. I didn't want to rattle the kids. I 
wanted to project a sense of calm” (qtd. in Serjeant). What matters here, for this 
inquiry, is not determining which interpretation of Bush’s emotion display is 
correct, but rather recognizing that all interpreters past and present approach 
reaction generally, and Bush’s reaction in particular, as a communicative act, 
with audiences local, national, and even historical. What matters here is the 
urgency accorded to Bush’s so-called reaction, how it signifies, and to whom.  
“Reactions” in our cultural moment are emotional and sometimes verbal 
displays that, we suppose, have bypassed or preempted their otherwise 
constraining contexts: mediations, decorums, power relations, personal reflection, 
and so on. Reactions, we believe, communicate a spontaneous (and perhaps 
incomplete) act of affective processing—a kind of emotional reflex. It is because 
of this chronology, because reactions so closely follow their catalysts, that 
reactions are assumed to escape from constraints and contexts, and it is for this 
same reason that we assume reactions offer important emotional information.  
Exactly what sort of emotional information do reactions provide? 
Ironically, this depends upon the thing that reaction is supposed to escape: 
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context. Despite explicit or implicit claims that reaction sidesteps context entirely, 
context and framing play important roles in what reaction means for both its 
producers and interpreters. 
In some contexts, reaction might register as “authentic” insofar as it is 
apparently unstaged and unconstrained. In others, it might be interpreted as the 
emotional equivalent of a “tell”: a display that reveals inappropriate emotion, 
flawed character, concealed truth, and so on. This is precisely what seems to be at 
stake, for instance, in the revived debate about Bush’s 9/11 (non)reaction: the 
contextual framing that would answer once and for all what Bush’s emotions 
really meant. Nonetheless, it is not despite, but rather because of reaction’s 
supposed escape from constraining contexts that reactions are considered so 
important within various spheres of communication, from the intimate to the 
public.  
Consider reality television, where these spheres interestingly blur. Many 
reality series like The Bachelorette (in which an attractive woman breaks up with 
a series of potential romantic partners before an international TV audience) seem 
to be designed around the capture and circulation of privately-coded emotional 
reactions. Unsurprisingly, a bulk of the media coverage and online discussion 
following the 2011 Bachelorette star’s final breakup centered upon the intensely 
emotional “reaction” of the castoff Ben, and what it revealed about him, her, their 
relationship, the series itself, and reality TV generally. “As heartbreaking as it is, 
Ben is being so real with his reaction,” Helena Zhang posted on Twitter. “Hated 
ben all season until his reaction to being dumped by Ashley,” posted one Lizzie 
Sheehan. And hellohew tweeted, “I'm glad Ben had a real reaction to being 
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dumped by Ashley. I hate the usual BS. It makes sense to b pissed.” The rejected 
Ben’s reaction here is presented as a “real” or authentic emotion display that 
escaped any number of constraining contexts—what hellohew describes as the 
“usual BS.” Escaped constraints here seem to include not only the decorum of a 
personal romantic breakup but also the artificiality of “reality” television. These 
discussions of reality television clearly demonstrate that reaction is commonly 
understood to be a genre of emotion display that sneaks out from underneath or 
overwhelms its would-be constraints. Commentators recognized, and praised, 
Ben’s emotion display as a “reaction” because that display, in their view, 
bypassed the constraints that would otherwise force Ben to conceal what he was 
feeling internally. Ben, they suggest, displayed a reaction insofar as he allowed 
his emotion, in its intensity and immediacy, to break free of these otherwise 
controlling contexts.   
Reactions, as a genre, are also commonly associated with a particular 
recurrent rhetorical situation. Often, reactions are coded as interventions into 
something that is or was outside the emoting subject’s control. Ben’s reaction to 
the breakup on The Bachelorette, for instance, was variously understood as a 
strategic response to the rejection, to his manipulation at the hands of the show’s 
producers, and so on. Bush’s 9/11 reaction came at a kairotic moment of 
opportunity, where he was seemingly expected to display a more strategically 
effective emotion (disgust? rage? surprise?) and in doing so begin to exert control 
on an out-of-control situation. The reaction videos of Twilight fans, explored in 
the next section, similarly present themselves as interventions into a situation 
that is either out-of-hand or that has been sullied by others. Reaction, then, can 
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register as an attempt to strategically introduce one’s voice, whether literally or 
metaphorically, into a situation that is not of one’s own making. Reactions in this 
sense are deeply connected to power relations. Specifically, reactions are 
commonly understood as attempts to seize or take back power, to upend, disrupt, 
reestablish, or just momentarily interrupt, existing power relations. 
Reaction, as a pathetic genre, appears across media. Reactions do appear 
in, and as, verbal texts, texts composed of words. However, as the Bush and 
Bachelorette examples show, reaction is also composed and read in the languages 
of the body, including facial, vocal, and gestural expression. This means that 
different media inscribe reaction differently, perhaps even unequally. While 
verbal text can report or mimic body languages, video captures them more or less 
directly. With video, bodily expression can be reproduced and circulated across 
time and space. In the medium of video, bodily expression can become an image 
or even a whole text. Frequently, in the YouTube reaction video, this is precisely 
what happens.  
This does not mean that video is a superior medium than writing or image 
or speech, or that vlogs are inherently more “emotional” than texts in these media. 
It means only that vlogging allows rhetors to capture and (infinitely) reproduce 
bodily expressions of emotion—a unique affordance, perhaps, but one that is 
gained at the cost of others. As the Twilight reactions discussed below reveal, 
rhetors do employ the vlog, the reaction video, and emotion displays rhetorically, 
to intervene in public conversations. However, the reactions also demonstrate 
that these rhetorical choices (choosing the vlogging ceremonial, choosing the 
reaction genre, and choosing a highly emotional register) have consequences for 
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how their messages are interpreted and received, consequences that do not 
always square with the rhetors’ hopes and intentions. Emotion displays are 
produced and interpreted within generic frameworks, within pathetic genres that 
both create and constrain their meanings. If Twilight fans hoped that the 
newfound ability to emote publicly and spectacularly would bring them whatever 
they wanted, they were mistaken. While the emotion displays made possible by 
vlogging do in a sense enfranchise these reader/rhetors, giving them a public 
stage that they would otherwise lack, their emotion displays were still created and 
constrained by genre—specifically, the genre of the reaction, which at once gave 
these vlogs their power and reach, and diminished their potential rhetorical 
currency, by framing these emotions as impulsive and therefore potentially 
fleeting—at least for some viewers, viewers that included the novel’s author, 
Stephenie Meyer.  
Emotion as Intervention: Vlogging about Twilight 
On August 9, 2008, the Entertainment Weekly website posted a video 
interview with Meyer, the woman who created the Twilight saga. The interview 
aired shortly after the release of the bestselling author’s latest Twilight novel, 
Breaking Dawn. The interviewer opens by asking Meyer about the impassioned 
early response to the novel (Zuly89). 
“It’s been a really busy week,” Meyer responds, smiling. “You know, we 
didn’t get to be there for the midnight parties or all of that but I watched a lot of it 
on YouTube, just to see what was going on.” 
The interviewer laughs, perhaps a bit uncomfortably, and says, “You’re 
following everything on the internet?” Here, less than a minute into the 
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conversation, the modulation of the interviewer’s voice flattens out, goes quasi-
robotic, suggesting that despite the light tone, they’ve already entered into 
rougher waters, and she’s going to navigate carefully. Meyer’s eye contact 
momentarily breaks and her smile tightens, belying her nonchalance as she 
replies, in a cheerful cadence, “Oh yeah.” 
“Fan reaction to Breaking Dawn has been…” the interviewer pauses, as if 
searching for the right word. “wild. In both directions. There have been, like, I 
love this book, and some people who are like, you know, I have some questions 
about this book.” When describing the positive reaction, the interviewer seems to 
melt into her seat, her voice rising and falling as if to convey the affect of 
someone swooning. When she describes the negative reaction, her body and her 
voice tense up. The interviewer’s words tell us that there is a controversy 
surrounding the novel, but her affect—her body, her face, her voice—tells us more. 
It isn’t just that readers have different ideas about the novel, they also have 
different feelings about it. When the interviewer asks Meyer how she herself 
“feel[s]” about “some of the more unkind comments about the book,” it’s clear 
that they aren’t talking about critical reception, or really any particular ideas or 
claims or critiques about the book. Reviews here are not nearly as important as 
reactions. 
Despite its imposing length (756 pages in the hardcover first edition), 
reaction videos responding to the novel appeared incredibly quickly. Released at 
midnight on August 2, by the end of the day, many readers had already devoured 
the novel and were crowding the internet, sharing their thoughts and feelings 
about it. Rather quickly, it became clear that reaction to the novel was, at best, 
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mixed. Perhaps conflicted, or even confused, would be a better word: as one 
young fan put it, “there’s been some uproars, good and bad uproars, all over the 
Internet” (ActualxReality22). The controversy was indeed spread “all over” the 
fandom and its established digital gathering-places: message board forums, blogs, 
social media, and so on. But although though there were many rhetorical genres 
open to them, many of these readers elected to express themselves on the video-
sharing site YouTube, through extempore vlogs that they titled “review” or 
“opinion” pieces, as in “Breaking Dawn: My Feelings” or “*GASP* A Positive 
Breaking Dawn Review!!!”—or “reaction” pieces, as in “Breaking Dawn Reactions” 
and “My reaction to a certain part of Breaking Dawn (No Spoilers).” 
Titles aside, these vlogs share a number of conventional features (fig 3.3). 
They display an individual or small group of individuals, usually girls or young 
women. The camera’s gaze centers on the face and upper body of the subject, 
allowing the viewer full access to his or her facial and gestural expression. The 
setting is domestic (almost exclusively so) and frequently a bedroom. The videos 
can be rather long, featuring detailed, point-by-point exploration of the novel. 
Finally, most videos explicitly respond to other videos and commentary on the 
novel, framing themselves as an intervention in an ongoing dissensus—a term I 
am using to describe something that resembles a controversy, but is actually 
centered on feelings rather than ideas or claims.  
That this a dissensus, rather than a controversy, is clear in how it is 
described in Breaking Dawn reaction videos: 
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•  “I donʼt know why people didnʼt like it...I hope you werenʼt 
disappointed, as most people were” (Lails08)  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Breaking Dawn reaction videos. Clockwise from top-
left.  
• KourtTWLOHA. “Breaking Dawn Review ((SPOILERS!))” 
YouTube. 22 August 2008. Web. 21 October 2011. 
• TechNBailey. “The Breaking Dawn Experience: Review.” 
YouTube. 23 August 2008. Web. 21 October 2011. 
• Maggiehanna. “Reaction to Breaking Dawn (Spoilers).” YouTube. 
3 August 2008. Web. 21 October 2011. 
• Jessihhcuhh. “My reaction to a certain part of Breaking Dawn.” 
YouTube. 3 August 2008. Web. 21 October 2011. 
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• “Hey guys...I thought since you know the whole commotion 
with Breaking Dawn is in the air Iʼd add my two cents in.” 
(howeverchill) 
• “I canʼt believe it. I was gone for a week and I got on all these 
forums and YouTube videos and theyʼre all so negative and 
then thereʼs a video of Stephenie Meyer who is so hurt by 
this. I just feel bad for her” (Howeverchill) 
Each subject’s description of the rhetorical situation is described in terms 
associated with emotion. Readers are “disappointed,” either with the book or 
their fellow fans. What needs to be addressed, according to these exigency-
statements, is not so much the book itself (its merits as literature or 
entertainment) but the turbulent currents of emotion it has set loose: the 
“commotion” and “uproars,” the disappointment and “feel[ing] bad,” ”the 
“complaining” and the “hurt” among not only fans or readers generally, but also 
Twilight producers such as author Stephenie Meyer.6 
Did this dissensus emerge because readers were making emotionally 
charged reaction videos? Or did readers make reaction videos because of the 
emotionally charged dissensus? Seemingly, both. What matters is that as the 
dissensus took shape, rhetors seemed to recognize that vlogging and specifically 
the reaction video genre, which some rhetors explicitly acknowledged and played 
                                                
6 Howeverchill’s notion that Meyer is “hurt” apparently comes from the 
Entertainment Weekly interview mentioned earlier. Tellingly, at the height of the 
dissensus, a YouTube user Zuly89 uploads this nearly hour-long interview to 
YouTube in six parts, retitling it “Stephenie Meyer’s Reaction to Breaking Dawn 
Complaints.” This reframes the interview, making it another emotion display in 
the ongoing dissensus that is playing itself out on the Internet. Before long, it has 
accrued thousands of user comments—and inspired reaction videos of its own! 
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with, provided affordances for the bodily display of emotion that other genres did 
not.  
Readers of course had a wide variety of established rhetorical genres 
available to them, including formal reviews, blog and message board posts, letters 
to the author or publisher, fan fiction, vids,7 letters to newspaper editors, and 
more. Readers of Breaking Dawn, in fact, expressed themselves in all of these 
genres. Like any large-scale controversy, the uproar over Breaking Dawn did not 
confine itself to a single genre, platform, or medium. However, vlogging became 
particularly important in this controversy because it was able to capture and 
circulate the languages of the body—because, in other words, it allowed rhetors to 
capture instantaneously bodily emotion displays that otherwise would have to be 
filtered through visual or textual representations.  
Vlogging and the reaction video genre, in other words, became kairotic 
because this emotional exigency seemed to demand an emotional response. 
Specifically, they offered special affordances that became more and more 
attractive to would-be rhetors as the Breaking Dawn dissensus took shape, 
namely their ability to capture and circulate emotion displays, through facial, 
vocal, and gestural action. This, seemingly, was why so many readers seeking to 
intervene in the dissensus turned to vlogging: because it allowed rhetors to 
readily communicate their own emotions to a larger public that, they believed, 
                                                
7 Vids are fan-produced videos that expand upon or otherwise interpret a 
canonical text by remixing images and audio from other pop culture texts: though 
they are often posted on YouTube, such videos do not usually involve webcams or 
any photographic image of the uploader. 
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werenʼt thinking properly—and more importantly, werenʼt feeling properly about 
the novel.  
Another reason many readers expressed themselves through the reaction 
video was that the rhetorical situation seemed to demand emotional immediacy. 
Other genres of response (letters to the author or publisher, or even YouTube 
mash-ups and vids) take considerable time to produce, but vlogs can be 
composed and published within minutes. This immediacy seems crucial to those 
who created Breaking Dawn reaction videos. For example, Maggiehanna opens 
her vlog by emphasizing its (rushed) timing: “August 3rd, 2008,” she begins, “It’s 
2pm Eastern Standard Time and about an hour ago I finished this book [holds up 
a hardcover of Breaking Dawn].” Chattering with the breakneck pace and 
wandering course of a teenager who barely slept the previous night, Maggiehanna 
shares her thoughts and emotions about various happenings in the novel, 
gesturing wildly throughout (refer back to Figure 3.3) and alternately expressing 
concern, disgust, shock, puzzlement, and pleasure. Like Maggiehanna’s frenetic 
clip, most Breaking Dawn reaction videos begin by stressing their own rhetorical 
and emotional immediacy. Readers not only sought to broadcast their reactions 
right away, so that they could address an urgent exigence, they also sought to 
capture those reactions while they were still fresh and unprocessed. “Just got the 
book! Just got the book!” jessihhcuhh shrieks at the opening of her reaction video. 
“Okay, so I just finished Breaking Dawn,” begins JebpyHP, who also stresses in 
the uploader description that this is her “initial” or immediate reaction. Another 
young woman prefaces her reaction, “I just finished the book” (karamaraih). The 
vlogger here, Mariah, explains that while she usually vlogs with a friend named 
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Kara, she isn’t sure Kara has finished the book yet—and she wanted to share her 
reaction right away. Another vlogger calling herself Tuesday captures two 
reactions in all their immediacy (FantasticTwiHards). First, we witness the thrill 
of anticipation as Tuesday opens a box from Amazon.com. You can almost see the 
butterflies as she unwraps the novel from its packaging, breathy and giggling: 
“I’m freaking out a little bit,” she says, before cracking the spine and indulgently 
smelling its contents. “I’ve been dying for this book for a year.” At 2:00, the video 
cuts to a radically different scene, and a radically different reaction. Holding her 
now visibly worn copy of the novel, Tuesday addresses author Stephenie Meyer 
directly: “This book really sucks. [ . . . . ] You disappointed me.” Tuesday’s 
comments, along with the sadness and frustration apparent in her affect, 
illustrate once again that readers created reaction videos to address a dissensus, a 
misalignment of emotions. They also illustrate how producers of reaction videos 
hope to achieve rhetorical and emotional immediacy; as Tuesday later admits, 
she has captured and published her reaction video even before she has finished 
reading the book. Readers of Breaking Dawn composed reaction videos, then, so 
that they could address a public dissensus through emotion display, and so that 
they could capture those emotions quickly, publishing their vlogs while both the 
dissensus, and their own emotions, were still fresh.  
Online video sharing’s affordances for emotion display help explain why 
potential rhetors would turn to vlogging and the reaction to intervene in this or 
any dissensus, but cannot explain this response fully. Affordances are only part of 
the story: for the other half, we must attend to genre. Affordances may make an 
utterance possible, but it is genre that makes an utterance meaningful to others. 
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Without the templates of the “reaction” and “reaction video,” and the inventive 
and interpretive powers they grant, all of these videos would be 
incomprehensible to viewers. Of course, these videos perplex and even anger 
many of their viewers, as the page comments clearly demonstrate. However, the 
fact that so many of these videos appeared, that they garnered so many views, 
that they constantly cite and respond to one another, and that they created 
enough of a stir that they would be discussed in a mass media interview with the 
novel’s author suggests that many did indeed find them meaningful, even 
persuasive. What meaning did producers and viewers find in these videos, then? 
Why did so many Breaking Dawn readers share and seek out “reactions” in 
particular? 
As my earlier analysis showed, reaction is a pathetic genre, a genre of 
emotional and sometimes verbal display that, we assume, has escaped or 
overwhelmed its constraining contexts. The Bachelorette’s Ben, for example, was 
believed to show a “reaction” insofar as his display of anger broke through the 
constraints otherwise imposed by politeness, by the conventions of reality TV, 
and so on. Breaking Dawn reaction videos present themselves as similarly 
unconstrained. This is particularly evident in the videos’ sometimes-excessive 
length (TechNBailey uploads her video in no less than eleven clips, each lasting 
ten minutes), their informal tone (many of them begin with the cozy greeting 
“Hey guys!”), their wandering course, and their utter lack of editing.  
One could argue that the immediacy and unrehearsedness of these 
reaction videos are more products of laziness or technical inexpertise than they 
are products of deliberate rhetorical artistry. Even if they are unpolished, 
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however, isn’t this still part of what gives these videos their meaning? What gives 
them, for many viewers, their sense of unfilteredness, of rawness or authenticity? 
Perhaps these are shoddy pieces of work, but the fact remains that what we might 
look for in a reaction video is very different from what we might look for in a 
published book review in a newspaper, or even a polished book review prepared 
for school, even if that review were composed by one of these same young women. 
Just as viewers look to Bush’s reaction for his “true” feelings about 9/11, viewers 
look to reaction videos for “true” feelings about the novel, for emotion displays 
unconcealed by decorum and uneroded by time or thoughtful reflection.  
The unconstrained character of reaction videos is also apparent in vloggers’ 
comments, and particularly their apologies and retractions. Tuesday, for example, 
apologizes again and again for expressing her disappointment: “Um, I’m sorry, 
Stephenie, I feel like I’m disappointing you by saying that it sucks, but I kinda feel 
like you disappointed me, in a way” (FantasticTwiHards). By apologizing, 
Tuesday presents her own emotion as inappropriate and excessive. By 
apologizing, Tuesday admits that she probably shouldn’t be sharing her response 
publicly, but that she couldn’t help herself. Her emotion, she implies, has 
overflowed the dam of constraint.  
Other vloggers show that their emotions are unconstrained by issuing 
retractions. In the description of her YouTube video (in text that appears just 
below the video frame), the fiercely disappointed JebpyHP stresses that this is 
her “initial” reaction only—and that her feelings later shifted. “Okay so I DID like 
some parts of the book. This [video] is my initial reaction.” Retractions like these, 
however, seem a bit halfhearted. After all, despite the vlogger’s change of heart, 
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she did not remove her video from YouTube. We are left to conclude that 
retractions like these are rhetorical, designed to present the emotions expressed 
as immediate and unconstrained, rather than to nullify them. JepbyHP wants 
viewers to know that her feelings have shifted, not so much to alter the emotional 
message of her video, but rather to reinforce it, by presenting that emotion as 
wholly unconstrained, and therefore genuine.  
Here we begin to see how the rhetorical logic of the reaction video (which 
derives its force from emotional immediacy and rawness) also provides an 
opportunity for viewers to critique and dismiss the emotional messages 
transmitted by those videos. In a seeming paradox, JepbyHP’s retraction 
reinforces the emotions displayed by suggesting they later dissipated. This a 
potential fault line in the reaction video’s rhetorical logic—a weakness that 
Twilight author Stephenie Meyer would later use to dismiss readers’ reactions to 
her novel. 
In my earlier discussion of reaction, I explained that, as a pathetic genre, 
“reaction” can imply certain power relations. In short, reactions are often coded 
as interventions into something that is or was outside the emoting subject’s 
control, registering as attempts to strategically introduce one’s voice, literally or 
metaphorically, into a situation that is not of one’s own making. (This is one 
reason, seemingly, that they are re-actions, we might say, rather than simply 
actions.) Specifically, reactions are commonly understood as attempts to seize or 
take back power, to upend, disrupt, reestablish, or just momentarily interrupt 
existing power relations. For this reason, the remediation of reaction into the 
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reaction video raises questions about the distribution of power and voice among 
media producers and consumers.  
Much has been made, of course, of the democratizing potential of YouTube, 
and its ability to “broadcast” the ideas and attitudes of everyday people. The view 
of YouTube as progressive force was perhaps best illustrated when Time 
Magazine chose to celebrate “You” as their Person of the Year for 2006, a 
recognition normally given to celebrities, politicians, and other public figures. 
With a cover that mimicked the YouTube interface, Time editor Lev Grossman 
declared that it and other Web 2.0 platforms would provide an “opportunity to 
build a new kind of international understanding, not politician to politician, great 
man to great man, but citizen to citizen, person to person.” 
And it is true that online video sharing gave ordinary readers of Breaking 
Dawn a way to circulate their feelings about the novel. In this sense, the 
technologies that allowed readers to remediate reaction into the reaction video 
are progressive, giving voice (or screentime) to rhetors who previously may have 
lacked any reasonable access to the public sphere. Looking at these videos in 
terms of genre, however, complicates this emancipation narrative. Just because 
Breaking Dawn readers were able to circulate webcam videos of themselves, 
doesn’t mean that they radically transformed their subjectivities, that is, the 
positions from which they speak, or the kinds of things that they are able to 
communicate. After all, these readers did not choose to upload “critique” videos: 
they chose to upload reaction videos. Why reactions? Because even before online 
video sharing made the reaction video possible, fan reactions already held 
meanings and significances for any number of audiences: for the media 
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producers who desired information on their target markets, for publics with 
longstanding fascinations with the emotive excesses of fans, and for other 
Twilight fans already drawn into intense emotional relationships with local and 
digital peers. In this sense, the reaction video seems to reproduce existing 
mediated power relationships within a new technological frame—one in which 
producers still produce, fans still react, and publics still watch fan frenzies with a 
mixture of perplexity, disgust, and delight.  
In her interview with Entertainment Weekly, Stephenie Meyer dismisses 
the negative “reaction” broadcast by readers online by safely positioning that 
reaction squarely within those existing power relationships. Rather than 
recognizing the authenticity and legitimacy of readers’ negative emotional 
reactions, and reaction videos, Meyer re-casts these emotions as the fleeting 
frenzies or “freak out[s]” of hysterical “fans.” When the interviewer asks Meyer 
about these negative reactions, the author responds by predicting they will be 
short-lived: 
Well, I’ve actually named it the “Rob effect.” For some reason, I 
don’t know, it just takes the fans a couple days to get used to 
something. And it was most obvious when they announced who was 
going to be playing [the central character in Twilight] Edward, and 
everyone freaked out, and there was all this online controversy, and 
now everyone completely loves [the actor who was cast,] Rob[ert] 
Pattinson. [ . . . . ] So I was expecting it. (Zuly89) 
The immediacy and unconstrained character of “reaction,” as a genre of emotion 
display, here allows Meyer to completely disregard her readers’ disappointment 
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and angst, portraying these emotions as ephemeral and even predictable. While 
delivered more courteously, Meyer’s snub echoes many of the dismissive 
comments on reaction videos, comments like the ones quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter, questioning NuttyMadam3575’s sanity. Like these cruder 
commenters, Meyer dismisses reactions as impulsive, short-lived, and ultimately 
irrelevant. It is important to note, however, that Meyer is able to dismiss 
reactions for the very same reason that readers believed that reaction would be 
rhetorically effective—because, as a pathetic genre, reaction registers as 
immediate and unconstrained.  
Perhaps understandably, many Breaking Dawn readers felt insulted and 
demeaned by Meyer’s words here—so much so that many readers subsequently 
signed an online petition titled, simply, “Legitimate Concerns About Breaking 
Dawn.” The petition demands that Meyer and her publishers respectfully 
acknowledge readers’ grievances: 
The thing that has upset me the very most is Meyer's reactions to 
her fans. "The Rob Effect" comment was insulting and belittling. 
We just don't "get" it yet, but we'll like it once we come around? 
Meyer, do you realize that The Rob Effect is most certainly taking 
place, but in the opposite direction? Once the hype and midnight 
delirium began to wear off, many former fans began to have more 
and more issues with your final chapter in this series. You are 
dismissing real, legitimate concerns instead of really listening to 
your fans and answering them in a respectful way. No, you can't 
please everyone, but when such a large percentage of your fanbase 
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is crying "Foul!" it's time to reevaluate what you have done. We are 
not a fringe few that have unrealistic complaints. We were your 
faithful fans who loved to sneak off into the Twilight world. [ . . . ] 
We are the people that you asked to come along with you on this 
journey, and we are disappointed. Will you please answer us in a 
respectful manner? 
Interestingly, the petition uses the term “reaction” not only to describe the 
emotions of readers, but also Meyer’s dismissal of readers’ emotions. In both 
usages, the petition attempts to give weight and significance to what Meyer has 
diminished, insisting that reactions do matter, that for good or ill they have 
purpose and rhetorical weight. It attempts to illustrate that, however unmindful 
or impulsive, reactions tell us something. Though her comments were brief, 
Meyer’s reaction had an impact on her readers. Likewise, the petition insists, 
readers’ reactions ought to have had an impact on Meyer and others behind the 
novel. Ultimately, the petition illustrates how the reaction genre can become the 
grounds for a rhetorical tug-of-war, with one side insisting that reaction’s 
immediacy and lack of constraint give this pathetic genre authenticity and weight, 
and the opposite side suggesting that these same properties render it fleeting and 
irrelevant. 
In the end, neither those who created reaction videos, nor those who 
dismissed them, earned a clear rhetorical victory. However, it is clear that the 
reaction video’s emergence did alter the rhetorical landscape of the Twilight 
fandom, however subtly. Even if it did not produce tangible change, it is all too 
apparent that the intensity and accessibility of readers’ reactions to Breaking 
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Dawn on YouTube did produce a good deal of unease, both for the author herself, 
and for the fans, who seemed to sense something shifting in their relationship to 
the series, its producers, and to other fans. Rather ironically, it was the fan who 
would become most (in)famous for her reaction videos who sensed this shift most 
acutely.  
At the height of the dissensus, NuttyMadam3575 uploaded her five-minute 
webcam jeremiad, “im getting really sick of all the breaking dawn haters!!!”, a 
vlog that lambasts fellow fans, not only for upsetting the author but also for 
shaking up the emotional circuitry of the fandom: 
I am very, very disappointed. How can you act like this? After 
reading that amazing book—not shit, not boring, not glorified 
fiction...A-maz-ing boooook. Iʼm gonna say it real clear. AMAZING 
BOOK. Youʼve been waiting for, for what, a year? And youʼve been 
thinking about how wonderful itʼs going to be, and youʼre dying to 
get your hands on it, because itʼs gonna be so good. ...And then you 
complain about it? Because itʼs not what you wanted? Since when 
do you get what you want by complaining? (NuttyMadam3575) 
Here, NuttyMadam3575, the queen of the reaction video, berates her fellow fans 
for sharing their impulsive, un-thought-out emotions on YouTube: “Your brain 
obviously isn’t working right now,” she accuses. These reactions, she senses, 
aren’t proper within the established order of things. Upset fans here are 
“ungrateful,” and their expressions of dislike are not legitimate concerns or 
grievances but unwelcome and inappropriate “complaints.” Here, 
NuttyMadam3575, in an attempt to dismiss the emotions of her fellow fans, gives 
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them a different genre-label. Reframed as complaints, rather than reactions, the 
emotion displays of her fellow fans take on different, and less subversive 
meanings. While the petition discussed earlier presents readers’ “reactions” as 
raw and authentic emotions, arising out of “legitimate concerns” about the novel, 
NuttyMadam3575 reclassifies those emotions as unworthy illegitimate 
“complaints,” as bellyaching. With this subtle rhetorical move, NuttyMadam3575 
once again illustrates the power of genre to shape how we create and interpret 
those displays. Simply by switching their genre-label, the vlogger casts readers’ 
emotions in a radically different, and much harsher, light. 
 Like the previous chapter, which revealed how vlogging can be deceptively 
dialogic, promoting back-and-forth exchange between vloggers and viewers, this 
chapter’s exploration of emotion affirms that vlogging is an inherently interactive 
or participatory form, whose meanings and uses are never fully determined by 
the original vlogger, but rather are created collectively by those who produce, 
view, comment on, embed, and share these videos. NuttyMadam3575’s rhetorical 
relabeling of readers’ emotions as complaints, rather than reactions, is only one 
example of how vlogs get continually reframed and reinterpreted. The 
contemptuous comments posted to NuttyMadam3575’s own reaction videos 
provide another example, as they dismissively relabel her “reaction” as a “seizure” 
or “orgasm.” The following chapter extends this discussion of vlogging’s 
participatory character, examining how the ethos or credibility of more 
informational vlogs is assessed, and indeed co-created, by their viewers. Like 
confession and reaction videos, witness videos suggest that vlogging, despite 
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appearances to the contrary, is a profoundly collaborative and distributed 
rhetorical practice. 
  
 
Chapter 4 
The Witness Video: Vlogging and the Problem of Online 
Credibility 
Introduction 
The 2010 Gulf of Mexico Oil Spill was an incomprehensible disaster, one 
whose massive scope and complexity perplexed all involved: the corporation that 
caused it, the governments that were slow to intervene, the Gulf residents who 
suffered its effects, and the broader publics who struggled to understand just 
what was happening and how they might respond—rhetorically and otherwise. 
Because the spill flowed unchecked for so long (nearly three months) and spewed 
forth such a spectacular volume of pollutants (about five million gallons of crude 
oil), many called the disaster “unprecedented,” as it devastated the ecosystem 
and the regional economy like no manmade disaster before it (“Times Topics”). 
Equally unprecedented was the scope and complexity of the disaster as a media 
event. Earlier oil disasters like the 1989 Exxon Valdez earned attention from the 
national and international press, along with discussion on an earlier incarnation 
of the internet. And in 2005 the drama of Hurricane Katrina played out across a 
broad range of media. Nonetheless, for many the 2010 Gulf spill was the first 
disaster to play out in a significant way via new media and online video. Much 
more so than the Exxon Valdez and even Hurricane Katrina, the public witnessed 
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the Gulf spill through the media kaleidoscope of the internet and its decentralized 
architecture—a shift that created an array of rhetorical opportunities and 
challenges for disaster victims, witnesses, concerned citizens, and the like, along 
with a host of interpretive challenges for those who sought to learn about and 
make sense of the disaster as they gazed into this online kaleidoscope. 
Online video proved particularly central as many turned to YouTube both 
to follow the disaster and to circulate their own messages about its unfolding. For 
example, millions watched the live “spillcam” posted to the internet by British 
Petroleum (BP), the oil company responsible for the disaster (Jansen and Keilar). 
Broadcasting twenty-four hours a day, underwater cameras streamed video of jet-
black oil surging relentlessly into the Gulf. The spillcam helped make the Gulf 
spill, in the words of environmental historian Brian Black, “the first real-time 
environmental disaster on record” (743). Discussion surrounding the spillcam 
revealed just how important the internet and online video had become to the 
disaster as media event. Eventually, the spillcam proved so popular and so 
powerful that BP reversed course and attempted to shut it down, perhaps 
recognizing that its release had backfired and galvanized public sentiment against 
them. In an unprecedented acknowledgement of the internet’s importance to 
public discourse and democracy, the White House and Congress intervened, 
pressuring BP to keep the spillcam going. In a statement, Congressman Edward 
Markey wrote, “This may be BP’s footage, but it’s America’s ocean. Now anyone 
will be able to see the real-time effects the BP spill is having on our ocean” (qtd. 
in Black). In doing so, Markey affirmed the perceived importance of the internet 
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and online video to the public’s understanding of and emotional engagement with 
the ongoing disaster. 
 Though the spillcam became the most influential online video of the 
disaster, many found additional rhetorical uses for online video. For example, 
many who were unhappy with press coverage of the disaster turned to vlogging to 
circulate their own messages about the spill’s progress and effects, presenting 
themselves as witnesses to the ongoing disaster. However, those who hoped that 
the YouTube platform would provide a safe haven from commercial spin and 
corporate PR were to be sorely disappointed, for quick to join disaffected and 
disenfranchised vloggers on YouTube was BP itself. About a month after the 
initial explosion, BP introduced its own YouTube channel and began promoting it 
heavily. Featured on the channel were BP-produced witness videos that 
mimicked the format and features of witness vlogs created by the disaffected, but 
which contradicted their messages, speaking of hope and progress and a quick 
return to normalcy.  
While the credibility of the “spillcam” seemed beyond question, this 
jumbled stream of witness vlogs presented both viewers and would-be composers 
with a serious challenge—the challenge of credibility. In a field crowded with 
claims and claimants, how could composers create an effective public ethos? How 
could they work to persuade the public they were trustworthy? From a viewer’s 
perspective, conversely, how could witness vlogs be evaluated? How could 
viewers decide which would-be witnesses they could and could not trust? 
Addressing these and other questions, this chapter examines how YouTube users 
handled the problem of credibility as they composed and viewed video 
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testimonials related to the 2010 Gulf disaster. In this particular rhetorical 
situation, composers and viewers alike faced, in crystallized form, a challenge 
that YouTube and internet users face every day—the problem of online credibility. 
The Witness Video Genre 
Portable and relatively inexpensive cameras, along with video sharing 
platforms like YouTube, are allowing everyday people to videorecord events of 
public interest that they believe are being overlooked or neglected by professional 
media, and to present those events to audiences large and small, more or less 
instantly. In this “witness video” genre, the YouTuber becomes a kind of amateur 
reporter, broadcasting to the public events and stories that they believe aren’t 
getting the attention they need or deserve.  
New media scholar Anandam Kavoori identifies the “Witness” video as one 
of YouTube’s most important genres, carefully differentiating the witness vlog 
from other shared recordings of daily life: “Properly delineated from other more 
selective, random, and often trivial recordings of daily life, the Witness is 
characterized [ . . . ] by the recording of public experience” (154). While what is 
private and what is public is subjective and ever shifting, to condition Kavoori’s 
definition, we might say that witness videos are those that make a claim 
(explicitly or implicitly) that what they record is of public interest.  
As Kavoori, along with Mary Grace Antony and Ryan J. Thomas, have 
shown, the witness video is a well-established genre of user-generated public 
video, one with rich variations. Some witness videos are simply “raw” footage of 
stunning or tragic events: videos of tsunami waves tearing through Japanese 
cities (RussiaToday), videos of supposed UFO sightings (Sheilaaliens), videos of 
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traffic accidents (cfm4life), and of college students being unjustly tasered. Antony 
and Thomas base their study on one particularly disturbing witness video, a well-
known and controversial videorecording of a man being shot and killed by Bay 
Area Rail Transit Officers. Kavoori describes similar witness videos that chronicle 
the demolition of buildings, executions (including that of Saddam Hussein) and 
psychological breakdowns.  
These sorts of witness videos offer the event as a pure spectacle, but other 
witness videos, like the vlogs I analyze in this chapter, are more narrative in 
nature. Rather than (or sometimes in addition to) the audiovisual spectacle of 
events, these vlogs offer personal accounts or testimonials of those events. We 
can differentiate between the two varieties of witness video by identifying who, in 
a given video, the implied witness is. In the first variety of witness video, the 
viewer of the video is the implied witness (seeing the event “firsthand” in the 
viewing window). In the second variety of witness video, the witness vlog, the 
individual onscreen is the witness, as they share what they have seen or heard or 
experienced with a public who, they believe, needs to know. These videos are not 
about witnessing, but rather about witnesses. 
Witness Videos and Media Convergence 
Witness videos like these have been held up as prime examples of the 
power of the internet, YouTube, and other Web 2.0 platforms to give voice to the 
masses, to democratize media, and generally to introduce into the public sphere 
concerns and questions that professional media, in their supposed thrall to 
corporate and political interests, would otherwise overlook or ignore. The 2005 
arrival of Web 2.0, for example, was heralded as a new stage in the evolution of 
 117 
the web in which users supplanted producers (authors, designers, webmasters, 
etc.) as the primary creators of online content, making the internet more 
interactive, collaborative, and democratic (O’Reilly). Online video sharing and 
YouTube, its largest platform, were widely praised as transformative Web 2.0 
technologies. Time Magazine placed YouTube at the center of its celebration of 
Web 2.0 in 2006, when they recognized “You” as their “Person of the Year.” 
Editor Lev Grossman, calling YouTube the “million-channel people's network,” 
claimed that this and other Web 2.0 platforms would democratize media, 
“bringing together the small contributions of millions of people and making them 
matter.” Going further, he presented YouTube and Web 2.0 as vehicles for 
bottom-up social revolution: “It's about the many wresting power from the few 
and helping one another for nothing and how that will not only change the world, 
but also change the way the world changes.”  
For some, the witness video represents, in its purest form, video sharing’s 
potential to transform media and even “the world.” Antony and Thomas express 
hope that what they call “participatory media technologies” might counteract the 
omissions, misrepresentations, and homogenizations of “mainstream mass 
media,” which they claim exert too powerful an influence over the public sphere, 
influencing “what issues may be deemed newsworthy and the corresponding level 
of importance they are afforded” (1283). The internet including online video offer, 
for these scholars, the possibility of a more open and diversified public sphere, 
one in which everyday individuals, rather than media corporations, help set the 
agenda. Thanks to new media, they explain, 
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Participatory media technologies that allow for the creation and 
distribution of user-generated content overturn traditional notions 
of all-powerful news media that define and restrict a largely passive 
audience. In other words, traditional power dynamics that separate 
sender and receiver are shifting and blurring. [ . . . ] New 
communication technologies have made it possible for members of 
the public to take on the responsibility of representing common (i.e., 
non-elite) interests and actively participate in the creation and 
dissemination of information. (1283-1284) 
While it may be true that the internet, YouTube, and the witness video have made 
it “possible” for media to take on a more democratic character, this does not 
mean that democratization is inevitable. In his study of witness videos uploaded 
to iReport.com, the more skeptical Farooq A. Kperogi argues that corporate 
media will not cede control over the public sphere so easily. Specifically, Kperogi 
claims that, while “the flowering and proliferation of web-based citizen 
journalism” has indeed expanded and diversified the public sphere, citizen media 
is being aggressively coopted by “corporate media hegemons” (315). In short, 
Kperogi argues that by controlling the platforms themselves, that is, sites like 
iReport and YouTube, corporate media are still effectively setting the agenda for 
the public sphere, still determining what is important and what is newsworthy, 
albeit through subtler means. By manipulating interfaces and controlling sorting 
algorithms, these so-called hegemons still exercise considerable influence over 
what viewers will see—and not see. Through these insidious means, according to 
Kperogi, the process of democratization is being perversely reversed: “online 
 119 
citizen media are actually being coopted into the culture and conventions of 
mainstream media practices” (315), effectively providing free labor and free 
content for corporate media. Rather than creating awareness of marginalized 
issues, witness videos, Kperogi suggests, may simply be providing fodder (or 
more accurately, footage) for the same old corporate media mills and their self-
interested narratives.  
Bringing together these two schools of thought on new media paints a 
complex and admittedly confusing picture. On the one hand, there is agreement 
that the internet is opening new avenues to the public sphere, avenues that serve 
as alternatives to mass media. On the other hand, there is the claim that mass 
media is quickly learning how to capitalize on or even control these seemingly 
democratized avenues for expression. Taking a broader view, Henry Jenkins, in 
Convergence Culture, reminds us that we needn’t choose between these two, 
seemingly competing narratives. Jenkins describes the current media landscape 
as one of “convergence,” in which the roles played by media producers and media 
consumers blur and break down.  
Convergence, as we can see, is both a top-down corporate-driven 
process and a bottom-up consumer-driven process. Corporate 
convergence coexists with grassroots convergence. Media 
companies are learning how to accelerate the flow of media content 
across delivery channels to [ . . . ] reinforce viewer commitments. 
Consumers are learning how to use these different media 
technologies to bring the flow of media more fully under their 
control and to interact with other consumers. [ . . . ] Sometimes, 
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corporate and grassroots convergence reinforce each other, creating 
closer, more rewarding relations between media producers and 
consumers. Sometimes, these two forces are at war [.] (18) 
Media convergence, in which the messages and motives of disparate rhetorical 
actors effectively dissolve into one another, adds new layers to an old puzzle, the 
puzzle facing those who turned to online video sharing to learn about the BP oil 
spill—namely, the puzzle of credibility. Specifically, those who turned to YouTube 
to learn about what was happening in the Gulf encountered a morass of witnesses 
and claims, one further muddied by media convergence and specifically the 
convergence of the witness vlog with BP’s corporate crisis management. This 
chapter performs an intertextual analysis of witness vlogs and comments on 
those vlogs in order to explore how YouTube users construct and assess the 
credibility of informational videos generally and witness videos specifically. 
Credibility and Vlogging 
 YouTube advertises itself as a platform to “broadcast yourself.” Those of us 
who remember earlier media epochs might associate the notion of “broadcasting” 
with the spread of news or information. However, YouTube’s “broadcast” 
architecture hosts information-based content (like our witness video) a bit 
uncomfortably. While the YouTube interface provides ample equipment for 
spreading videos (through its handy linking and embedding tools, for instance) 
the interface provides few options for assessing the credibility of videos and the 
claims they present. Instead of encouraging assessment, the YouTube interface 
instead encourages movement (the movement of videos from viewer to video, as 
well as the movement of the viewer from video-to-video). In doing so, it 
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discourages activities like assessing or dwelling, frustrating viewers’ abilities to 
evaluate the credibility of any information or claims a video might offer.  
With certain videos whose information claims seem especially important 
to the public interest, however, YouTube users do cobble together ways to 
evaluate credibility, particularly using the site’s (hotly debated) “comment” 
function. In this way, credibility on YouTube emerges not from the author or 
even the video itself, but rather out of their interplay with the interpretive activity 
of viewers—that is, out of the larger vlogging ceremonial (see Chapter Two). The 
ethos of any given video, then, is created in large part by the framing of viewer-
commenters, who resist the interface’s call to constant movement, and who 
instead stay to assess and contextualize the video, and to share their findings with 
other viewers via comments. 
 The difficulty of credibility assessment on YouTube and other video-
sharing sites is a new incarnation of an old problem—the problem of online 
credibility. From the mid-nineties, scholars of online communication including 
Nicholas Burbules, Barbara Warnick, and Laura Gurak have frequently described 
online credibility as a “problem” (Burbules 442, Gurak 93). The credibility of 
online communications is a “problematic” matter for any number of reasons 
(Warnick 46). For one thing, as Burbules and Warnick emphasize, the authorship 
of web content is so often diffuse or indeterminate. For instance, as Warnick 
points out, websites are frequently “coproduced,” their authorship “distributed” 
among any number of persons or entities, from designers to copywriters to 
commenters, advertisers, and so on (45). As Burbules recognizes, “how to 
differentiate credible from fraudulent information is not a new problem, but 
 122 
unraveling these in the context of a vast rapidly changing networked system is” 
(442). This is perhaps especially true as media convergence continues to blur the 
boundaries between commercial and amateur web content and muddy the 
process of authorship generally. 
At first glance, the authorship of YouTube videos seems much clearer and 
less diffuse than the earlier, text-and-image, pre-social media web content 
analyzed by Warnick and Burbules. Incorporating features usually associated 
with social media like Facebook and Twitter, YouTube videos have clearly 
identifiable authors, or, to use the site’s vocabulary, identifiable “uploaders,” as 
we can see in Figure 4.1.  
At the time of this writing, in summer 2012, the interface surrounding any 
given video displays the identity of the uploader rather prominently, and, 
through an array of links, allows viewers to learn more about the uploader, or at 
least watch more of his or her videos. On the webpage that frames any given 
video, the uploader’s username is included above the viewing window, alongside 
a link enabling the viewer to “subscribe” to that uploader’s videos. Beside the 
username and subscribe link, the interface prominently displays a number; this is 
a count of how many videos the uploader has shared on the site. The count also 
doubles as a drop-down menu offering quick access to those videos. Below the 
viewing window, the uploader’s username is repeated in a boilerplate phrase 
repeating the username of the uploader as well as dating the video, as in 
“Uploaded by HistoryTours on Jun 22, 2010.” In this way, markers of authorship 
(uploadership?) frame the video, in a literal, visual sense, surrounding it from 
above and from below.  
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While it would be a stretch to claim that YouTube’s interface attempts to 
establish the “expertise” of uploaders, it does seem designed to establish some 
flavor of credibility, a credibility that seems tagged to an individual uploader. 
Specifically, it suggests that the uploader’s history of activity on the site, the 
longevity and volume of his or her participation, might give the viewer a read on 
the reliability, or at least the currency, of the video being watched. Through its 
array of uploader-related links, it encourages the interested viewer to watch more 
of the uploader’s videos, creating a path that viewers can follow to learn more 
 
Figure 4.1: A witness video claiming that it was raining oil due to the Gulf 
spill. From HistoryTours. “Oil Rain in Louisiana?” YouTube. 22 Jun 2010. 
Web. 31 Mar 2012. 
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about the uploader longitudinally. Certainly, not all viewers will follow the paths 
that YouTube has laid out for investigating user histories, and perhaps some will 
never look at the uploader’s username at all. Nonetheless, the interface (as 
currently designed) does allow viewers to make a limited assessment of the 
video’s and uploader’s credibility, with credibility here being limited to a measure 
of the uploader’s participation on the site itself.  
A history of the user’s activity on the site, however, seems a very imperfect 
source for assessing credibility, and can only take a viewer so far in evaluating the 
trustworthiness or untrustworthiness of informational content. Indeed, the 
mechanisms I have described are all movement-mechanisms, and can just as 
easily move a viewer’s attention farther and farther away from the video they 
originally hoped to evaluate. Further, while YouTube foregrounds the uploader’s 
user- or account name, these names usually reveal little to nothing about the 
uploader beyond his or her participation on the site. This means that when, for 
example, a witness stands before a camera and shows his or her face, he or she 
can nonetheless remain effectively anonymous. Even if users click their way to an 
uploader’s main page or “channel,” the information presented there about the 
uploader tends to be quite minimal. Figure 4.2 shows the channel page for user 
“HistoryTours,” who during the 2010 BP spill uploaded a witness video claiming 
that it was raining oil in Louisiana. Again, the user’s participation on the site is 
foregrounded. Here, the user chooses to share his real name and profession at 
top-left, but this is optional, and actually quite unusual. Beyond his name, we 
might look to the “About” section to assess the uploader’s credentials, but here we 
find only that he claims to be an “actor, journalist, cajun chef and youtube legend.” 
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This text emphasizes again how YouTube’s systems for assessing credibility (if 
they can be called that) are largely self-referential. Just as the design of the 
channel page foregrounds the volume and velocity of the user’s participation, 
especially the number of his views, subscribers, and videos, here in the “About” 
section the user establishes credibility by reference to his own “legendary” 
participation in the site. In short, YouTube’s formal systems for assessing the 
credibility of videos, at least those systems that allow us to investigate the identity 
or credentials of the author, offer only closed loops that refer viewers back to the 
platform itself.  
However, as Warnick reminds us, credibility is about more than 
authorship and credentials—or, at least, can be. Writing in 2007, Warnick places 
online credibility within an enlightening historical frame, reminding us that the 
 
Figure 4.2: A YouTube user “channel.” From HistoryTours. “Actor Casey 
Nunez.” YouTube. 22 Jun 2010. Web. 31 Mar 2012. 
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changes in communication and credibility we are currently seeing are far from 
unprecedented. Credibility varies over time and across cultures, she argues, 
becoming constructed and assessed differently across different cultural moments, 
and even across different media and genres within the same moment. From 
Warnick’s broadened perspective, if there is in fact a “problem” with online 
credibility, it is not a problem inherent in the medium itself, but rather a problem 
within our perception and understanding of that medium. The true problem, 
Warnick insists, is that users and scholars alike remain clinging to a notion of 
credibility that is diminishing in its relevance and utility, an outdated notion of 
credibility that might be called “source credibility” or “credentialism.”  
According to Warnick, credentialism is the “modernist” notion that a 
message’s credibility should be assessed by referencing the established reputation 
or expertise of the author or entity producing the message, whether that producer 
is Walter Cronkite, Dr. Phil, the BBC, or our supposed oil rain witness, YouTube’s 
HistoryTours. When we assess a message’s credibility according to its credentials, 
we look not at the message, but rather behind it. Credentialism, Warnick writes, 
came into vogue during the nineteenth and twentieth-century dominance of the 
commercial media industries, which tended to produce branded messages with 
“readily identifiable authorship” (45). For any number of reasons, however, 
credentialist assessments online become difficult if not impossible, as our 
analysis of the YouTube interface has shown. For one thing, web content is 
frequently coproduced and/or produced (psuedo)anonymously. For another, 
even when information about authorship is provided (as it is on YouTube) that 
information is rarely included to establish the expertise or reliability of the author, 
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as it might be for an article in a trade journal, a newspaper column, or a pamphlet. 
Instead, paths to learning more about the author(s) of content are usually 
hyperlinked slides propelling the viewer to consume more and more of the 
author’s content, not to learn about his or her “credentials,” in Warnick’s 
modernist sense. 
So how do we create and assess credibility online? Warnick argues that 
online credibility is “field dependent.” Borrowing this term from the philosopher 
Stephen Toulmin and his work, The Uses of Argument, Warnick claims that 
credibility is constructed and assessed quite differently from field to field, so that 
internet users approach websites about film and websites about health and 
medicine with very different assumptions about what determines their credibility, 
even though both types of sites exist within the same web medium. 
Further, and more importantly for our discussion of the witness video, 
Warnick and Gurak suggest that credibility online is far less about credentials—
about who is behind the text—and far more about ethos, about how the author 
creates a sense of credibility and character within the text itself. In this way, 
credibility online works more like credibility in ancient rhetorical theory, and less 
like credibility on the CBS Evening News. As Warnick explains, credibility in the 
time of Aristotle was primarily a textual construction:  
In Athens in the fourth century BCE, for example, ethos was tied to 
the speaker’s character as portrayed in the speech itself (ethos) 
rather than to any external knowledge of the speaker’s position and 
education (source credibility). [ . . . ] Audience perceptions were 
based on how the speaker constructed a view of himself as 
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possessing such traits as courage, self-control, prudence, and 
liberality that were in accord with the values of Athenian culture. 
(46) 
In other words, in discussing credibility, ancient rhetorical theory downplays the 
social position of the speaker (source credibility), and instead emphasizes the 
credibility that is created within the rhetorical performance itself (ethos).  
My discussion of the YouTube interface affirms that credibility is indeed 
field dependent, differing considerably not only from credibility in professional 
media, but also from credibility on the sort of HTML-based, text-and-image web 
that Warnick’s study concentrates on. Online video sharing sites like YouTube, 
while still hosted on the HTML-based web, differ significantly in two ways. First, 
and most obviously, they introduce the element of video, previously alien to (or 
awkward on) the web, but eventually pushed through HTML-based sites using 
browser plug-ins, especially Adobe’s Flash. Second, but equally important, online 
video sharing sites also include social media structures that make issues of 
authorship and credibility look much different than they did on Warnick’s more 
dispersed and faceless web. 
The participatory architecture of YouTube, as well as the culture of 
dialogue surrounding the vlogging ceremonial, makes the credibility of 
informational online videos an intertextual and interactive construction. 
Credibility here involves the dynamic interplay of the video itself with the 
subsequent rhetorical activities of its viewers and commenters along with their 
interactions with the uploader. While Warnick and Gurak argue that credibility 
on the pre-social web resembles the classical notion of ethos, I argue that 
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credibility in a social media environment is a profoundly collaborative and 
always-ongoing activity. On YouTube specifically, videomakers attempt to 
construct textual credibility or ethos using various techniques; viewers as they 
comment and embed the video reframe it in ways that affirm, change, or 
undermine its credibility; uploaders then sometimes respond to viewers 
comments in attempting to regain credibility, and so on. What emerges from all 
this rhetorical activity is a kind of distributive credibility that viewers can then 
assess, intertextually, by consulting the video and its various comments and 
contexts. But it doesn’t stop there. Viewers can then, if they so choose, participate 
in this ongoing credibility-making process, by commenting, embedding, or 
otherwise sharing the video in ways that reframe the message’s legitimacy. This 
distributed credibility does not reside exclusively in the author or the text itself 
but rather gathers or accretes around online videos, and is always potentially 
ongoing. 
While it may be especially visible and important on YouTube, credibility is 
interactive and distributed in all rhetorical transactions including online texts of 
all kinds. Kristie Fleckenstein articulates the interactive and distributed nature of 
credibility in her exploration of digital poetry, “Who’s Writing: Aristotelian Ethos 
and the Author Position in Digital Poetics.” Like Warnick, Fleckenstein returns to 
Aristotle’s discussions of ethos to articulate her theory of online credibility. The 
difference between their engagement with Aristotle is that, while Warnick uses 
Aristotle to emphasize the textual nature of credibility (in other words, how it is 
constructed in the text), Fleckenstein uses Aristotle to emphasize the interactive 
and distributed nature of credibility; in other words, how it is constructed across 
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texts and contexts. In Fleckenstein’s reading, “Aristotle constructs a concept of 
ethos that emphasizes the liquid movement among speaker, audience, scene, and 
context, offering a powerful lens for re-seeing author positions in digital 
poetics”—and also, I would add, for understanding the credibility of video sharing 
and other online rhetorics. Like the interactive digital poems described by 
Fleckenstein, YouTube’s participatory architecture allow users to interact with 
and impact the text. While opportunities for users to modify the original video 
are limited, the YouTube interface allows viewers to comment on and re-embed 
videos and in the process reframe their meaning and credibility. Fleckenstein 
explains that this sort of digital interactivity only formalizes the intrinsically 
distributed, ecological, or networked nature of ethos, which even in classical-style 
oratory “circulates throughout the network of bodies, communities, and moments” 
and becomes “a product of the ecology of rhetor, audience, scene, and city-state.” 
Fleckenstein here reminds us that credibility, even in texts that aren’t 
functionally interactive, is always the product of a negotiation between rhetors 
and audiences/communities, a negotiation that, despite being sometimes 
invisible or implicit, is no less real. While Warnick is right to point out that 
credibility is constructed within-the-text, and that credibility online is field 
dependent, differing from context to context, Fleckenstein adds another layer of 
insight, showing that the author can never create credibility unilaterally. In the 
classical agora and on YouTube, the author in constructing their credibility must 
take into account their audiences and their values, expectations, and tastes. 
Furthermore, in online environments, the author must relinquish the text into a 
formally interactive environment where viewers can comment on, re-embed, and 
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otherwise reframe the information presented, each participating in an ongoing 
process of distributed credibility. 
We can see this construction of distributed credibility in (and around) two 
witness videos: the first uploaded by a concerned citizen, and the second 
uploaded by BP. Even texts that use nearly identical textual strategies for 
constructing ethos, for projecting authority and good character, nonetheless 
accrue quite different credibility, thanks to the collective efforts of their viewers. 
As they share their own assessments of videos, viewers help construct distributed 
credibility. They offer their fellow viewers valuable context as well as possible 
ways to assess the information presented in the video.  
The following study illustrates how viewers contribute to the distributed 
credibility of videos by posting comments through the YouTube interface. My 
analysis suggests that YouTube’s current interface makes collective credibility 
assessments possible, but admittedly somewhat difficult. Specifically, I suggest 
that YouTube’s interface (as of summer 2012) provides an imperfect environment 
for collective assessment efforts, for two reasons. First, the interface promotes 
constant movement and discourages viewers from dwelling on individual videos. 
Second, YouTube’s comment system lacks organization and currently offers no 
good method for sorting or navigating through comments, which on popular 
videos number in the hundreds or thousands and vary widely in quality and 
relevance. Nonetheless, I conclude that distributed credibility remains a reality, 
since viewers continue to assess videos’ credibility well beyond the YouTube 
interface. Viewers also share credibility assessments wherever they embed, link 
to, or discuss videos online: in blogs, through social media, on news sites, and so 
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on. Each assessment becomes available to fellow viewers through searches or 
hyperlinked wanderings, and thereby adds to the distributed credibility of online 
videos.  
Distributed Credibility and the Witness Video 
Jennifer Rexford was an oil cleanup worker for BP. In the months 
following the cleanup, she began posting an emotionally gripping series of 
YouTube videos that document the intensifying of her illness and despair. This 
illness she claims was caused by her participation in BP’s Gulf cleanup program. 
Specifically, she claims that during the cleanup she was exposed to harmful 
dispersant chemicals used irresponsibly and inappropriately by BP. Holding a 
shaking camera at an awkward angle, in an early video titled “Sick P2S 
worker.wmv,” she tells the story of her illness in fits and starts. 
Haltingly, her voice full of sadness, Rexford explains that she is suffering 
from “multiple boils, staph infections, and other things,” blaming her 
deteriorating health on BP, its cleanup contractor P2S, and their disregard of 
safety regulations: “P2S many times ignored OSHA regulations, telling us we 
would be safe in the conditions that we worked in. And, unfortunately, we 
weren’t.” Rexford not only describes but visually documents her symptoms on 
camera. Acknowledging that her symptoms are grotesque, she brings the camera 
close to her body, all the while apologizing for exposing herself in this way.  
Now I’m going to try to PC as possible show you…if I can get into 
the light…[ heavy breathing ] I’m sorry I’m trying to get into the 
light here and get a decent picture…um, I actually don’t want to 
show my butt cheeks…I’m trying not to show my butt itself…but um 
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these are scars from previous boils…These are scars that are 
continuing to pop up, pop down…and I hate showing this but it 
drives me crazy because I have to get my word out somehow. 
(jmrexford, “Sick P2S Worker.wmv”) 
Rexford closes her video with an intense emotional appeal (Figure 4.3) that is not 
only a plea for personal help, but a public outcry, urging viewers to pass on her 
story and raise awareness that she, Rexford, is only one among many suffering:  
All I gotta say is people are sick here [ . . . . ] We are suffering, and 
we are suffering bad. And if anyone can help, or if anyone out there 
hears our story, please, please [ . . . . ] Please, don’t kill off the Gulf. 
Just don’t kill off the Gulf. Genocide. Genocide is not right. And this 
is chemical genocide. And it will no longer be tolerated. [ . . . . ] 
Please, take back the Gulf. 
In a video posted a month later, Rexford displays her continuing deterioration 
and desperation (“BEFORE GOING IN OAK HILL”).  
I am now losing feeling in my right arm. And this twitch that you 
guys see in my face constantly—my face has just been moving on its 
own. By the end of the day I can’t control my lips and uh I can 
barely hold fluid into my mouth. My left pupil is always dilated and 
they’re saying that I’m having neurological damage. [ . . . ] I want to 
document my illness and our situation. We need help. I don’t know 
what else to do. They’re going to let us die. They’re going to let us 
die. 
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The 339 comments posted on the page for this vlog offer a window into how 
viewers assess its credibility—and into how they participate in the creation of that 
credibility. Reviewing these comments, it becomes clear that Rexford’s intense 
displays of emotion, as well as the graphic displays of her physical symptoms, 
create for many viewers a strong sense of credibility, even though she is a 
complete stranger making provocative claims and offering little in the way of 
context or background information. 
Most comments express sympathy for Rexford and/or promise to share 
the video to bring attention to the plight of her and other BP cleanup workers. 
“My heart and prayers go out to you and your family,” writes a typical 
 
Figure 4.3: Cleanup worker Jennifer Rexford’s first vlog. From Jmrexford. 
“Sick P2S worker.wmv.” YouTube. 13 January 2011. Web. 8 April 2012. 
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sympathetic commenter. “I’ve shared this on my Facebook. As a resident of 
Lafourche Parish here in Louisiana, I’ve been trying to get the word out as much 
as possible. I hope and pray that something can be done…” (CrimsonVelvet1). 
Another sympathetic commenter, clearly affected by Rexford’s emotional address, 
writes: “I’m praying for you sweetheart and I’ve shared this video with people I 
know…crying for you dear one…” (axolotlmafia). Clearly, many viewers saw the 
video as credible because they perceived Rexford’s emotions as authentic, raw, 
and real. Other commenters affirmed Rexford’s credibility and emotional 
authenticity, not by expressing sympathy with Rexford, but by directing outrage 
toward BP and other perceived culprits:  
BP is so full of shit. Their approach to the disaster has been to use 
dispersants to hide the oil, and not to clean it. This method of doing 
it on the cheap is just so typical of corporate America. I can't think 
of anything poignant to say, because this video speaks for itself... 
It's times like these I wish I had faith so that I could pray for these 
people. Unfortunately the way that we must fix this is through 
policy. End Corporate Government. End the Capitalist scam. 
(alextoob) 
Whether they expressed sympathy or outrage, these sorts of emotional comments 
tended to affirm and extend the video’s credibility, as well as its emotional tenor. 
This last commenter’s statement that the “video speaks for itself” perhaps best 
sums up how these viewers assessed its credibility: arrested by Rexford’s 
emotional and physical displays, they cannot doubt that her story is credible. 
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 Other sympathetic commenters were more purposeful, stressing the 
importance of spreading the video widely and getting attention for Rexford’s and 
her co-workers’ plight both on the internet and in mainstream media. As one 
fairly representative “spreader” wrote, 
[ . . . ] You should e-mail about your plight to CNN or BBC, heck, 
ALL OF US should e-mail your plight to CNN or BBC. 
Reblogging/retweeting/posting on Facebook spreads awareness but 
we can do much, much more. Send it to your local newspaper, your 
blog, anything as long it’s a source of media that can help spread all 
the BP worker’s plight. (RandomEpicUsername) 
Spreader comments like these don’t always explicitly affirm the legitimacy of the 
video’s claims. Nonetheless, they express conviction that her story could use 
more attention and further investigation, extending her what might be called 
provisional credibility. This comment, for instance, affirms the “plight” of 
Rexford and other BP workers and emphasizes the importance of “spread[ing] 
awareness.” Most comments on the video, in fact, emphasized “spreading” above 
all else, revealing these users’ assumptions about the power of social media to 
draw public attention, and give credibility to, issues and stories ignored by 
mainstream media. In these hundreds of calls to “share” Rexford’s video, viewers 
clearly hoped to build up its (distributed) credibility.  
 A few responses, perhaps a dozen of the 339 comments, question 
Rexford’s claims or express frank skepticism. “More evidence required please,” 
writes StargateMunky with cold directness. Some of the skeptical commenters, 
despite their questioning, show sympathy for Rexford’s apparent suffering. “The 
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twitch might only be Bell's Palsy, which is not a big deal,” writes one sympathetic 
skeptic, alternating between expressions of compassion and incredulity. “A friend 
of mine had it and it ended up going away. Have you had your blood tested for 
any of the material in the the dispersant? Best of luck, my thought and heartfelt 
wishes are with you and the other workers” (zavatone). Other skeptical 
commenters show little or no sympathy. One simply comments, “fake” 
(danogizmoprophet). Others go further in their accusations. “Just another 
american nut job looking for some money. I am so fucking sick of american and 
its people,” spits jordanjcm.  
Not all skeptics, though, are full of bile. A few offer intense close readings 
of the video, looking for evidence to call Rexford’s claims into question: 
i'm sorry about inquiring about your symptoms, but you have me 
curious as to why your entire face muscle is pulling up for your eye 
twitch. if your eye had nerve damage, the twitches in the eye are 
from the brow to the fold below your eye, why is your face muscle 
pulling up from your mouth? i can't see that being involuntary 
unless you had parkinson's or there was electricity involved 
considering how the muscles are pulling or being pulled. (qubeh) 
Skeptical commenters like these call into question the video’s larger claims by 
examining small inconsistencies or possible factual errors. Even when offered 
with a touch of sympathy, questions raised by skeptics tend to give rise to debates, 
often heated, in which the video’s credibility is more deeply debated in the 
comment thread: 
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Easy to fake facial twitch? Let's see you do it. I can't. You viewed 
propaganda so you think reality is faked? There's LOTS of 
chemicals that cause nerve damage that don't TELL you that...like 
formaldehyde. 5 years in a formaldehyde soaked FEMA camper left 
me disabled with neurological problems amongst others....you want 
to say that's faked, too? (NoirAngelique) 
This last comment affirms the video’s credibility by offering additional context, a 
rhetorical move practiced by both the sympathetic and the skeptical. Here, the 
context offered is the commenter’s personal experience with harmful chemicals 
and their effects, a context that backs the original video’s claims. Another, cruder 
commenter offers a similar context, in sharing his or her personal experience 
with “raunchy chemicals.” In this case, however, the personal experience is 
intended to undermine rather than undergird Rexford’s claims: 
[ . . . ] I've worked around raunchy chemicals and other than having 
the urge to eviscerate politicians and other lying sacks of shit, am 
fine. [ . . . ] don't post that you're sick unless you learn how to lie 
better. (DoDilly188) 
Personal experience is one context that YouTube commenters bring to assess the 
credibility of videos; another context they bring is information. In the comments 
on “BEFORE GOING IN TO OAK HILL,” believers and skeptics alike posted 
contextual information to back or belie Rexford’s claims. Here is one exchange 
between two commenters, the skeptic qubeh and the sympathetic carahert, about 
the possible effects of the chemical dispersants in question. 
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the harmful component of corexit 9500 is 2-butoxyethanol, which 
can, in really high concentrations, get as bad as pulmonary edema 
and hemolysis, but as far as i know it dissipates into the air into 
reasonable enough amounts within days. (qubeh) 
Replies carahert: 
Humm. Now look up the INGREDIENTS: Propylene Glycol: 
Potential Chronic Health Effects: Slightly hazardous in case of skin 
contact (sensitizer). CARCINOGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. 
MUTAGENIC EFFECTS: Not available. TERATOGENIC EFFECTS: 
Not available. DEVELOPMENTAL TOXICITY: Not available. The 
substance may be toxic to central nervous system (CNS). Repeated 
or prolonged exposure to the substance can produce target organs 
damage. (carahert) 
It is in this activity, this sharing and debating of contextual information, that 
viewers contribute most clearly to the distributed credibility of the video. In 
posting this contextual information in comments, viewers take what would 
otherwise be an internal or private process of assessing credibility, and share it 
with other viewers. In this way, they participate in the ongoing process of framing 
the video and constructing its credibility. Subsequent viewers, when they visit the 
page for Rexford’s video, not only have access to her claims and appeals, they also 
have access to the collective credibility-assessments of previous viewers, posted 
in the form of comments. If they are unsure whether to believe what Rexford is 
saying, they can turn to the contexts (information and personal experience) 
offered by commenters to support or subvert her claims. They can consult the 
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close readings offered by both believers and skeptics to look deeper into the video. 
They can scan the expressions of sympathy and cynicism to get a feel for how the 
video is resonating with other viewers. In short, the comments posted to a 
witness video or other informational video on YouTube can potentially influence 
a viewer’s assessment of that video’s credibility. 
 This is not to say, however, that a YouTube viewer’s assessment of a 
video’s credibility is objective. Again, despite having little to no evidence to back 
up her claims, Rexford’s video garnered comments that were overwhelmingly 
supportive, sympathetic, and largely unquestioning, with the skeptical and hostile 
comments I have quoted representing only a small minority of the 339 comments. 
Interestingly, the reverse is true of witness videos uploaded by BPplc, the public 
relations YouTube account created and promoted heavily by BP in the wake of the 
Gulf spill. The overall rhetoric of BP’s witness videos is strikingly similar to the 
rhetoric of Rexford’s videos. Like the witness videos of Rexford and Craig’s, BP’s 
witness videos present themselves as provocative “countermessages,” messages 
calling for attention to issues being overlooked or misunderstood. Specifically, BP 
uploaded two series of videos featuring Gulf residents who bear witness to “what 
is really going on” down there: one, “Voices from the Gulf,” mimics many features 
of amateur witness videos, but with slicker production values. In addition to 
being posted to YouTube, “Voices from the Gulf” videos were also aired as 
commercials on television. 
The second series, “Gulf Snapshots,” were uploaded to YouTube only, and 
more closely approximate the amateur cinematography (or lack thereof) 
characteristic of other witness vlogs. Shot with a single, low-resolution camera, 
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seemingly unrehearsed, and recorded in a take or two (with the stumbles and 
pauses to show for it), “Gulf Snapshots” present themselves squarely within the 
witness vlog genre. Consider "Gulf Snapshots: Nicole Scott, Emerald Coast, 
Florida” (Figure 4.4) This cheery but grainy video (uploaded, significantly, 
around the same time that Jennifer Rexford began uploading her witness vlogs 
claiming that the Gulf’s beaches were poisoned) features a monologue by Gulf 
resident Nicole Scott and her upbeat assessment of the state of the Gulf. After 
praising the virtues of nearby beaches and claiming that “the beaches are looking 
packed,” Scott sums up her testimony in a closing sound bite: “Clean. Ready for 
 
Figure 4.4: A BP-produced witness video. From BPplc. “Gulf Snapshots: 
Nicole Scott, Emerald Coast, Florida.” YouTube. 3 May 2011. Web. 2 May 
2012. 
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business. Excited for business.” 
 The 23 comments posted on this vlog’s page, however, mostly attack and 
undermine its credibility. Here, we see the same sorts of credibility assessments 
being made of Rexford’s vlog, but with their polarity largely reversed. While 
many posted promises to share or pass on Rexford’s video and get it the attention 
it deserved, here many commenters express hope that through their participation 
they can squash the video and gag BP: 
hey youtubers help me report and "dislike" every bp video on 
youtube maybe we can get them removed for a day:D!! (xalicaix) 
Though the sentiment is turned upside down, comments about squashing a video, 
like comments about spreading a video, reveal a belief that viewers have the 
power to uplift or undermine the credibility of a video through their collective 
rhetorical action. Some commenters, like this one, clearly overestimate or 
overstate their power over the site’s content or the credibility of that content; 
despite xalicaix’s efforts, the video remains publicly available nearly a year after 
its uploading. Nonetheless, comments like these do hint at a subtler but very real 
power available to viewers: the power to comment and in doing so reframe a 
video and affirm or call into question its credibility. 
 Commenters on the “Snapshots” video, like commenters on Rexford’s 
video, also expressed skepticism, but here skepticism (and bile) became the norm 
rather than the exception. Some commenters simply scoffed at the video: 
“HAHAHAHAHAHA! Keep these vids coming BP. No ones buying into this PR 
crap LOL” (OceanRide1). Many other commenters extended skepticism through 
close analysis of the video, recalling commenters’ questions about Rexford’s 
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twitching eye and other symptoms. Responding to Scott’s statement that “the 
beaches are looking packed,” many commenters point out that despite the video’s 
being set on a beach, few beachgoers are visible in the background: “sweetie 
Miami Beach is more packed on dead season, I think iv seen 12 people on the 
beach [ . . . ] The beaches are looking dead” (ak6081). One skeptical commenter 
closely analyzes Scott’s body language, believing he’s found evidence that she is 
conflicting or lying: “while shaking her head no she proclaims the beaches are 
packed....” (howardalexrice).  
As with Rexford’s video, other commenters assessed the video’s credibility 
by bringing in context. Here, too, some offered context by bringing in personal 
experience: 
I was standing RIGHT where this was filmed earlier this year. The 
CHEMICAL stench in the air was horrible at night. I talked to some 
local about what it was I smelled. They won't go in the water. Yes, 
the sand is white. The water is a beautiful coke bottle green & 
crystal clear. It's absolutely beautiful. I heard the impact from the 
blowout was minimal there; however, given the chemical smell at 
night and the fact the locals I talked to refused to go in, I'd think 
twice before swimming in it. (Search4TruthReality) 
As with the Rexford video, others offered context in the form of information: 
BP and the GCCF have no intention of "making it right" for people 
in the Gulf. 
Gulf Coast Claims Facility (GCCF) is aiding in downplaying BP 
connection of chemical illnesses and other medical issues stemming 
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from the BP oil disaster while over 130,000-plus claimants have 
filed lawsuits countering these egregious claims, now consolidated 
in Louisiana federal court,. (junk11111111) 
In short, commenters who assessed the credibility of witness videos tend to 
employ similar strategies, including 
• offering support or skepticism, 
• vowing to share or squash the video,  
• performing close analysis of the video to test it claims, and 
• contributing context in the form of relevant personal experience or factual 
information.  
No matter which strategy they use, when they comment, viewers do more than 
simply reveal their own personal assessments. Certainly, the comments analyzed 
above offer a window onto the individual assessment processes of YouTube 
viewers. Equally important, these commenters formally participate in crediting 
and discrediting videos, contributing to videos’ distributed credibility or 
interactive ethos, in a way anticipated by Fleckenstein. Commenters offer fellow 
viewers possible ways to approach and contextualize the information offered. 
Thanks to YouTube’s social media architecture, viewers who happen upon either 
of these videos now have abundant commentary that they can consult in forming 
their own judgments about the video’s credibility.  
Limitations of the YouTube Interface for Assessing Credibility 
As the above analysis demonstrates, YouTube’s comment system allows 
videomakers and viewers to collectively negotiate the credibility of informational 
videos including “witness videos.” However, that credibility-negotiation is not 
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always orderly and accessible, at least within YouTube’s current interface. To 
categorize the types of comments related to credibility, and to put them in 
dialogue with one another, requires a long and laborious process, one that I 
doubt any YouTube user would bother to undertake outside of formal study. As 
most who even dabble in YouTube know, YouTube comments are infamous for 
being chaotic, capricious, and sometimes viciously crude. The concept map in 
Figure 4.5, by online cartoonist Jessica Hagy, illustrates a typical attitude towards 
YouTube comments. It suggests that Charles Darwin’s The Origin of the Species 
and YouTube comments offer equal proof that “people are animals.” Scott Monty, 
the head of social media for Ford Motor Company, expresses a similar attitude in 
his blog: 
 
Figure 4.5: Illustration by Jessica Hagy of Indexed, poking fun at the crudity 
and incivility of YouTube comments. From Hagy, Jessica. “Our true natures.” 
Indexed. 8 August 2011. Web. 10 April 2012. 
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How many sensible and well-reasoned comment threads have you 
seen on YouTube? [ . . . ] The number you're looking for is ZERO. 
All too often the threads devolve into inane commentary, not to 
mention hateful or offensive language. There's a definite lack of 
civility going on there. 
Despite his otherwise sanguine attitude towards the “million-channel people’s 
network,” Time Magazine editor Lev Grossman expresses revulsion towards its 
comments and their crudity: “Some of the comments on YouTube make you weep 
for the future of humanity just for the spelling alone, never mind the obscenity 
and the naked hatred.”  
To be frank, the comments I have presented in my analysis above have 
tended be those that are most civil, while I have left out of my analysis those that 
spew hostility, including many comments for example that simply harass the 
ailing Rexford about her weight and appearance. The truth is that civil, well-
meaning, and well-informed comments on YouTube videos, the type that would 
help other viewers make judgments about a video’s credibility, are frequently in 
the minority. Many have speculated about why YouTube comments tend to be so 
crude, but the simplest answer is that the platform has no effective system in 
place, whether top-down or crowdsourced, for moderating comments. Certain 
comments can be hidden or deleted if enough users report them as being hateful 
or irrelevant, but this is far from a systematic way to address the problem of 
incivility and fly-by-night commenting. The continuing prevalence of crudity in 
YouTube comments makes the sort of distributed credibility I have described 
more of an ideal or possibility than an everyday reality. While it is true that 
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others, like this scholar, can sit down for hours to separate the wheat from the 
chaff, it seems unlikely that many will dwell long enough to piece together the 
sort of distributed credibility I have described above. 
 Helpful comments are not only scarce on YouTube, they are also difficult 
to find. In its 2012 interface, YouTube displays comments simply chronologically, 
with the newest first and the oldest last. Granted, YouTube offers some limited 
mechanisms for foregrounding popular comments; by pressing a “thumbs up” 
icon, users can help promote certain comments, with the most popular appearing 
directly underneath the video. Besides this, however, comments simply appear in 
a chronological list, as in an antique guest book, with no way for users to 
reorganize or sort through the sometimes-overwhelming mass of comments. This 
lack of organization is clearly an impediment to the ideal of distributed credibility 
I have described above. 
 Even to access the corpus of comments on a particular video, if they 
number more than a few, requires clicking through several, hard-to-locate links. 
YouTube’s interface, with its flashy sidebar offering related videos, makes it much 
easier and more attractive to move on to the next clip, than it does to dwell on a 
single video or dive into the depths of its comments. The implications of 
YouTube’s push-forward interface, encouraging constant movement from video 
to video, become serious when videos present competing informational claims. 
While researching this chapter, several times I visited the page for a witness video 
making claims against BP, only to find that YouTube had allowed BP to place a 
highlighted ad for a countermessage, a counter-witness, in the top-right corner, 
as recommended viewing (Figure 4.6). 
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Here we encounter what Jenkins calls “media convergence” in one of its 
most corrupt and confusing forms, as the edges between amateur and 
professional content, and citizen and corporate messages begin to blur. Here we 
also see how the idealistic “democratization” envisioned by the likes of Grossman 
comes up against the “hegemonic cooptation” envisioned by Kperogi. While a 
generous onlooker, observing this crossroads of the citizen and the corporate, 
might conclude simply that opposing sides are being allowed to voice their 
perspectives, nonetheless, we can see how this kind of convergence, abetted by 
YouTube’s heavily lubricated interface, along with its advertising-hungry 
business model, makes assessing or even considering the credibility of 
informational videos a problem. 
 Furthermore, as my comparative analysis of the two witness videos shows, 
viewers’ credibility assessments are far from objective. Instead, they are bent or 
 
Figure 4.6: An anti-BP video featuring ad for a BP-sponsored video. From 
gulfoilspill. “Proving Corexit Poisoning-Civil Engineer Marco Kaltofen-Gulf 
Oil Spill.” YouTube. 3 September 2010. Web. 1 May 2012. 
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biased by the values of the (online) community. Though nobody had ever heard 
of Jennifer Rexford before she started making provocative videos and claims, 
most commenters seemed to believe her, and contributed comments that 
buttressed her credibility. Conversely, because Nicole Scott’s video was uploaded 
by BP, essentially all commenters expressed extreme skepticism and distrust, 
with one going so far as to contradict the visual evidence presented, claiming that 
the clean-looking water had been doctored: “i bet that was a lot of working 
photoshopping frame by frame. though, i guess it was worth it because as a result, 
you didn't actually have to clean the gulf coast to make this video” (aschaevitz). 
As Gurak notes in her early study of “cyberspaces,” online communities like “any 
community of shared values” tend to give credibility to messages that already fit 
their value system. Noting this distortion of perception and evaluation, Gurak 
laments that 
 “truth” does not always prevail, especially in the highly specialized 
spaces of the Internet. [ . . . ] communities often become self-
selecting and may not challenge the information they obtain in 
cyberspace forums. Instead, they choose to believe it because 
certain messages appeal to their shared values. [ . . . ] The current 
structure of the Internet is thus the classic double-edged sword: 
while it allows for many people to connect with each other across 
space and time, it may also, especially in the discrete communities 
of Usenet groups and discussion lists, promote insularity and offer 
fertile ground for unchecked information. (85) 
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Guided by Gurak’s insights, we see that the credibility assessments of Rexford’s 
and Scott’s videos seem to center less on the claims themselves and more on the 
values behind those claims. Rexford’s claims are believed because of the values 
held by those who participate in the YouTube community, which has strong 
strains of anticorporatism and distrust of mainstream media. For much the same 
reasons, Scott’s claims are disbelieved more or less automatically, even though 
there is no evidence that BP compensated her for her statements. 
 Despite YouTube’s problematic commenting interface, and despite the 
community biases apparent in comments, distributed credibility remains a useful 
concept for understanding how we construct and assess the credibility of 
YouTube videos and other online content. Perhaps it is asking too much of 
YouTube to provide better mechanisms for collectively assessing credibility, when 
it already provides a complex architecture for hosting and sharing video content. 
Whether YouTube ever becomes a place where users can construct and assess 
credibility more effectively, distributed credibility nonethless remains a reality, 
and not only for the patient YouTuber willing to dive into the murky and 
unsightly depths of a video’s comment thread. Happily, distributed credibility is a 
reality that flows well beyond the bounds of the comment thread on a given video, 
extending out into the wider web, crossing through various online communities 
and their distinct values, and coursing through all those places where videos are 
embedded, linked to, and mentioned. For example, a quick search pinpoints a 
blogger who has been diligently (perhaps obsessively) investigating Rexford’s 
claims and publishing the results, calling it “inconsistent” and concluding that it 
is a “fiction” and a “fraud” (Fat Lester). Furthermore, on the social news site 
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Reddit, we find an in-depth, factually based, and comparatively civil discussion of 
Rexford’s videos and claims (FluoCantus). A few excerpts from the 430 
comments on the page devoted to her video should give the flavor of the exchange, 
which differs considerably from the YouTube comment thread. Here, one 
commenter provides informational context: 
Neurological damage is a known effect of hexane exposure. Hexane, 
a hydrocarbon, is a common component in crude oil. It's very likely 
that oil cleanup workers were exposed to hydrocarbons (you know, 
since that's what they're cleaning up), which are sufficient to 
explain all the symptoms that people describe. (Reductive) 
Another Reddit user comments, closely analyzing the video: 
Breaking down the youtube video: the author of the video claimed 
numbness and tingling that she had numbness in her right arm 
which could be an atypical presentation of n-hexane poisoning. She 
also has some sort of efferent oculomotor nerve problem that is 
keeping her from constricting her left pupil, and she is also have 
facial fasciculations which is indicative of a few different things on a 
differential diagnosis. These are all atypical presentations of n-
hexane poisoning as far as the literature shows, so her problems 
could be compounded by something else. She could also have 
myasthenia gravis which explains her lip muscle weakening 
throughout the day, fasciculations in her face, and nasal voice. 
In short, all the types of credibility assessment present in YouTube comments can 
also be found here on Reddit, though in a more accessible and organizable 
 152 
interface. This is because Reddit’s interface is carefully designed to spark 
intensive discussion, and reward positive contributions to that discussion. Every 
user has the ability to “upvote” or “downvote” a comment, pushing the most 
helpful, well-informed, and civil comments to rise to the top.  This bottom-up 
editorial process makes distributed or “crowdsourced” credibility an everyday 
reality—and makes sites like Reddit far better theatres than YouTube for 
assessing the credibility of online information. 
 All this suggests that the YouTube and vlogging, as a ceremonial, are far 
better suited to promoting emotional exchange among participants (Chapter 
Two), and to circulating pathetic appeals (Chapter Three), than they are at 
distributing information. Vlogs, it seems, are vessels equipped to transport not 
information but rather emotion. 
Along with emotion, this study of witness vlogs has hinted at the 
importance of speed to vlogging, suggesting for instance that viewers interpreted 
witnesses’ reactions as either authentic and inauthentic, in part, because of the 
speed with which they appeared online. The following chapter takes a closer look 
at the speed or, more precisely, the speeds of vlogging. Acknowledging but 
moving beyond the fact that vlogging is “fast” (that is, capable of being composed 
and circulated rapidly), the chapter shows that vlogging runs at many complex 
and unpredictable speeds. This chapter also begins a discussion that will continue 
into my sixth and final chapter, a more practical discussion of how this research 
might inform composing as well as the teaching of composition.  
  
 
Chapter 5 
The Rant Video: Vlogging’s Many Complex Speeds 
On the afternoon of Friday, March 11th, 2011, a UCLA junior named 
Alexandra Wallace returned to her apartment, annoyed. It was the week of final 
exams, and Wallace had hoped to do some studying in a campus library. 
Unfortunately, the studying hadn’t gone particularly well—especially, Wallace felt, 
because her work had been repeatedly and rudely interrupted by other students. 
Once at home, Wallace decided she would express her frustration through the 
webcam attached to her computer. She dashed off a three-minute vlog and shared 
it with her friends online (Figure 5.1). By the end of this clip, Wallace seems much 
less annoyed. Her expression seems relieved, even cheerful. With a smile and a 
polite but playful cadence, she concludes: “So, thanks for listening! That was my 
rant!” 
Seventy-two hours later, Wallace’s vlog, along with her name and face, 
were at the center of a controversy that had become international in scope, one 
covered by newspapers including The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times 
and the U.K.’s The Daily Mail; network TV news programs on CBS and ABC, as 
well as blogs with global readership like The Huffington Post. It became a 
trending topic on social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, Reddit, and Digg. 
Several of these re-posts drew hundreds of thousands of views and tens of 
thousands of comments, most of them angry or outright hostile. Many claimed 
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that Wallace’s video, which she titled “Asians in the Library,” was deeply racist, 
because Wallace had directed her rant not towards specific individual students 
behaving badly in the library, but rather towards “Asian people” generally. 
The problem is these hordes of Asian people that UCLA accepts into 
our school every single year, which is fine. But if you're going to 
come to UCLA then use American manners. [ . . . ] Hi, in America 
we do not talk on our cell phones in the library. I swear every five 
minutes I will be [ . . . ] like deep into my studying, into my political 
science theories and arguments and all that stuff, getting it all down, 
like typing away furiously, blah blah, blah, and then all of a sudden 
when I'm about to like reach an epiphany... Over here from 
somewhere, “Ooooh Ching Chong Ling Long Ting Tong, Ooohhhhh.” 
 
Figure 5.1: The infamous “Asians in the Library” vlog by former UCLA 
student Alexandra Wallace. Many YouTubers, including the uploader here, 
reposted the vlog after Wallace removed the original, just a few hours after 
uploading it. From Mangoh69. “Asians in the Library – UCLA Student’s 
Racist Rant.” YouTube. 13 March 2011. Web. 1 May 2012. 
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Many online communities, including some thriving on YouTube, adopt a 
“postracial” character, tolerating and even encouraging members to play with 
issues of race and racism. Still, most commenters on YouTube and beyond agreed 
that Wallace had taken her “play” (if this was play at all) several steps across the 
line. 
 Wallace was stunned by the immediate global reaction to her vlog. She 
deleted the video, even took down her Facebook account, but others had archived 
the video and quickly re-posted it to YouTube. On Friday, March 18th, just a week 
after she uploaded her vlog, Wallace released a letter to the campus newspaper. 
Besides her original video, this would be her only public statement. She wrote: 
In an attempt to produce a humorous YouTube video, I have 
offended the UCLA community and the entire Asian culture. I am 
truly sorry for the hurtful words I said and the pain it caused to 
anyone who watched the video. Especially in the wake of the 
ongoing disaster in Japan, I would do anything to take back my 
insensitive words. I could write apology letters all day and night, 
but I know they wouldn’t erase the video from your memory, nor 
would they act to reverse my inappropriate action. (qtd. in 
Parkinson-Morgan) 
Wallace’s apology emphasizes, above all, the vlog’s temporality or speeds—in 
other words, its poor timing. For one thing, the video’s circulation intentionally 
but rather unfortunately coincided with another “disaster”: the Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami, which killed thousands and impacted millions of 
Japanese. Aided and abetted by YouTube’s immediate and global reach, Wallace’s 
 156 
“humor” clearly found its audiences “too soon” to play for laughs. Equally 
unfortunate, temporally, is the acknowledged reality that the video will endure, 
persisting not only in the individual and collective “memory” of its viewers but 
also in the physical memory of the YouTube archive. Within days, Wallace had 
completely lost control of her video’s meaning, circulation, and legacy. She had 
fallen victim to the very thing that had attracted her and thousands of other 
composers to YouTube and the internet: its many complex and unpredictable 
speeds. 
 This chapter uses this notorious rant, and the rant genre more broadly, to 
explore online rhetorical practices, and especially to examine how these 
rhetorical practices structure, and are structured by, time. The story of Alexandra 
Wallace can be told many ways: as a story about ignorance, about race and 
privilege, about the failures of higher education, and so on. For the record, I agree 
wholeheartedly with those who have condemned Wallace’s remarks as ignorant, 
hateful, and disturbing, particularly considering the casual and carefree manner 
in which she delivered them. Moving forward, however, I leave all critique of 
Wallace’s vlog to those who participated in the public controversy that brewed 
around it. In this chapter, I choose to tell Wallace’s story as a tale of precarious 
and unpredictable speeds, a story about a young person’s naïve and disastrous 
experiment in vlogging, despite working within one of the vlogging’s most 
established and beloved genres—the rant. In short, I present Wallace’s story as a 
cautionary tale that encourages composers and composition teachers to become 
more sensitive to the many and varying speeds at which texts are created and 
circulated online.  
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Tracking Speeds Online 
If composers hope to carry out their rhetorical purposes online, and to 
prevent rhetorical accidents like Wallace’s, they need to be highly attuned to the 
internet’s rhetorical speeds. Throughout this chapter, I pluralize speed(s) to 
counter the notion that the speed of online communication can be tracked 
simplistically, using any single measure or concept. Many scholars, pundits, and 
other mythmakers have described the speed of the internet as one of 
homogeneous quickness or rapidity. From this perspective, the internet is simply 
“fast,” constantly “accelerating,” and perhaps approaching “immediacy.” This, 
however, is a simplification that potentially narrows our understanding of online 
communication and compromises our ability to meaningfully participate in it. 
Thankfully, in recent years, scholars of communication and culture have begun to 
recognize what computer scientists and others have known all along—that the 
internet runs at many fluctuating speeds. While these speeds can never be fully 
measured or predicted, composers who attune themselves to online speeds are 
much more likely to succeed rhetorically in electronic environments. 
Cultural theorists like David Harvey, Anthony Giddens, and Paul Virilio 
usefully call our attention to the “speediness” of modern communication, 
including online communication. According to these and other cultural theorists, 
the internet is only the latest development in a larger story of social, cultural, and 
political acceleration, a speeding-up with far-reaching (and perhaps dire) 
consequences. Thanks to the internet and other technologies of speed, we are 
experiencing what Harvey calls “time-space compression,” what Giddens calls 
“time-space distanciation,” or what Virilio calls “dromological” intensification. In 
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short, the speed of communication is picking up in a big way, an acceleration that 
impacts how we live and relate to one another. For Virilio especially, the 
consequences of acceleration are grave, as technologies cause us to become more 
and more disoriented in time and space, and increase the frequency of “accidents.” 
Accidents are in Virilio’s view integral to technologies, which separate us from the 
realities of space and time. Just as the invention of the automobile was also the 
invention of the car crash, we might say that the invention of the rant video was 
also the invention of viral ruin. While advertisers and other technological 
mythmakers might paint the acceleration of technology as progress, Virilio and 
other theorists call our attention to the darker complications and consequences of 
speeds.  
These accounts of cultural acceleration compel us to think critically about 
rhetorical speeds. However, they are far more concerned with forecasting the 
broad effects of speed (its impact on big-picture culture, society, and psyche) 
than with examining speeds themselves in their specificity and complexity. For 
those looking for more nuanced and practical theories of rhetorical speed, these 
theorists probably paint with too broad a brush. Furthermore, as compositionist 
Kate Eichhorn points out, cultural theories like these tend to be “trapped by a 
bleak streak of technological determinism” (299). For Eichhorn, Virilio’s 
theorizing in particular leaves “little hope that individual users could shape and 
redirect technologies in liberatory ways” (299). In short, these theorists can 
provide a broad framework and rationale for attending to rhetorical speeds, but, 
because of their wide scope, speculative methods, and deterministic bent, they 
provide few if any practical insights into rhetorical speeds. 
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In Cyberliteracy, Laura Gurak takes a more practical and liberatory 
approach to rhetorical speeds. To become cyberliterate, Gurak argues, 
participants need to grapple with the special properties of “cyberspace,” including 
its singular speed (29). To participate effectively and meaningful in online 
communication, composers should understand how “cyberspace” operates, 
appreciating the characteristics that distinguish it from other media, including its 
“interactivity,” its “anonymity,” its “reach,” and of course its “speed.” While 
Gurak usefully moves the discussion of speed toward questions of practical 
literacy, rather than deterministic effects, she still grounds her analysis in 
deterministic assumptions about the internet’s supposed “speediness”: 
The Internet inspires speediness. We sit poised at our keyboards, 
waiting for the next email message and replying as quickly as 
possible. People regularly apologize for not answering an e-mail 
message quickly enough, and most of us have wondered if a person 
might be sick or out of town simply because that person did not 
reply right away. Speed also changes how we think about social 
relationships. Professors who teach online courses often mention 
the large amount of email they receive from students and the speed 
with which they feel compelled to respond. As the epigraph to this 
chapter suggests, speed and reach invite us to “compress time” 
[ . . . ] (30) 
Gurak here presents the speed of cyberspace as unified and inescapable, 
determined by the affordances of the technology at hand. When Gurak speaks of 
the “speed” of cyberspace, she is referring only to its “top speed,” thereby 
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overlooking the possibility of multiple or flexible speeds. But just as we rarely 
drive our cars or bicycles at top speed, we also rarely communicate at top speed. 
For example, most of us have left an e-mail in the inbox for days or even weeks 
while we considered how best to respond. Many of us have also spent an evening 
looking back at a friends’ old posts or photos on social media sites, reflecting on 
how things have changed over the years. These temporally complex activities 
remind us that online communication doesn’t always move at “top speed.” To 
attain true cyberliteracy, then, internet users need to track not the “speed” but 
rather the plural “speeds” of online communication. 
 In his study of the composing methods of DJs, James J. Brown Jr. affirms 
the importance of tracking speeds to composing online. Specifically, he presents 
the speed-sensitive composition methods of the DJ girl talk as a model for 
“dromological writing,” or writing that is “attuned to the problem of speed” (83). 
Importantly, speed-sensitive composing is not composing that maxes out 
technological affordances, but rather composing that takes advantage of the 
rhetorical possibilities inherent in the many available speeds, recognizing the 
nuances and complexities of each. Brown explains that dromological or speed-
sensitive composing is “nimble” and 
not necessarily fast. It may very well be, and the results may be so 
fast that they appear, in Ulmer’s words, ‘schizophrenic.’ However, 
the dromological writer is not merely stepping on the gas. S/he is 
attuned to the speeds of various rhetorical environments, and able 
to slow down or speed up as necessary. (83) 
 161 
Brown’s account illustrates that speeds can vary considerably in rhetorical 
environments both online and off. No matter how “fast” the technology, different 
speeds are available and have different rhetorical effects. Still, Brown’s 
conceptualization of speed remains somewhat fluid. In some places, the term 
seems to refer to the speed of the composing process and, elsewhere, to the 
pacing of the text or finished composition. Nevertheless, Brown’s study provides 
a theoretical foundation for a more textured and specific mapping of the speeds 
of rhetoric online.  
As Brown acknowledges, there are a multitude of rhetorical speeds, speeds 
that vary considerably according to the genres and technologies and cultural 
practices involved. To help composers begin tracking speeds, I offer the schema 
in Table 5.1, a taxonomy of rhetorical speeds designed to prompt reflection, 
invention, and critical inquiry. This taxonomy is not intended to be exhaustive or 
authoritative, only suggestive, since multiple and alternative taxonomies are 
always possible. The hope is that this taxonomy will give internet observers a 
better understanding of online communication as a multitude of rhetorical 
practices, and also give composers a better shot at creating texts that will carry 
out (and not exceed) their intentions, helping prevent rhetorical “accidents” like 
Wallace’s.  
Would-be composers can learn a great deal about online media and genres 
by tracking these speeds, or other types of speed, depending on their relevance to 
the genre at hand. Consider, for example, an apprentice vlogger. Practically 
speaking, composers can study and imitate the speeds of a vlogging genre they 
hope to compose in—confessions, reactions, rants, and so on. They can imitate  
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the pacing and duration of texts, the tempo of their composing process, the 
kairotic timing of its public uploading, the frequencies of updates or new 
Table 5.1: A Taxonomy of Rhetorical Speeds 
 
Speed type Stage Description 
Tempo Composition The temporal 
orchestration of the 
composing process, 
conventional to a given 
genre. Tempo suggests 
how the creation of the 
text should be paced 
chronologically. 
Frequency “ The temporal spacing 
between succesive texts. 
Especially important for 
genres like vlogs, blogs, 
social media posts. 
Pacing “ The temporal 
arrangement of 
elements within a given 
composition. Especially 
important for video. 
Duration “ The temporal length of 
a composition. 
Especially important for 
video. 
Timing (kairos) Publication Temporal coordination. 
The strategy of aligning 
publication with various 
contexts and conditions 
identified as an exigency 
or “rhetorical situation.”  
Velocity Circulation The rapidity or slowness 
with which online 
compositions move 
from audience to 
audience within or 
across spheres.   
Continuance “ The rhetorical lifespan 
of an online 
composition, the brevity 
or protractedness of its 
presence online.  
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installments, and so on. In tracking and imitating these speeds, composers learn 
both how genres are made as well as how they make meaning. For, as John 
Hartley explains, speeds are a “a major determinant of what a given piece of 
writing means”—more important, even, than the piece’s “ostensible content.” 
Attending to speeds helps composers create effective and meaningful online 
compositions that will resonate properly to viewers. Equally important, attending 
to speeds helps composers understand the risks and rewards inherent in a given 
genre or platform, recognizing that, within the multiverses of the internet and 
YouTube, compositions may take on speeds we never anticipated, desired—or 
dared to hope for.  
In addition, when composers track speeds, they can also earn a critical 
perspective on a medium and its genres. As Catherine F. Schryer, Deborah 
Mutnick, and Jordynn Jack have illustrated, the distinctive speeds of a given 
utterance, genre, or medium have consequences including profound ideological 
implications. Every utterance structures time and space in a certain characteristic 
way, not only through its external or material speeds (of composition, circulation, 
etc.) but also through its internal or symbolic representations of time and space. 
Borrowing a concept from the literary theory of M. M. Bakhtin, these scholars call 
a text’s characteristic arrangement of time and space a “chronotope.” Bakhtin 
describes the chronotope concept in The Dialogic Imagination:  
We will give the name chronotope (literally, "time space") to the 
intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships that 
are artistically expressed in literature. [ . . . ] In the literary artistic 
chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are fused into one 
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carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, 
takes on flesh, becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes 
charged and responsive to the movements of time, plot and history. 
(84) 
Bakhtin discusses how literary genres, in particular, imply a certain characteristic 
arrangement of time and space. Chivalric romances like those of Chretien de 
Troyes, for example, present a characteristic “adventure-time” that emphasizes 
chance, fate, and the random. In the chivalric romance, Bakhtin explains, things 
always happen “suddenly” (151-152). For the chivalric adventurer—as well as the 
reader of the chivalric romance—“the world exists exclusively under the sign of 
the miraculous ‘suddenly’; it is the normal condition of his world” (152). For 
Bakhtin, in short, each literary genre posits a “world” in which space is arranged 
and time flows in certain characteristic ways. Genres, in other words, possess 
chronotopes because they construct the “normal condition[s]” of the world and 
its arrangement of time-space.   
While Bakhtin restricts his discussion of chronotopes to literary genres, 
rhetorical scholars have extended and expanded upon the chronotope concept, 
demonstrating that chronotopes are as present (and as powerful) in nonliterary 
genres as they are in literary ones. Rhetorical scholars have shown that all texts 
have chronotopes to the extent that they emphasize certain movements, 
meanings, and intervals of time while conversely but necessarily sidelining 
alternatives. In doing so, texts as well as genres regulate “the placement and 
actions of human individuals in space and time” (Schryer 84). Schryer 
demonstrates as much in her study of “bad news” insurance letters, showing how 
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these letters discourage their recipients from responding by presenting timelines 
that are vague and confusing (Schryer 84).  
Jordynn Jack echoes Schryer in insisting that representations of time 
enable and constrain possibilities for action, and, therefore, serve ideological 
interests. In her case study, Jack illustrates how, among others, the commonplace 
of “time-space compression” impacted discussions on the regulation of 
genetically modified foods in Canada. “If Canada does not act quickly, work on 
these biotechnology applications will not take place in Canada”: in reasoning like 
this, rhetors employed time-space compression to frame the debate in terms of 
the here and now, and to sideline other possible time-space framings, especially 
those that would emphasize wider and longer-term concerns (66). As Jack 
demonstrates, chronotopes can be powerfully persuasive, perhaps especially 
because they are often tacit or invisible.  
The internet’s chronotopes likewise influence users’ understanding and 
experience of time. For example, is YouTube eroding the nation’s attention 
spans? Giving added significance to “gut reactions”? These sorts of claims are 
hard to prove. Nevertheless, their ubiquity in public debates about YouTube 
suggests that the site’s chronotopes do have psychological and perhaps even 
societal impacts.  
However powerful, chronotopes like these are almost always unarticulated 
and unacknowledged. Paying attention to the speeds of rhetoric online and on 
YouTube, therefore, can help students to compose not only more effectively, but 
also more critically. Specifically, it can help students to recognize not only how 
speeds enable and constrain possibilities for composing, but also how speeds can 
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carry their own messages, messages composers may or may not be willing to 
spread. Composers, however, need not reproduce chronotopes blindly. 
Chronotopes may be powerful and often invisible, but, as Jack’s study reminds us, 
conventions never fully determine how an individual utterance will arrange time 
and space. Even when time and space constrain us, possibilities always exist for 
chronotopic improvisation, hybridity, and resistance. Before they can improvise 
or resist chronotopes, however, composers must first recognize and understand 
their implications. 
 To illustrate how tracking speeds can inform how we compose (or avoid 
composing) online, the next section offers a case study of the “rant video” genre 
and its uptake by Alexandra Wallace. My analysis contrasts this genre’s 
characteristic composing tempo—a high-risk, high-reward rhythm that prompts 
composers to capture intense momentary emotions and share them immediately 
online—with its potential for intense velocity and long-term continuance (in 
other words, “virality”) in online spheres. 
As a number of scholars have noted, YouTube itself moves at many 
complex speeds, accelerating or decelerating as it takes on various rhetorical 
roles (Grainge, Davies). Sometimes, and for some people, YouTube is a virtual 
agora, promoting immediate back-and-forth conversation and allowing users to 
compose and share and respond to videos more or less instantly (Jackson & 
Wallin, Lange, Juhasz). Speedwise, YouTube-as-agora tends to be quick in tempo 
and frequency, brief in duration and continuance, loose in pacing, and attains 
minimal in its velocity. Meanwhile, YouTube also plays the role of interactive 
archive, allowing users to create enduring records or exhibits of video material 
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that will remain open to public audiences indefinitely (Snickars & Vondreau, 
Skinnell). Speedwise, YouTube-as-archive has a fairly constant velocity and 
prolonged continuance, with tempo, frequency, pacing, and duration varying 
considerably. 
The kicker is that YouTube can operate as agora and archive at the same 
time, as Alexandra Wallace discovered when her conversational video became 
archived indefinitely and exhibited globally by YouTube users with rhetorical 
intentions far different from her own. To borrow Paul Grainge’s language, 
Wallace experienced firsthand the tension between “YouTube’s dual function as 
video streaming platform and archival interface,” a time-tension that can be 
creative as well as destructive (4). 
The Speeds of the Rant 
When she composed “Asians in the Library,” Wallace clearly believed that 
she had successfully coordinated her performance to the speeds of the internet, 
YouTube, and the rant video. Through her video Wallace clearly hoped and 
expected to reach like-minded people who shared her particular perspective: 
people, in other words, on her frequency or wavelength. In this metaphorical 
sense of frequency, Wallace proved spectacularly unsuccessful. While a minority 
of viewers affirmed Wallace’s explicit observations and attitudes, the 
overwhelming majority did not, returning only contempt and even outright 
hostility. In terms of composing speed or tempo, however, Wallace was quite 
successful. In explicitly labeling her video a rant, and drawing implicitly on 
conventions associated with the genre, Wallace linked her vlog to one of  
YouTube’s most established, even beloved forms.  
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As of September 2011, a search for “rant” returned over 30,000 videos on 
YouTube alone: rants on politics, rants on Shark Week, rants on stereotypes, 
rants on “fatties at the grocery store,” rants about YouTube itself, rants on haters, 
rants on Twilight and Miley Cyrus, rants on restaurants (in general and 
specifically), rants on Macs and PCs, rants on sports and music, rants on 
infanticide, Wikipedia, nosy people, “girl gamers,” natural hair products, and 
hundreds of other topics. More than a few YouTubers hang their entire online 
identities on the rant genre, and several include rant in their user or channel 
names: Rev Rant rants on video games; RantTank and Stripper Rant on 
seemingly random aggravations. Most rants are vlogs, produced quickly by 
ordinary people with their webcams. However, users have also clipped and 
shared rants from TV shows, movies, politics, etc.: football coaches “exploding” 
during press conferences; public meltdowns by celebrities like Charlie Sheen, 
Christian Bale, Alec Baldwin, and Mel Gibson. YouTube also hosts literally 
thousands of “Hitler rants”: in this absurdly comic subgenre, composers borrow a 
scene from the 2004 German drama Downfall in which Adolf Hitler madly 
berates his military advisors in his native language, and then layer over the scene 
anachronistic subtitles that make it seem Hitler is ranting about the iPad, or 
President Bush, or Germany’s defeat in the 2010 FIFA World Cup, or, in a 
postmodern turn, about the proliferation of “Hitler rants” videos. Apparently, 
however, even this heady flow of video rants can’t satisfy viewer demand. Project: 
Rant, whose YouTube channel hosts nearly 150 rant videos, is a major initiative 
by Pitch Productions to remediate text rants that they cull from Craig’s List and 
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other public sources, then dramatize and film them using professional actors, 
transforming them, effectively, into dramatized vlogs.  
The genre of the rant vlog, of course, builds on traditions that extend deep 
into history and reach across many different media (Table 5.2 offers a temporal 
comparison of the verbal rant and the rant video). The Oxford English Dictionary 
lists usages of “rant” as far back as the seventeenth century. The term has 
seemingly always been associated with excessive displays of emotion; 
suggestively, “rant” has also served as a name for exuberant gatherings and 
“lively, noisy, or irregular” musical numbers. Daniel Seidel of Slate offers a brief, 
celebratory history of the rant in his article “The Lost Art of the Rant: How the 
Web Revived a Storied Tradition of Expletive-Laced Tirades.” Published in 2007, 
just before the rise of public video sharing, Seidel’s piece chronicles the 
remediated reemergence of rants on public websites like blogs and craigslist, 
tracing their history to an “oral tradition” of ranting “perfected in taverns and 
street corners and smoke-filled comedy clubs.” And it is true that rants continue 
to thrive in any number of media. In recent years, however, rants have 
Table 5.2: Oral Rants vs. Rant Vlogs, a Comparison of Rhetorical Speeds 
 Verbal rant Rant vlog 
Tempo Instant, improvised? Frenetic.  
Frequency n/a Single or serial 
Pacing feverish feverish 
Duration Long/Excessive Long/Excessive 
Timing (kairos) Intentionally 
innappropriate 
Intentionally 
innappropriate 
Velocity None, save by word 
of mouth. 
Unpredictable. Possibly 
zero, possibly viral. 
Continuance None, save by word 
of mouth. 
Unpredictable. Possibly 
none, possibly 
indefinite. 
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experienced something of a renaissance with the emergence of public video 
sharing. Text-based web genres like the blog and the message board offer 
anonymity, immediate access to a public, and freedom of form—affordances that 
together make environments in which rants can be fruitful and multiply.  
Public video sharing, however, offers similar affordances, while also 
offering special affordances for the display of emotion. As the previous chapters 
illustrate, the audiovisual medium of digital video is able capture and circulate 
not only verbal language but also facial and gestural expression, vocal rhythm 
and intonation, eye movement, and other physical languages that carry emotional 
information. Because rants involve intense, even excessive emotion, this makes 
public video a more or less ideal platform for a new generation of rants, 
remediated for online video sharing and transplanted into the dialogic vlogging 
ceremonial (see Chapter Three).  
Rants, in short, are videos in which an individual expresses intense 
negative emotions toward a person, an idea, a thing, etc. Significantly, rants are 
rarely addressed or directed toward their object, even when the rant-object is a 
person: see, for instance, JennaMarbles’s “I fucking hate my roommate“ series of 
rant vlogs. Instead, rants are performed for an audience of (hopefully) 
sympathetic others. Rants offer a (seemingly) safe space for one to express 
emotions that have been frustrated within other contexts. Video rants range from 
the wholly earnest to the wholly facetious, with most videos occupying some 
uncertain space in-between these poles. For many videos the question of whether 
the rant is meant in earnest remains ambiguous (the videos seeming one moment 
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grave and the next tongue-in-cheek) but this ambiguity is part of what makes 
rants compelling, and, as Wallace discovered, dangerous. 
Like all genres, the rant is associated with a specific composing speed or, 
to use a term from my taxonomy, a tempo. The rant’s composing tempo specifies 
a particular interval between the composing act and the emotion that inspired 
it—or, more precisely, the generative absence of such an interval. In the rant 
genre, distinctions between invention and delivery, inspiration and expression, 
are reduced as composers move to a frantic composing tempo. This tempo is 
alluded to in the openings of many rant videos. Consider the opening of “People 
That Piss Me Off at the Gym,” a rant uploaded only ten days before Wallace’s:  
All right, so I’m making this video—this isn’t even going to be 
content—this is going to be like an unedited rant, about something 
that needs to be said. [ . . . ] Well, I might edit it if it gets out of 
control, but…” (JennaMarbles) 
The subject of JennaMarbles’s rant video is of course strikingly similar to 
Wallace’s, namely, the inappropriate and exasperating behavior of others in a 
public space. In fact, by the time Wallace created her video, this theme had 
already become something of a commonplace in rant videos (see also “Facebook 
rant” by ImMrTeddy, “Drive-Thru Rant” by FLuffeeTalks, and countless others). 
Beyond the parallels in subject matter, however, there are equally 
important parallels in tempo. JennaMarbles’s opening lays out the speeds of her 
composing and publishing process. She will simply “make” a video without any 
“content,” plan, or structure. If there is a plan, it is to lose control, or come 
dangerously close to it. She composes in one, frenetic spike of activity. This 
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composing tempo gives the product, the rant video itself, its characteristic, 
feverish pacing. Effectively, the duration of the composing process and the 
duration of the finished product become, essentially, one and the same.  
Importantly, neither producers nor viewers seem to believe that the 
looseness and impulsiveness of the composition and publishing process (if indeed 
it can be called a “process”) in any way inhibit rant vlogs. Rather, it is this 
impulsive tempo that gives the genre its characteristic meaning and allure. In fact, 
the impulsiveness of the composition is so important to the genre that, if video-
makers have prepared for the performance at all, they are eager to hide it. The 
more ill thought out the rant, it seems, the better. 
Wallace’s video seems perfectly tuned to the “one-click” composing tempo 
of the rant: its tempo, pacing, timing, and duration keyed skillfully to this 
vlogging genre. Like JennaMarbles and many other rantmakers, she begins en 
medias res (“Okay, so here at UCLA it’s finals week…”) and similarly offers 
disclaimers about what will be a reckless approach to composing: “So we know 
I’m not the most politically correct person, so don’t take this offensively.” This 
sort of disclaimer, in which the ranter brackets his or her own statements and 
emotions as being overly impetuous, exaggerated, or otherwise skewed, is a well-
established convention of the rant, appearing at either end of the vlog, or 
sometimes within the uploader’s description. Such disclaimers suggest that both 
speaker and viewer recognize that this is not really the best time or forum to 
express one’s anger, but that the rant will proceed nonetheless. In this sense, the 
rant vlog can be described as intentionally mistimed or akairotic. 
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Other rant vlogs, instead of highlighting the tempo of the composing 
process itself, call attention to the foreshortened interval between the composing 
act and the distress that inspired it: “Now, I’ve just arrived home from work,” 
begins an exasperated brianinnis in “Retail Rant,” an employee’s diatribe against 
customers who arrive as stores are closing. In another vlog, “RANT-MALLS!” 
supricky06 explains, “So today I had a mall experience, and I’d really like to share 
why malls are pretty much the worst place to go on the face of this planet.” 
In terms of tempo, then, rant vlogs are composed at an oddly specific and 
especially loaded point on the speaker’s emotional timeline: 
• after a distress has occurred, 
• following a period during which the distress went unexpressed (so that it 
intensifies), and 
• before the distress finds appropriate and effective expression, capable of 
bringing about change or redress. 
Of course, the ranter may not ever find, or even seek out, effective genres or 
forums for expression. In some cases, unfortunately, such forums might not exist 
(as seems to be the case with rants against school bullies) or because the rant 
itself is sufficiently cathartic. Either way, the characteristic emotion of the rant is 
not anger (negative emotion addressed effectively) but rather frustration, 
negative emotion misdirected and mistimed. This is not to say that rants lack 
purpose: on the contrary, it is their ineffectiveness, misdirection, and 
untimeliness that makes rants so compelling for producers and viewers. As Seidel 
phrases this, “A good rant [ . . . ] expresses a real passion, and it is often a passion 
that has been enflamed by powerlessness.” If the ranter were able to address their 
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distress in an appropriate or timely manner, Seidel observes, “there would have 
been no need for the rant in the first place.”  
In terms of timing or kairos, then, the rant vlog is rather complex. Rants 
are not timely or kairotic in any straightforward sense, as they intentionally fail to 
address the right audiences or seize the right moments to bring about change or 
redress. Instead, rant videos that are timely or kairotic are those that reach 
equally enraged or frustrated viewers, with whom they experience a kind of 
virtual catharsis. The importance of mistiming to the rant is perhaps best 
articulated by Project: Rant, the genre’s leading patron. Their mission statement 
provides a colorful description of the rant’s allure:  
People bitch about a lot of sh*t. A lot of random sh*t. A lot of that 
random bitching about said random sh*t is funny. When those 
people go online and take the time to type out that rage it’s hilarious. 
[ . . . ] We curate the weird, the angry, the bizarre, the obvious, the 
ugly truth, the anonymous and we love it. It gives you a brief 
glimpse into someone that would most likely never flip out like this 
in public.  
Once we understand that the timing of the rant vlog is not accidentally but 
intentionally, and generatively, inappropriate and ineffective, performed by 
people who would “never flip out” in other “public” times and spaces, then we can 
better understand why it is that Wallace believed she had composed a successful 
rant vlog. 
Though her explicit claims and assumptions offended many, it would be 
difficult to argue that Wallace hadn’t composed the sort of thing that people who 
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watch vlogs often find compelling. Wallace alludes to this in her apology letter, 
cited in the introduction. It is perhaps ironic that in her letter Wallace apologizes 
for the “inappropriate[ness]” of her video because she so clearly intended to be 
inappropriate, and because, in doing so, she was following the conventions of a 
vlogging genre that is by definition inappropriate, whose characteristic 
composing tempo and kairotic mistiming demands the explosion of frustrated 
emotion, and with it, overblown claims, sharp language, and other impieties. In 
short, while Wallace has been globally villainized for her rant video, she was 
actually quite perceptive in picking up the genre’s speeds of composition and 
publication.  
Ranting against the Rant 
Even though Wallace’s rant video offended so many so deeply, an 
examination of the wider controversy reveals why the genre remains popular, 
despite its risky composing speed. While the genre and its composing speed likely 
encouraged Wallace to express prejudiced ideas and attitudes she otherwise 
would never have admitted publicly, the controversy that played out over the 
following weeks demonstrate why so many still find the genre so valuable, as a 
tool for sending speedy and powerful messages loaded with emotion that defy 
decorum and other constraints. 
 Admittedly, many did use Wallace’s vlog to launch critiques of YouTube 
and its speeds, often implying that the speed of the platform is inappropriate, 
unhealthy, and simply “too fast.” This is especially true in mainstream journalism, 
perhaps because commonplaces about technology and adolescence (and the 
dangers that arise when these come together) have long been a staple in these 
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circles (Burgess and Green 17). For example, LA Weekly’s coverage of “Asians in 
the Library” highlighted the discrepancy between the hasty composing tempo of 
Wallace’s vlog, and the awesome scale and intensity of the controversy that 
followed. Characteristically for this publication, they played it for laughs: 
“Alexandra Wallace–equipped with a dorm room, a pushup bra, a webcam and 
two minutes fifty-two seconds too much free time—managed to ignite a ‘Kill the 
Beast’-caliber Internet mob in a matter of hours on Sunday afternoon.” Striking a 
similar, but more sober note, The Chicago Tribune titled its article about 
Wallace’s video “Post in haste…” True to its title, the article plays up the tension 
between the vlog’s harried composing tempo and its indefinite continuance, the 
length of its digital afterlife: “When you post something, it’s out there, and it’s 
forever.” In general, mainstream media’s coverage tended to be reactionary, 
framing Wallace’s video as a cautionary tale about the dangers of a reckless 
composing tempo.   
Surprisingly, many of the video responses posted to YouTube adopted a 
similar position, critiquing the tempo and timing of Wallace’s rant, while 
essentially working within those very same composing and publication speeds. At 
the end of his rambling, unedited, emotional video response, popular vlogger 
craftnation offers Wallace the following advice: 
We need to get rid of that. That’s stupid, you know. That is 
ridiculously the dumbest thing you can make videos about, cause 
you’re irritated [ . . . . ] If you just pissed off like that you should go 
count to ten—I’m pretty sure your teachers and your parents and 
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them told you to count to ten when you was younger, when you got 
pissed off about things. 
There is no way to know whether craftnation himself counted to ten before 
composing this video. Even if he did, however, he certainly styled the video so 
that it would seem like he hadn’t. Similarly, vlogger EbbyRo condemns Wallace’s 
video as a “racist rant” but also admits that she herself is “just ranting.” This 
ironic, fight-fire-with-fire approach was perhaps most clearly displayed itself in 
the comments posted on the video itself. While YouTube comments are 
notoriously coarse and ill thought out (see chapter four), the comments posted on 
“Asians in the Library” seem particularly unhinged:  
I am white as well, as a white american I say that you are REALLY 
FCKIN RACIST AND ANNOYYING , MIND YOUR OWN 
BUISNESS, WHO CARES IF THEY TALK ON THE PHONE BE 
MATURE AND TELL THEM TO BE QUITE [ . . . ] I mean shit, who 
the hell wears a lowcut shirt and rants like a little bitch? 
(namodrive777) 
These comments confirm that, while Wallace clearly introduced unacceptable 
racial attitudes into the rant, she was otherwise tapping into genres and speeds 
that were accepted and even adored in online public spheres, including on 
YouTube—so much so that many if not most responses adopted the same 
rhetorical speeds they were critiquing.  
 Overall, while Wallace took heavy criticism for ranting, the “Asians in the 
Library” controversy proved a boon for the rant vlog. The genre’s popularity, 
meaningfulness, and entertainment value were only reaffirmed. This, it seems, 
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was not just hypocrisy: rather, commentators on “Asians in the Library” 
expressed or implied genuine conviction that displays of impulsive emotion, 
including the rant, performed important rhetorical work, especially within the 
ecology of YouTube. While some urged patience and reason, others argued that 
the appropriate response did in fact require harsher and more impulsive 
emotions, quicker composing tempos and provocative mistimings—and this was 
not only drive-by, bile-spewing YouTube commenters.  
Even “official” responses, including a video response by UCLA Chancellor 
Gene Block, adopted an intentionally abrupt tempo and timing (fig. 4.2). 
Uploaded to the school’s official YouTube channel three days after “Asians in the 
Library” hit, the video was given a title that heavily emphasized emotion: “UCLA 
Chancellor appalled by student video” (emphasis mine). While it departs from 
the standard rant video genre in many ways, especially with its professional 
production, its scripted and rehearsed feel, and so on, it also shares some 
features: a close-up on an individual speaker; displays of intense emotion 
through facial expression, vocal intonation, and so on; emotionally loaded 
language and an emphasis on personal feelings (“This has been a sad day for 
UCLA, and a disappointing one for me personally, [ . . . ]”); and so on. 
Furthermore, by opening with temporal framing (“A video posted on YouTube 
this weekend [ . . . ]”) the video emphasizes the timing of Chancellor Block’s 
public emotional response. This official response video, then, draws on some of 
the emotional immediacy associated with the rant video genre (its composing 
tempo and therefore compressed emotional timeline) but with a key layer of 
temporal cushioning, however slim. “Regardless of how offended I am, or you 
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may be, about this video,” the Chancellor concludes, “I hope we can remain civil 
in our discourse.” Here, Block implies that while some patience and temperance 
is needed, intense, instantaneous emotional response is natural, even appropriate. 
The Chancellor’s swift-but-not-impulsive tempo, and his more purposeful timing, 
create an emotional response that is not hasty but still brisk. 
Not everyone, however, was satisfied with the Chancellor’s video and its 
speeds. In comments posted on its YouTube page, some viewers expressed 
disappointment that the Chancellor responded with such untempered emotion. 
At least one commenter accused him of repeating Wallace’s sins—accused him, in 
other words, of posting a “rant”: 
Instead of humiliating and kicking a very young person out for 
speaking her young, developing mind, try to change that person's 
 
Figure 5.2: Video statement by UCLA Chancellor Gene Block, responding to 
Alexandra Wallace’s rant. From UCLA. “UCLA Chancellor appalled by 
student video.” YouTube. 14 March 2011. Web. 22 September 2011. 
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mind with examples and logic. The Chancellor, instead of 
attempting to educate the very young student, gets on Youtube and 
rants against free speech and free thought at a university. (yohellojo, 
emphasis mine) 
Other commenters expressed disappointment that the Chancellor failed to 
display more intense emotion—that, in other words, he failed to rant. The 
following commenter accuses the Chancellor of being emotionally blank: 
While his message may be positive, it's a bit off [ . . . ] Speeches like 
this don't have any emotion in them, so there's no real call to action 
or sympathy emitted, just a blank statement of disappointment. 
(crazyartsyguy) 
Another commenter explicitly criticizes the composing tempo and textual pacing, 
implying that a more impulsive, rant-like response would have been more 
effective: 
His eyes were moving like he was reading off a script. I wish he'd at 
least memorized it or said it improvisational so it would be more 
believable. (bluezoo000) 
In short, many who were most concerned about Wallace’s rant nonetheless 
believed that the rhetorical situation demanded nothing less than a counter-rant, 
along with its characteristic tempo, pacing, duration, timing, and so on. 
 This means that, before we dismiss the rhetorical speeds of the rant vlog as 
reckless, we must recognize that it remains a popular and powerful form of public 
expression. While Wallace’s comments certainly deserve criticism, the rant vlog 
and its characteristic tempo have also given a public forum to everyday people 
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with worthwhile public messages, people like 22 year-old Ethan Sabo, a young 
conservative who earned national attention for a rant video condemning criticism 
of gay republicans (TGREthanSabo), and people like Joy Nash, whose rant 
against the stigmatization of obesity (“I’m fat, and it’s okay”) has to date earned 
nearly two million views. Viewers adore these rants because they express what 
others, or they themselves, dare not say in public, giving many a sense of 
empowerment, affirmation, and catharsis. Rant vlogs give a forum to everyday 
people who would otherwise lack the means or moxy to make bold public 
statements, to lose their cool, say the unsayable, and generally air grievances they 
would otherwise oppress. Key to the genre is its reckless composing tempo, which 
encourages videomakers to capture and share rants before they can think better 
of it: a risky rhythm that is nonetheless essential to the genre’s popularity and 
entertainment value as well as its rhetorical power and political relevance. 
 While composition teachers are right to hesitate before inviting their 
students to compose with such risky online genres and their complex speeds, the 
reality is that if we want to give students the option of composing online, we 
cannot simply assign students to create digital versions of conventional 
classroom genres. For example, if students really want to participate 
meaningfully on YouTube, a video literature review or video literary criticism 
simply doesn’t make sense; rather, students composing for YouTube should 
compose with its actual genres. If students believe the rhetorical situation calls 
for a rant, then rant they should, but only if they first fully appreciate the 
possibilities and pitfalls of the genre and its speeds, including its tempo and 
timing, but also the speeds at which the genre can circulate: its potential 
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velocities and continuance. This is an especially important consideration on 
YouTube, where a video might not only suddenly “go viral” but might also 
become a long-term exhibit in its archive.   
From Rant to Ruin: The Afterlife of Vlogging 
As “Asians in the Library” demonstrates, YouTube can indeed bring 
instant ruin. According to Wallace’s apology letter, the video instantly ruined her 
personal life, leading to “the harassment of [her] family, the publishing of [her] 
personal information, death threats, and being ostracized from an entire 
community,” all of which led to her voluntary withdrawal from UCLA, just days 
after the video’s posting.  
Furthermore, thanks to the participatory architecture and culture of 
YouTube (Burgess and Green, Jenkins, Skinnell), the video itself became an 
instant “ruin,” in another sense of that word. In “The Frequencies of Public 
Writing,” John Hartley explains the nature and meaning, and speed, of the ruin 
as a piece of public writing: 
Paradoxically, the most enduring human creation is the ruin. The 
ruin may indeed be defined as public writing that has outlived its 
author's intentions and even the language of public communication 
in which it was created. It sends what may be termed the 
"Ozymandias" message. Ruins speak to the unfolding present from 
"time immemorial," but the message is unintended, a text without 
an author. The ruin, together with other immemorial texts, such as 
prehistoric cave paintings and carvings, is the lowest-frequency of 
all forms of public address. 
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Like the inscription on Ozymandias’s pedestal, but within an incredibly 
compressed timeframe, “Asians in the Library” became a ruin insofar as it 
“outlived” its author’s intentions.  
It is important to note here that YouTube videos don’t go viral because of 
their author’s tempo or sense of timing; rather, they go viral because of their 
social velocity, as YouTube users share them with other users, through 
embedding, e-mailing, social media sharing, and even of course old-fashioned 
word of mouth. The virus metaphor is apt because, like a virus, YouTube videos 
spread from person to person, but it is misleading insofar as it suggests that this 
spreading occurs unintentionally. A video’s velocity emerges not randomly but 
only from a gathering of intentions—the intent is just not solely the author’s. 
Rather, the intent belongs to a video’s audiences, individually and collectively. 
Nearly every time the “view count” on a video ticks upward it is because some 
YouTuber has shared the video with a friend or family member or colleague or 
online acquaintance. And with each act of passing the video in question is 
reframed, taking on new meanings and motives and contexts. It is no longer an 
isolated message, sealed and endorsed by the author, but rather something like 
an exhibit or display. Like Ozymandias’s pedestal, or like a diary found in a 
historical archive, or like a novel shared between friends, the utterances’ message 
is transformed and, to a point, made subordinate to its new contexts and rituals. 
As Anne Freadman writes, “The same propositional content functions differently, 
and thus means something different, according to its performative setting. 
Meaning is not content; it is place and function” (59). To borrow Freadman’s 
term, the act of “sharing” a YouTube video is its own ceremonial with its own 
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meanings and functions. This clarifies why Wallace’s video spread so quickly and 
so globally even though (or because?) most viewers believed its explicit message 
to be false and distasteful. By the alchemy of sharing, the video circulated more 
or less ironically, not as a message from the original author, but as a display or 
exhibit with its own proper meanings, meanings that shifted with each exhibition 
or act of sharing, but which we can safely say largely opposed or parodied the 
original message. Through this alchemy of sharing, Wallace’s racist rant gained 
incredible rhetorical velocity, but not as a racial polemic; rather, as a message 
condemning and mocking racism. Like Ozymandias’s crumbling pedestal, the 
video’s transformative velocity within new contexts made its message highly 
ironic: “Look on my works, ye Mighty, and despair!" 
It is significant that, by the time “Asians in the Library” had earned 
widespread attention, Wallace had already removed it from the site, in an 
attempt to bring its gathering velocity to an abrupt halt. However, a number of 
YouTube users had already recognized the video’s growing momentum and 
archived it, deliberately ensuring its continuance. The moment Wallace removed 
her video, other YouTubers uploaded fresh copies of it, allowing the velocity of its 
ironic circulation to continue and accelerate. Ultimately, while Wallace judged 
the composing tempo and timing of the rant genre quite perceptively, she judged 
YouTube’s velocities and potential for continuance remarkably poorly. While she 
proved capable of participating in YouTube as an agora, creating a piece that 
meshed well with the platform’s more conversational composing practices, 
Wallace seemed to overlook that YouTube also operated as an archive, serving as 
a collectively-curated video database. Indeed, almost everyone who encountered 
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“Asians in the Library” encountered it not as a conversational message-from-the-
author, but as a popular exhibit in the YouTube archive, an exhibit whose infamy 
was spreading rapidly, but which, we knew, would also endure indefinitely. Most 
encountered the video, in short, as a ruin.  
It is worth noting that not all of YouTube’s ruins come with tales of shame 
and woe. Consider Paul “Bear” Vasquez’s “Double Rainbow” video, a simple 
moment captured on camcorder, in which Vasquez witnesses a double rainbow in 
the wilderness and expresses over-the-top joy at its beauty. As an exhibit in 
YouTube’s archive, the video has earned over 32 million views, achieving 
incredible velocity and continuance and certainly, in Hartley’s words, “outliving 
its author’s intentions.” Through the alchemy of sharing, it has become more 
than a recording of natural beauty, it has become a parody and celebration of 
Vasquez’s “insane” “freak out.” Though he recognizes that he is not responsible 
for the video’s viral spread or place in the archive, Vasquez has embraced his 
video’s unexpected velocity and continuance, recognizing in his interview that the 
“double rainbow” video phenomenon is not about him, but about those who 
watch and pass it on: 
The video is a mirror for people [ . . . ] There's nobody in it. [ . . . ] 
They get to see themselves through it. The comments I get are really 
about them, what it makes them feel about themselves. “I loved it.” 
“You're an idiot.” Every comment I get, it's about the people, not 
about me. (Baker) 
Not all of YouTube’s ruins are ruinous, in other words. Nonetheless, those who 
compose for YouTube need to be aware of its many speeds, each of which 
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interacts with and relies on the others. Those looking to make conversational 
videos like rants need to recognize that they might also become exhibits in the 
archive, might take on unintended velocities and suffer from unwanted 
continuance. Those who compose the archive need to recognize that videos only 
circulate through the conversational participation of YouTube users, its 
commenters, linkers, embedders, e-mailers, and sharers. Perhaps before they 
begin creating videos for YouTube, then, composers might spend some time 
participating in YouTube’s communities, performing for themselves the alchemy 
of sharing and participating in the collective curation of the archive, so that 
before they offer up a video, they first have a feel for vlogging’s many complex 
speeds.
  
 
Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
The Apology Video: Vlogging Remediates Expression 
 Over the years, YouTube has been the target of many lawsuits. More 
recently, it has also become a place for settling them. Many judges and attorneys 
are beginning to use vlogging as an avenue for legal redress, requiring offenders 
to publicly apologize for their actions on YouTube.  
 In 2008, a Florida judge sentenced two teenage pranksters to record and 
upload an apology on YouTube, a video in which they take responsibility and 
express regret for throwing a drink at a drive-thru employee (Manjoo). In 2009, a 
St. Louis police officer sued a local woman who falsely accused him of sexual 
misconduct. When she couldn’t pay the $100,000 in damages awarded by the 
judge, the parties settled on a YouTube apology (Garrison). In 2011, the legally 
mandated YouTube apology became national in scope. Following the terms of a 
settlement, Senate candidate Charlie Crist uploaded an apology for using music 
by David Byrne in campaign ads without the songwriter’s permission (Gordon). 
Following the lead of YouTube users, the legal system seems to be recognizing 
vlogging’s reach (chapter four), its paradoxical immediacy and permanence 
(chapter five), its affordances for emotion display (chapter three), and its sense of 
public vulnerability (chapter one), all of which combine to make vlogging a more 
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or less ideal 21st century version of the stocks—a space where wrongdoers can be 
publicly humbled. 
 I intentionally use this dated analogy to stress vlogging’s continuity with 
older forms of expression. Like many studies of new media, this dissertation has 
perhaps overemphasized the newness of its research object and overstated its 
potential to transform the art of rhetoric, and with it the public sphere. Reflecting 
on my four primary case studies, I am most struck by the continuity of vlogging 
with other, earlier forms of oral and emotional communication, that is, with 
earlier speech genres. All of the vlogging genres I have explored in these pages 
 
Figure 6.1: Politician Charlie Christ apologizes via vlog. From Law12345100. 
“Charlie Crist Official Apology to David Byrne for Copyright Infringement.” 
YouTube. 11 April 2011. Web. 8 May 2012. 
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carry familiar names and familiar purposes. The apology, like the confession, the 
reaction, the rant, or the eyewitness testimony, was not invented for YouTube. 
This dissertation, then, documents not the emergence of radically new forms of 
expression, but rather the remediation of existing forms of expression into new 
contexts and new ceremonials. 
Vlogging and Remediation 
 A decade ago, J. David Bolter and Richard Grusin coined the term 
remediation to describe how new media composers, rather than revolutionizing 
or reinventing the ways texts are assembled, actually feed upon and repurpose 
earlier forms. Focusing on the visual, Bolter and Grusin argue that  
New media are doing exactly what their predecessors have done: 
presenting themselves as refashioned and improved versions of 
other media, digital visual media can best be understood through 
the ways in which they honor, rival, and revise linear-perspective 
painting, photography, film, television, and print. (14) 
Just as the webpages analyzed by Bolter and Grusin remediated print genres 
(encyclopedias, newspapers, and so on), vlogs remediate speech genres, including 
the heavily emotional ones I have called pathetic genres.  
 Vloggers remediate earlier genres not because they lack ingenuity. Rather, 
vloggers remediate earlier genres because in doing so they (re)appropriate the 
social actions associated with those genres. As my second chapter illustrates, 
Twilight readers composed reaction videos because “reaction” already carried 
meaning and purpose for the parties involved: for the media producers who 
desired information on their target markets, for publics with longstanding 
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fascinations with the emotive excesses of fans, and for Twilight fans already 
drawn into intense emotional relationships with one another. Vlogging genres 
remediate not only existing forms but also existing social structures—in the case 
of Twilight reactions, structures in which producers still produce, fans still react, 
and publics still watch fan frenzies with a mixture of perplexity, disgust, and 
delight. Acts of remediation, in this sense, can also be acts of social reproduction. 
 This does not mean, however, that vlogging is a redundant, stagnant, or 
vampiric form. Recognizing that one genre remediates another does not mean the 
two are equivalent: reproduction, after all, is not the same as repetition. On the 
contrary, as my “confessions” chapter demonstrates, parallel genres can function 
very differently within different performative settings or ceremonials. The dinner 
table confession, on the one hand, and the confession vlog, on the other, may 
have similar rhetorical features, similar emotional registers, and so on. Within 
two different ceremonials, however, the confession genre functions quite 
differently. In one ceremonial, the confession may be a private act of defiance, 
and in the other, a public cry for identification and an invitation to constructive 
dialogue.  
 Remediation, then, transforms not only the text but also the “interlocutory 
positions” it posits, distributing differing roles and relations among those present 
to the text (Freadman 63). Consequently, remediation alters possibilities for 
response and uptake. A politician’s public apology, on television or in a public 
square, may draw scowls and shaking heads, but on YouTube, it draws remixes, 
parodies, and of course comments both sympathetic and caustic. Remediation, in 
short, is far more than simple repetition, more than reframing or repackaging, 
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more even than adaptation or translation. Remediation is an act of rhetorical 
transfer or reassignment; an act of social reproduction, yes, but one whose 
progeny may differ considerably from their parents. Transplanted to a changed 
environment, like a worker transferred to a different workplace, an athlete traded 
to a new team, or a piece of furniture moved to a different home, remediated 
genres take on new looks, new roles, and new purposes. 
 As my chapters have suggested, three affordances of vlogs clearly 
differentiate its genres from the speech genres they remediate: vlogging’s reach, 
replayability, and modularity.  
 Vlogging’s reach and replayability go hand-and-hand, as the medium of 
online video sharing allows utterances to be replayed across time and space. As 
the technology needed to vlog becomes more and more inexpensive and 
ubiquitous, rhetors gain new and wide-reaching access to public spheres. As my 
fourth chapter on witness videos illustrated, the reach and replayability of 
vlogging is allowing everyday people to broadly circulate information, ideas, and 
attitudes.  
 This rhetorical enfranchisement is complicated, however, by vlogging’s 
modularity. As my chapter on rants explains, because vlogs are digital, they can 
be easily duplicated, manipulated, and moved. They can be readily ripped apart, 
remixed, recontextualized, and redeployed for other rhetorical purposes 
(Manovich, Warnick). The “Asians in the Library” rant video demonstrated quite 
dramatically how vlogs can be rapidly reappropriated, as those who view and 
pass along these videos endow them with new meanings and purposes that the 
original vlogger likely never intended or even imagined. The modularity of 
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“Asians in the Library,” for example, allowed it to circulate more or less ironically, 
as a parody and nullification of its own explicit message. Through comments, 
blog posts, social media postings, e-mails, and so on, viewers of “Asians in the 
Library” thoroughly repackaged the video, situating it within new ceremonials 
and thereby investing it with new roles, meanings, and purposes. “Asians in the 
Library” might seem an extreme case, but other viral videos, like 
NuttyMadam3575’s reactions (Chapter Three), as well as rants like Paul “Bear” 
Vasquez’s “Double Rainbow” and Chris Crocker’s “Leave Britney Alone” follow 
similar patterns of ironic uptake. Furthermore, even when vlogs don’t go viral or 
suffer from ironic uptake, their easy modularity makes vlogs open to rapid 
recontextualizations and the transformations (wanted or unwanted, thrilling or 
chilling) that come along with these movements.  
 In short, it is not really vlogging’s content, not what we actually see or hear 
on video, that makes this mode of address potentially revolutionary. After all, we 
have all witnessed confessions, reactions, rants, testimonials, and apologies many 
times before. What makes vlogging different and potentially transformative is its 
reach, replayability, and modularity—and the participatory architecture and 
culture of online video sharing that makes all this possible. What is new and 
different about vlogging is not its genres, but rather how online video sharing 
allows these genres to move and to accrue meanings through the collective 
activities of their viewers.  
Vlogging’s Vital Expressivity 
 The active participation of viewers is one thing that critics overlook when 
they condemn vlogging as emptily expressive, egoistic, and emotionally 
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overwrought. In “Top Tens Reasons YouTube Has Ruined Life for Good,” one 
columnist insists that vlogging “encourages and rewards [ . . . ] self-promotion, 
vanity, and compulsion to be seen/heard,” (Sweeney). I would wager that, like 
many of vlogging’s critics, this columnist has never bothered to read the 
comment threads on the vlogs he condemns, or considered how self-expression 
and emotionality might be rhetorically constructive. 
 Whether they circulate in scholarly, popular, or other circles, claims about 
the worthiness or unworthiness of vlogging as a rhetorical form often depend 
upon a conceptual distinction that Barbara Couture identifies using the opposed 
terms “public expression” and “public rhetoric” (“Reconciling Private Lives and 
Public Rhetoric: What’s at Stake?”). In contemporary public discourse, Couture 
argues, there is a lamentable trend away from “public rhetoric,” a community-
oriented communicative practice that “involve[s] a reciprocal exchange of views 
in a charitable context” (2). Each step away from public rhetoric, she regrets, is a 
step toward “public expression,” an egocentric communicative practice in which a 
speaker with an already formed identity delivers already-formed content. 
Couture’s essay associates public expression with the so-called "strong poet" 
(think Henry David Thoreau) who seeks truth and a way forward in him or 
herself rather than in communal exchange (10). Public expression is ethically 
dubious because, Couture argues, “[it] demands that the audience absorb, deny, 
refuse, or obliterate difference, specifically what is different from the identity of 
the speaker”: in other words, in public expression views are not exchanged but 
rather imposed (4). Online video sharing was still in the incubator when Couture 
published this argument, but had she written just twelve months later, vlogging 
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might have supplied Couture with a lurid cornucopia of public expression to draw 
on for (negative) examples, including many of those discussed in the preceding 
chapters. 
Nevertheless, as those chapters affirm, vlogging is a form in which these 
concepts (public expression, public rhetoric, and I would add, public dialectic) 
converge or collapse. My discussion of confession videos demonstrates how vlogs 
operate as both monologue and dialogue, as an address to oneself and an 
invitation to converse (Wesch, Yanoshevsky, Lange “Vulnerable”). Vlogging and 
its characteristic “back-and-forthness” seems, in many ways, a more challenging 
and more constructive alternative to what usually passes for “public rhetoric,” the 
lengthy essays and speeches that Jackson and Wallin playfully suggest leave 
audiences adrift on a “Sea of Rhetoric” (378). Importantly, what catalyzes 
vlogging’s back-and-forthness is the vlogger’s vulnerability—in other words, her 
willingness to publicly express herself, to share what she is thinking and feeling. 
Lange affirms and extends these insights. By sharing “intimate moments” and 
expressing themselves openly before a webcam, Lange suggests, vloggers can and 
do effect “social change,” evoking critical self-reflection and productive public 
discussion of issues. Lange concludes that, not despite, but because vlogs are 
inherently expressive, they hold public significance: 
The sharing of these intimate moments is not self-indulgent, 
solipsistic obsession. Rather, it provides a means to connect with 
others and raise awareness in ways that are less overt than acts such 
as public marches but are nevertheless quite important. 
In my chapter on confessions, vloggers explicitly resisted calls to become less 
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expressive and more argumentative. When atheist commenters encouraged her 
to “practice, get your talking points, and deliver them succinctly” 
(theherdmentality), missdynasty33, an African-American agnostic, refused. In 
doing so, she acknowledged that what makes YouTube “great” is its 
expressiveness: “Thats the great thing about youtube and having my own channel. 
I don't have to practice, I can do whatever I want to do.” In this vlogger’s 
comments, we see both the self-interestedness that Couture criticizes, as well as 
the openness and vulnerability that lead to constructive dialogue, which Lange 
celebrates. This, then, is the great paradox of vlogging: that its expressiveness is 
seemingly both its greatest rhetorical weakness as well as its greatest strength. 
 The pushback against vlogging frequently criticizes video ranters, reactors, 
and confessors for being egocentric, but it also criticizes them for displaying 
excessive emotion. It is true, as my chapter on reactions confirms, that emotion is 
central to vlogging. Part of what makes vlogging such a compelling forum for 
frank and vulnerable self-expression is its ability to capture and relay emotion, 
especially emotion displayed through facial, vocal, and gestural action. However, 
the chapter also affirms that emotion and its display are deeply social and 
rhetorical activities. Humans participate meaningfully in social, cultural, and 
public spheres through emotion: through feelings, sensations, intensities, affects, 
passions, etc. In rhetorical terms, emotion is sometimes simply what the 
rhetorical situation demands, is sometimes what audiences need and want from 
rhetors. One example of this would be the widespread public demand that 
President Obama display greater anger towards BP during the 2010 Gulf oil spill, 
a demand he finally met when he assured the public, in interviews with CNN and 
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the Today Show, that he was “furious” at BP and busy investigating “whose ass to 
kick” (Mail Foreign Service, Gabbatt). Another example would be the court-
mandated YouTube apology. Whether it is fast-food pranksters, false accusers, or 
national politicians who are forced to apologize via vlog, the idea is essentially the 
same—to demand that wrongdoers publicly emote, to require that they publicly 
express remorse and humility. “I sincerely apologize to David Byrne for using his 
famous song and his unique voice in my campaign advertisement without his 
permission,” Crist confesses, his voice deep with regret. This is more than egoistic 
self-expression, more than personal emotion. The emotion here is Crist’s, but it is 
also Byrne’s, and the public’s. Like every apology in history, it is inherently 
addressed, inherently social and inherently rhetorical. 
 Remediated as a vlog, the apology retains many of its rhetorical features, 
but takes on new affordances: new reach, new replayability, and new modularity. 
The YouTube apology may look and sound like earlier apologies, but it also 
harbors new possibilities for meaning and movement. As one observer notes, 
forcing Crist to apologize via vlog (rather than via press release or televised 
statement) opens up infinite possibilities for viral penance: “by forcing Crist to 
make this fairly humiliating apology on YouTube,” the apology “can now be Auto-
Tuned into a dance mix, mashed-up [ . . . ] inserted into scenes from Charlie 
Sheen’s 20/20 interview, or whatever else that wacky Internet wants to do with it” 
(O’Neal). Like all vloggers, Crist must express himself, must make himself 
vulnerable, must reckon with his vlog’s response and uptake, must in short 
“throw himself at the mercy of YouTube” (O’Neal).  
 If my research has failed to prove that vlogging is a rhetorical act, then, at 
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the very least, I hope it has proven that vlogging is an act of incredible bravery. 
While critics like Couture might see vlogging’s bald self-expression as cowardly 
and self-centered, as an act meant to close down others, I choose to see vlogging 
from the other end, as a radical act of opening up, as an act of courage and 
vulnerability. Within the ceremonial of online video sharing (chapter two), 
vloggers make themselves vulnerable not only by exposing their private thoughts 
and emotions to public audiences, but also by exposing themselves to the 
complex and unpredictable rhetorical ecology of YouTube, by facing the 
possibilities of harsh criticism and profound connection, of indefinite stagnation 
and instant virality, of recontextualization and reappropriation. It is one thing to 
confess, rant, or react before friends and family. It is quite another to record and 
upload this kind of vulnerable expression, never knowing who may see it, or what 
will happen next. 
Implications for Composition Pedagogy 
 Because successful vlogging demands that composers make themselves 
publicly vulnerable, and because vlogs can be always be remixed and 
recontextualized, composition teachers should probably never require students to 
vlog. In one of my own courses, a mention of a possible vlogging assignment 
prompted a mini-mutiny, causing students to shift uncomfortably in their seats 
as they contemplated the possibility of sitting before a blinking webcam, and 
opening themselves up to whatever lay behind it. Wesch, who enlisted 
undergraduate research assistants to study and produce vlogs, showed similar 
caution, allowing some student-researchers to withdraw from the second, 
participatory portion of the research. “Some students were unable or unwilling to 
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participate in this aspect of the research because of the deeply personal 
challenges of self-analysis the process requires” (21-22). Wesch’s study reminds 
us that vlogging is risky not only because it involves making ourselves vulnerable 
to publics—but also because vlogging makes us vulnerable to ourselves, forcing us 
into an intimate (and possibly uncomfortable) encounter with our own bodies 
and voices, our own ideas and emotions. Because of the vulnerability it demands, 
and because the possibility of undesired remix and virality is ever-present, 
assigned vlogging just doesn’t seem to fit within the composition course. 
 This does not mean, however, that instructors should always discourage 
students from vlogging. In courses that invite students to compose for public 
spheres, for example, composition teachers might offer students the option to 
compose vlogs, as long as vlogging remains one alternative among others (i.e., 
letters to the editor), and as long as the instructor helps student-vloggers 
appreciate vlogging’s characteristic vulnerabilities and risks. 
 As my fifth chapter on rants suggests, perhaps the best way to gradually 
introduce students to vlogging is to first invite them to participate in the broader 
vlogging ceremonial—to contribute comments, to create playlists, to embed and 
link to and discuss videos—before they produce their own vlogs. This kind of 
immersive participation will help students recognize the conventions of vlogging 
genres, but equally important, it will help them to recognize the consequences of 
vlogging—its risks as well as its rewards. Furthermore, when students participate 
immersively in the vlogging ceremonial, they will come to appreciate how its 
various components interrelate, witnessing the complex interactions that arise 
between genres and utterances. They will realize that what is said or shown in a 
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video is never the end of the story, at least not if that video is successful and finds 
itself some viewers. Rather, the video is only the opening statement in a complex 
and ongoing conversation. It is a starting point for discussion, dissection, and 
redaction. It is material supplied for generative reposting and remixing. Students 
may believe they already know how to rant or react, how to confess or bear 
witness or apologize. By participating immersively, however, they will learn that 
these seemingly familiar genres of speech and emotion, through the alchemy of 
remediation, take on new meanings and new movements within the vlogging 
ceremonial. Only once students understand this, once they have witnessed and 
participated in these broader rhetorical processes, will they will be adequately 
prepared to sit before their webcam and press record—a seemingly simple act 
that nonetheless carries so many unanticipated consequences and complexities.  
 I want to conclude this dissertation with a proposal, by suggesting that this 
concept of immersive participation might be more widely relevant, that it might 
inform the teaching and learning of composition, even when vlogging, or the 
internet, or even computers, do not appear on the syllabus. As Freadman shows 
us, genres always participate in broader ceremonials. Just as reaction videos are 
enmeshed in a rhetorical network of comments, playlists, social media postings, 
and so on, so too are letters to the editor enmeshed with opinion pieces and news 
articles, subscription cards and advertisements, submission guidelines and 
editorial style sheets. Conference presentations are likewise enmeshed with calls 
for papers and conference programs, published session reviews, Q&A sessions, 
and (more recently) conference-related social media posts. Inviting students to 
immersively participate in these broader rhetorical networks, these ceremonials, 
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would allow them to better understand and appreciate the genres we ask them to 
compose in. Participating immersively compels composers to chart the 
conventions of genres, to map their circulations, to witness their complex 
interrelationships, and to appreciate their possible consequences—all valuable 
experiences that will help students to create more effective and mature 
compositions, to avoid rhetorical “accidents,” and to understand exactly what it is 
they are sending out into the world. While vlogging might seem the most isolated 
and self-expressive of all genres, electronic or otherwise, when studied more 
closely, vlogging actually reminds us that genres—and the people who compose 
them—are profoundly interconnected. Vlogging reminds us that it is immersive 
participation, rather than imitation or rote memorization, that offers apprentice 
composers the most valuable path into the complex and dynamic realms of real-
world rhetoric. 
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